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ABSTRACT
The subject of this thesis is the relationship between the Conservative dominated 
National Government and the Conservative Press in Britain during the Spanish Civil 
War. This thesis takes issue with previous findings that during the late 1930s the 
government was successful in manipulating the press. By focusing on the civil war 
however, it becomes clear how limited government influence actually was, even 
amongst its traditional allies. This was a cause of concern to a government, which 
realized that improved relations between Britain and the western dictator states 
depended to a great extent on its ability to influence the way, in which foreign affairs 
were reported, especially events in Spain. As a result of this study, the following 
conclusions can be made. Firstly, as already stated, the government was only partially 
successful in securing the reporting of events in a way that would not undermine 
appeasement, the central plank of British foreign policy at this time. Quite simply, 
the dictators failed to grasp the limitations of an accountable government’s power in a 
parliamentary state. Secondly, and paradoxically, the relationship between Britain 
and the ‘New Spain’ was poor, even though British policy during the civil war had 
aided the victory of Franco. The conservative press bore some responsibility for this. 
Thirdly, the war caused divisions, which cut across established ideological lines 
within the conservative movement. Since party discipline ensured the support of 
conservatives within Parliament, it was within the press, with its freedom from 
government control, that these divisions were most evident. Inevitably, therefore, as 
the war progressed, conservative papers actually contributed to the growing anti- 
Franco and anti-fascist sentiment among the British public. The civil war was thus a 
period during which, far from achieving the support of the press for its policies, the 
government became increasingly frustrated as it saw its foreign policy being 
undermined.
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CHAPTER ONE: GOVERNMENT AND MEDIA IN EARLY TWENTIETH 
CENTURY BRITAIN.
The subject of this thesis is the relationship between the Conservative dominated 
National Government, in power in Britain during the later thirties, and the 
conservative press. Particular reference will be made to the way in which the Spanish 
Civil War of 1936-9 caused that relationship to change. Indeed the Civil War had a 
tremendously divisive impact on British society, a phenomenon almost unprecedented 
in modem British history.1 The divisions provoked by the outbreak of the war cut 
across traditional party political loyalties, so that by the last months of the conflict the 
majority of the British public, regardless of political convictions, was sympathetic 
towards the Republican side. Publicly, on the issue of the Spanish Civil War, the 
government was committed to a policy of neutrality. It was a cynical policy, aimed at 
lulling its domestic critics. Yet it failed to convince them and, as we shall see in later 
chapters, growing popular sympathy for the Spanish Republic would be a cause of 
poor Anglo-Spanish relations following the final victory of Franco in the spring of 
1939. It has been suggested that, both before and after the outbreak of fighting there, 
class and ideology had a profound influence in shaping the views and policies of the 
British government towards Spain.2 Indeed the election of the coalition under Manuel 
Azana in February of 1936 provoked alarm among government and business circles in 
Britain. These circles were to become increasingly concerned at the threat to private 
property in Spain. This was especially important given that Britain had very 
substantial investment in that country.3
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The rising tide of Spanish social and economic unrest in the five years preceding the 
outbreak of the Civil War had made both investors and ministers nervous at the long­
term prospects for British interests. Hence the military rising of the Spanish generals 
in mid-July of 1936 was welcomed in London as a necessary counter revolution which 
would put an end to what appeared to be the threat of communism in Spain. 
However, as will be demonstrated, the unity among the British right-wing at the start 
of the rebellion was to be short lived. The conservative consensus rested on the 
assumption that the issue in Spain was clear-cut, namely that the Republican regime 
was clearly unable to contain its radical and revolutionary elements. These left-wing 
elements defending the Republic were, it appeared, as much opposed to a 
parliamentary democracy on the British model as the rebel generals. Hence, the 
insurgents were seen as the lesser of the two evils, for they seemed to pose no threat to 
foreign capitalist interests in the peninsula. However, the conservative consensus, 
shaped by a too simplistic ideological perception of the issues at stake, gradually 
broke down following the failure of Franco to take the Spanish capital in the late 
autumn, thereby turning what had been an insurrection into a prolonged civil war.
Among the opposition parties in Britain the main issue at stake was that a popularly 
elected government was confronted with an illegal and therefore treasonable rebellion 
by its army. Furthermore, the rebels were dependent for support from National 
Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy, at that time the two most dangerous European 
powers.4 Foreign intervention in Spain was both to transform the war and to prolong 
it. Outside aid to Franco from Germany and Italy was far more substantial than any 
aid reaching the legally recognised Republican government. Thus, Franco was to be 
increasingly identified with international fascism, which was to ensure at least a
superficial unity against him among the political opposition in Britain. Moreover, this 
identification of Franco as the most recent adherent to the club of fascist dictators was 
progressively to undermine support for him in British society as a whole. This was 
because the outbreak of the Civil War coincided with a gathering crisis in 
international relations in Europe. Both Italy and Germany had done much to provoke 
this by their flagrant breaches of the Paris peace settlements signed after the First 
World War. Initially, there had been substantial support in Britain for the grievances 
espoused by Hitler at the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles towards his adopted 
country.5 However, when the dictators moved from mere hyperbole to more 
aggressive and even militaristic means by which to achieve their goals this caused 
alarm in Britain, for what was being brought into focus was the potential of Germany 
and Italy to threaten the world power status of Britain and France. Although opinion 
polls were still in their infancy, those taken during the later thirties show that there 
was a progressive swinging around of opinion against the dictators.6 German and 
Italian intervention in Spain served only to encourage this trend. Not just the 
parliamentary opposition therefore, but millions of ordinary British people 
sympathised with the Spanish Republic in what they saw as its struggle against 
international fascism.
The scale of German and Italian involvement in Spain was to have three main effects. 
Firstly, it kept at the forefront of the political agenda the military and strategic threat 
posed by fascism to Britain and France in the Mediterranean. Secondly, the use of 
German and Italian aircraft to bomb undefended towns in Spain greatly influenced 
British public opinion. Horror at the devastation caused by these attacks also led to
• Qincreased public sympathy for the Republic. Thirdly, it was these strategic and
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humanitarian concerns provoked by intervention, which fuelled general anti-fascist 
sentiment in Britain. This was to have important consequences for Britain’s 
relationship with Germany and Italy, both of which the British government was 
attempting to appease. In order to avoid recourse to war, Neville Chamberlain, even 
more than his predecessor, Stanley Baldwin, consciously sought a new settlement 
between the western democratic powers and the fascist dictators. However, as we 
shall see, fascist intervention in Spain was to hinder the process of appeasement, 
souring relations between the western democracies and the dictator governments.
German and Italian intervention, precisely because it raised the prospect of a new 
balance of power in the western Mediterranean, which would be detrimental to Britain 
and France, meant that the war could no longer be viewed solely in those ideological 
terms, which had been the basis for the conservative consensus both within Parliament 
and without. Furthermore, there developed within the liberal and left-wing press, a 
consensus in support of the Spanish Republic. These newspapers even argued that 
Non-Intervention, far from being proof of the neutrality of the British government, 
was actually a means by which the government could prevent aid from reaching the 
Spanish Government. They also pointed to the failure of the British government to 
take effective steps to prevent either Germany or Italy from assisting Franco. 
Moreover, this liberal/left wing consensus was strengthened by the belief that because 
Franco was so dependent on the support of the Axis, the victory of the Republic was 
not only desirable on ideological grounds, but also a necessity for the security of both 
Britain and France.
As we shall see repeatedly in later chapters, among conservatives, the strategic 
implications of Axis power intervention had the opposite effect of undermining their 
consensus towards the Civil War.9 There was a shift in opinion even amongst those 
who at the start of the war had been among the most enthusiastic advocates of right- 
wing, and hence hostile, attitudes towards the Spanish Republic. Winston Churchill, a 
Conservative Member of Parliament and a journalist for newspapers of Conservative 
sympathies, clearly demonstrated this shift in his articles on international affairs 
written in the later thirties and published in Step By Step. In the articles written at the 
beginning of the war, Churchill, by adopting an entirely unsympathetic attitude 
towards the Republic, was typical of conservative opinion at the time. In The Spanish 
Tragedy, written August 10th 1936, Churchill contrasted the supporters of the Spanish 
Government: “the passions of a poverty-stricken and backward proletariat 
[demanding] the overthrow of Church, State and property, and the inauguration of a 
Communist regime” with the supporters of the rebellion: “the patriotic, religious and 
bourgeois forces under the leadership of the army, and sustained by the countryside in 
many provinces.”10 Later, on October 2nd, Churchill suggested that the atrocities 
committed in the name of the Republic were far worse than those committed by the 
rebels, for “they cannot be accused of having fallen to the level of committing the 
atrocities which are the daily handiwork of the Communists, Anarchists, and the 
P.O.U.M.”11
Yet by November 1937, Churchill was writing more favourably about the Republic: 
“it is just as wrong to call the Valencia and Catalonian Governments a mob of savage 
bolshevists as to dub the Nationalist Movement a mere body of rebels, traitors and 
reactionaries.”12 Furthermore, by the end of 1938 Churchill’s opinion had shifted
once again, to what now amounted to a complete reversal of his earlier writings on the 
war. Churchill, having shifted from his original position of sympathy for the rebels to 
one of seeing both points of view, had by the latter stages of the war reached the 
conclusion that the Nationalists posed a serious threat to British interests. Indeed his 
writings in this period demonstrate actual hostility towards them. Thus, on December 
30th 1938, he declared, “it would seem today that the British Empire would run far 
less risk from the victory of the Spanish Government than from that of General 
Franco.”13 In expressing concern at the threat of Axis power intervention in Spain to 
the long-term interests of both Britain and France in the Mediterranean, Churchill was 
adopting a position very similar to that of the Liberal and Labour opposition in 
Parliament and the liberal/ socialist press.14 As will be shown later, Churchill was one 
of a number of Conservatives who came to the conclusion that the strategic risks 
threatened by the victory of Franco far outweighed any threat to foreign investment 
that would be posed by a victorious Republic.15
The historiography of government and press relations in the inter-war period in Britain 
is relatively sparse, a reflection of the scarcity of sources. Indeed much of the contact 
between ministers and officials on the one hand, and with journalists, proprietors and 
editors on the other, was of an informal nature and, as a result, went unrecorded. F.R. 
Gannon’s, The British Press and Nazi Germany 1936-1939 was, therefore, a very 
important breakthrough in a relatively unexplored area.16 However, the study is almost 
exclusively concerned with the reaction of the press towards Germany, with little 
discussion on either the interplay between government and press or the attempts of the 
government to influence newspapers to adopt a particular line. Therefore, Cockett’s 
Twilight o f Truth, published nearly twenty years later, was a substantial development
of the debate, precisely because it undertook an in depth exploration of the means of 
contact between official/government circles and the press. In so doing, it drew 
important conclusions concerning the role of British newspapers in their attempts at 
appeasing Germany. It also drew attention to the implications of a government in a 
parliamentary state using its influence on newspaper proprietors to persuade them to 
exert pressure on their editors to damp down the reporting of the actions of those 
dictators whom Chamberlain was trying to appease. However, in both of these books 
the focus is almost entirely on Anglo-German relations. Despite its narrow focus, 
Twilight o f Truth in its examination of the relationship between the government and
17the press in Britain in the 1930s arrives at conclusions about the period as a whole. 
Where the study of government and press relations is concerned, the Spanish Civil 
War, in sharp contrast to the importance accorded to the reporting of Nazi Germany,
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has been a neglected area.
In recent years there have been a number of new studies on the role of Britain and its 
government during the Civil War. Two examples are Neutralidad benevola and La 
perfidia de Albion,19 which, to some extent, supported the conclusions made by 
previous writers on Britain’s role in the war. Among historians in general, therefore, 
there has emerged an agreed opinion that official British perception of the Civil War 
was influenced by an ideological hostility towards the Republican government in 
Madrid. This consensus among historians also holds that Non-Intervention concealed 
a tacit preference in British government circles for the victory of Franco. There has, 
however, been very little consideration in previous studies of the role of the British 
press. Indeed, Jill Edwards, in The British Government and The Spanish Civil War, is 
very dismissive of the idea that official circles in London paid much attention to the
way in which the press reported on the war. In specific reference to the British press 
she argues that “[it] could be manipulated without much difficulty when necessary. 
Often the Government received unlooked-for support, even from the left-wing 
press”.21 The lack of studies specializing in government and press relations is 
demonstrated in the most recent contribution to the debate, Buchanan’s Britain and 
the Spanish Civil War?2 In its bibliographical survey of the literature on British 
responses towards the conflict, there are cited only five books dealing with the media. 
Although four of these focus on the press, only one, Herbert Routledge Southworth’s 
Guernica! Guernica! A study o f Journalism, Diplomacy, Propaganda and Illusion 
refers specifically to the Civil War. This last example, albeit an important study on the 
development of the controversy following the destruction of this Basque town, does 
not refer to the long-term implications of the way in which British press reporting of 
this event influenced the relationship between press and government.23
The lack of attention paid to the relationship between the government and the press 
during the Civil War is regrettable on several counts. Firstly, the nature of events that 
unfolded during the Spanish struggle was such as to place the relationship under great 
strain. Secondly, studies that have concentrated on the impact of the press on Anglo- 
German relations during the later thirties have, by largely ignoring British press 
reporting of German intervention in Spain, failed to take into account the considerable 
impact made on Anglo-German relations by the Civil War. Finally, by ignoring the 
divisive effect of the Civil War on British society, a division that after all was fuelled 
by debate within the press, previous studies have arrived at conclusions that suggest 
the relationship between government and press was much less complex than was 
actually the case. This study is hence an attempt to redress the balance.
The particular focus of this thesis will be on the conservative press and its reporting of 
the Nationalist side and its German and Italian allies. It has already been stated that 
the opposition parties and newspapers broadly supported the Republic. Therefore, 
among the opposition, differences were confined to debating the extent to which this 
support should be translated into practical measures to aid the Republic. In sharp 
contrast to this, the divisions within conservative ranks were over whether to support 
the Republic or Franco. Therefore, for conservatives, both within the party and the 
press, the dilemma was whether or not openly to criticize the policy of Non- 
Intervention, which would mean challenging the Conservative-dominated 
government. However, divisions were to emerge in the Conservative Party over 
appeasement and these in turn were to undermine what consensus there was within the 
conservative press in support of government policy on Spain. After all, the 
Conservative Party and its supporters were also influenced by the growth of 
opposition in Britain to what appeared to be the rise of more serious and militant 
forms of fascism in the later thirties. Thus, a study of government and press relations 
that focuses on the Civil War must lead to different conclusions from those studies 
which have failed to take the Civil War into account.24 A variety of evidence from 
British sources points to the belief that the failure of the government to maintain a 
consensus of support for its policy on Spain amongst even its nominal allies in the 
conservative press was to have a direct and damaging effect on its relations not only 
with the Axis powers, but also with the Nationalist regime, which emerged victorious 
after the Civil War.
Because this thesis is concerned with government and press relations, it is necessary 
to consider the role of the press within the mass media in inter-war Britain, and to 
examine different perceptions of that role within opposing political systems. The 
function of the mass media in a democracy as opposed to that in a fascist state was, 
fundamentally, a reflection of these two diametrically opposed systems of 
government. Whether in a democracy or a fascist dictatorship, newspapers tended to 
be privately owned, but in any dictatorship all forms of media communications were 
(and are) subjected to very extensive political control. Through such control, the 
government could reach out to the masses and also prevent the dissemination of 
opposing and ‘undesirable’ opinions, which might threaten the hegemony of the ruling 
elites.25 Within the democracies, political control of the media such as this was 
fiercely opposed. There was a great deal of public opposition to any form of press 
censorship in Britain, and newspapers were keen to defend themselves against the 
charge that they were bowing to government pressure. It was recognised that in a 
parliamentary state the press had a particularly important ‘social function’. The reader 
was to be provided with news upon which to form independent views.
During the period of the Civil War, the different perceptions of the media within these 
contrasting systems of government became a thorn in the flesh of international 
relations. One reason for this was the availability of British newspapers in Germany 
and Italy. The dilemma for editors was whether to print articles by resident 
correspondents publicizing the brutality of the fascist regimes. By raising public 
awareness in Britain, they risked generating opposition both from the dictators and 
also towards them. Moreover, British newspapers, precisely because they were 
available in Germany and Italy, provided a source of independent and critical press
comment unobtainable in the controlled press of these countries. Fundamental to the 
fascist dictatorships was the need to extend their influence beyond their borders. Not 
content with the high degree of control that they had over the media in their own 
countries, they sought to rein in the independent press of the democracies. On a 
number of occasions in the years of the Spanish Civil War, the dictators made it clear 
to the British government that the stable relations between nations, so desired by 
Neville Chamberlain, was dependent on his persuading the press to dampen down all 
criticism of their regimes. The fundamental basis of appeasement was the belief that 
peace was possible between opposing systems of government. Yet, ironically, in 
order to achieve success, it would be necessary for the British government to restrict 
the independent press, thereby emulating the methods of the dictatorship. It was an 
impossible demand; indeed the debate generated by the Spanish Civil War between 
the governments of Britain, Italy, Germany and eventually of Franco, served only to 
highlight the extent of the lack of understanding between these different forms of 
government.
Technological innovation in the early years of the century had a profound impact on 
mass communication. Culminating with the advent of television in 1936, the British 
public was confronted with the variety of media similar to that available today, 
although, of course, access to television and even to the wireless was much more 
restricted then. Nevertheless, the evolution of new forms of communication extended 
the means by which images, news and views could be conveyed. In the thirties, the 
increase in radio ownership, in particular, created a new phenomenon, the ability of 
one form of mass communication to reach a huge audience simultaneously. 
Moreover, the development of radio and newsreel created new responses from the
government. Governments were concerned with the impact of visual and aural forms 
of the media on the public. If harnessed in the interests of the state, they were a means 
of promoting social and political stability. Conversely, however, they also had the 
potential to pose a threat to domestic consensus and political stability. Technological 
advances within the media brought not only a much larger potential audience but also 
the power to shape opinion in large numbers of people. The sophistication of these 
advances spawned a variety of techniques by which public opinion could be subtly 
manipulated. The inter-war period saw the beginning of attempts to ascertain public 
opinion in a more scientific way.27 In the years following the First World War, within 
government and official circles in Britain, the belief was gaining ground that public 
opimon was a significant factor, which had to be taken into account. For example, 
public opinion was taken into consideration in decisions about rearmament in the 
thirties29 and also in the formulation of official policy towards the Spanish Civil War. 
In Moradellios’ La perfidia de Albion, for example, it has been argued that opposition 
within Britain to such a move made it impossible for the government to make public 
its preference for the victory of the Nationalist cause. That is why Non-Intervention 
had to be the cloak for the real policy of the government, which used its influence to 
prevent the Republic from securing supplies from abroad, whilst at the same time 
taking no action to stop British clearing banks from assisting the rebellion.30 In its 
broadsheet, How News is Produced, which appeared in October 1937, PEP 
highlighted
[the]growing practice of appointing highly-paid public relations officers, 
mainly in order to keep in touch with public opinion.. .and in some cases 
to try to influence the expression of criticisms in the press and elsewhere by 
discouraging their publication or by prompt and effective reply to possible 
starting-points of controversy.31
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The inter-war years saw the beginning of a genuine parliamentary democracy, with the 
extension, in 1928, of the franchise to women above the age of twenty-one. By 
claiming the democratic credentials of being the mouthpiece of public opinion, those 
who claimed to speak on its behalf, such as the writers of leader articles in the press, 
sought to add an air of authority to their views. Public opinion was exploited as a 
means of generating support for the views being expressed. Indeed Denys Thompson, 
formerly news editor of The Daily Mail, recognised this when in 1939 he wrote the 
following:
The newspapers regularly exploit [the] inclination to think and act as 
others do, in order to bluff their readers into accepting the required 
opinions. This accounts for the common use of such phrases as ‘public 
opinion is unanimous’, ‘The nation decides’, ‘The man in the street’. ...
‘The vast majority of thinking people’.32
In spite of the availability of alternative and, perhaps, more accessible forms of mass
communication, newspapers were still able to retain a very important hold over British
society. The press was recognised as the most important influence on the forming of
political opinions. Newspaper circulation also rose substantially in the six years
preceding the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. The PEP report on the press
published in April 1938 pointed out that between “1930 and 1936 the estimated
average circulation of all daily newspapers rose by some 1.44 millions, to 19.05
millions, and [at] the same time national Sunday newspapers increased by 0.48
millions to 14.4 millions.”34 The same report concluded, “in 1934 every 100 families
bought 95 morning and 5714 evening newspapers every day, and 130 Sunday
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newspapers every week.” The increase in circulation meant that newspapers had the 
potential to influence the views of the bulk of the population.
The British government recognized the power of the press. Therefore, it sought to 
influence the line taken by newspapers on a number of issues. For example, it will be 
shown in succeeding chapters how the government continually urged newspaper 
proprietors to ensure that their papers displayed greater sensitivity when reporting the 
actions of German and Italian troops in Spain. Yet not only was this pressure exerted 
on matters relating to foreign affairs but on domestic issues also. For example, at the 
outbreak of the Civil War the government was preoccupied with the abdication crisis. 
Whereas the American press was filled with gossip concerning the relationship 
between Edward VIE and the American divorcee, Wallis Simpson, the consensus 
within government and press circles in Britain was that there should be no coverage of 
this issue. The British press therefore remained silent about the affair until after the 
abdication in December 1936. Regular contact with newspapers was maintained in a 
variety of ways. More formal contacts were made through the lobby and through 
ministerial addresses to The Newspaper Proprietors’ Association. There were other, 
less formal but equally important contacts between the worlds of politics and the 
media that were maintained by ties of family, class and friendship. These contacts 
were exploited by those in official and government circles who wished to build 
consensus within the press in support of government policy. A more detailed 
consideration of these forms of contact will be the focus of the next chapter.
The support of the press, however, could not be taken for granted. Indeed, there were 
a number of factors that lessened the extent to which newspapers could be controlled 
by outside agencies. Firstly, newspapers represented one of the largest industries in 
Britain “with a net output surpassing that of shipbuilding and chemicals.”37 Such a 
powerful and wealthy industry was hardly likely to be easily cowed by the
government. Secondly, in the years after the ending of the First World War, 
newspapers were increasingly independent of the control of political parties. This was 
in direct contrast to the dominant trend in the early years of the century when family 
syndicates closely linked to a particular political party owned the majority of the 
London based daily newspapers. The reason for this change was the growth of 
advertising in the newspapers. Total capital spent on advertising in the press trebled 
between 1907-1938. This encouraged costs within the industry to rise, and in turn 
made newspapers far too expensive for political parties or their supporters to sustain. 
Hence, there arose the independent press barons such as Lords Beaverbrook and 
Rothermere. Both of these were nominally ‘Tory* in their politics, but nevertheless 
achieved political independence of the mainstream parties.38 Apart from these factors, 
the influence of the government on the press was further undermined by the lack of 
benefit to newspapers themselves in an arrangement that tied them too closely with 
the government. The government could offer editors advance information on policies 
and initiatives in return for their support. PEP recognised this in spring of 1938, yet 
noted that “this is comparatively little done, except in the case of The Times and the
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Daily Telegraph.” In any case it was in the interests of the government and officials 
to maintain contacts with representatives from a variety of newspapers, and not just 
with those whose journals either supported the government line, or whose editorial 
stance was broadly Conservative. Indeed the lobby was a means by which journalists 
from newspapers from across the political spectrum could be brought within a more 
formal relationship with the government. It will be shown how F.A Voigt, diplomatic 
correspondent for the Manchester Guardian and also a lobby correspondent, had 
particularly close access to the Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Robert 
Vansittart.
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The government could be very misleading in the information it was willing to 
disseminate even to its most loyal supporters in the press. This, of course, was a 
further factor undermining the trust of editors and journalists in news provided from 
official sources. It will be shown in chapter three that on a number of occasions the 
government made frequent attempts to manipulate the press by providing selective 
and thus in a sense ‘doctored* information. Journalists working on location could be 
better informed of the situation abroad than the government. In April 1937, for 
example, the evidence made available to the government that German aeroplanes had 
destroyed Guernica was largely due to the accurate reports sent back by The Times ’ 
correspondent, Steer. In a later episode, in the immediate aftermath of the war, The 
Times correspondent Philby was to write to Ralph Deakin at Printing House Square, 
of the inaccuracy of the reports sent back to London by British consular officials. In 
his view the pro rebel bias of the latter led them to gloss over the atrocities committed 
by the Nationalists.40 Given that there was little that it was prepared to offer to 
newspapers in return for their support, the government hoped to obtain their goodwill 
by “summoning a conference of editors and explaining its policy to them.”41 Indeed, 
given the developing international crisis in these years, this was to become a frequent 
occurrence.
The Government had to compete with a variety of influences in its effort to shape the 
presentation of news and views in British newspapers 42 It must be remembered that 
the pressure under which newspapers operated was a significant and constant factor. 
Newspapers operated within a tight time schedule, which imposed additional pressure, 
the need for selection of news and views to print meant that only a fraction of the
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items which came to the newspaper offices could ever be printed. In 1938, it was 
estimated that about 1 500 000 words came into the offices every day in the form of 
news or features, yet the total number of words printed in a large quality newspaper 
each day was 150 000 for The Times, and only about 70 000 for other quality 
newspapers.43 The fact that the main story could break late in the day posed an 
additional burden, enforcing last minute changes to the layout of the paper: “when a 
big story breaks late at night the whole aspect of the paper may be changed between 
the first and later editions.”
The government had to compete with commercial considerations for the attention of 
newspapers. The high costs of the newspaper industry and the need to attract 
advertisement revenue meant that proprietors had to be astute businessmen. Indeed 
because advertising was such an important source of revenue, representing about half 
the revenue in a popular paper in 1938, advertisers were “in a strong position for 
exercising pressure if they are so inclined,”44 Wickham Steed, formerly editor of The 
Times, went further when, in 1938, he referred to newspapers as units in “vast money 
making concerns.” In his opinion this was an unwelcome result of the increased 
influence of market pressures 45
The readership of the paper was an additional factor that editors and proprietors had to 
bear in mind. Indeed, this was noted by writers of a number of treatises on the press 
in this period. In general, however, there was disagreement over the extent to which 
the readers of a particular paper could exert influence over it. In March 1938, a PEP 
broadsheet, for example, concluded that the relationship between the press and the 
public was reciprocal; they influenced each other. The report stated on the one hand
that “the press, by its selection and treatment of news and features, moulds the
opinion of the public”, whilst on the other hand it concluded,
[thejpress is a highly competitive industry, run largely with a view to profit, 
and in some cases dominated by the pursuit of very high rates of profit. It 
must therefore follow public taste and has a strong temptation to appeal 
to the middle or lower ranges of public taste rather than take any risks of
• 46outstripping it.
That year, PEP also came to the conclusion that there was little difference in the tastes 
of readers of quality papers compared with those of the more popular publications, 
even “for the class newspapers the most popular topic was crime and divorce.” 47
The early years of the century witnessed the spread of consumer affluence in Britain, 
and, after the First World War especially, an increase in leisure time for the majority
* Q
of the population. This, in turn, meant that the majority could not only afford to 
purchase the products of the media, it also forced changes on the industry itself in 
order to exploit the demands now being made upon it. Thus, the media industry 
increasingly felt obliged to respond to what it perceived as changes in public taste. 
The means by which commercial culture engaged with its audience was done crudely, 
through the measurement of actual sales. To put it simply, it was a question of 
providing the public with what media tycoons believed the public demanded. The 
effect of this was far reaching on newspapers. For example, it altered the presentation 
of news, and this affected even the ‘class’ papers. Hence, it has been argued recently 
that far “from dictating the cultural preferences of their public, producers needed to 
bind themselves to the tastes of a diverse audience.” 49
At times, the competing pressures on the press led to conflict between the interests of 
the government and demands from other sources. According to PEP, circumstances
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forced newspapers to print reports before their accuracy could be checked. Hence, the 
“press works at the opposite end of the scale to the scientist, who may hardly care 
whether an account of his research appears in 1938,1939, or 1940 so long as it is, 
when published, as completely as possible unassailable by criticism.”50 We shall see 
how, in the case of the Spanish Civil War, coverage in the press of rumours of 
extensive German military penetration of Spanish Morocco in January 1937, for 
example, and later of the extent of unrest within Nationalist ranks in 1938, was not 
only misleading but was to cause considerable embarrassment to the British 
government in its relations with the dictator powers.
Given the need of newspapers to attract advertising revenue to meet costs, it has been 
suggested that outside financial and market pressures were so great that they exercised 
undue influence by encouraging the press to play down the seriousness of the 
international situation in the later thirties. At the time it was argued that “financially it 
was unwise or impossible for the British press to adopt a strongly critical line towards 
Nazi Germany; the readers did not want to read it and the intellectuals did not want to 
write it.”51 It has also been argued that the rapid economic recovery, which took place 
in Britain after the Great Depression at the beginning of the decade, meant “there was 
a natural desire to foster this recovery by creating a good psychological atmosphere.” 
Yet the report of the Royal Commission on the press in 1949 found no evidence that 
newspaper presentation of foreign news during the inter-war period was strongly 
influenced by commercial forces. After all, if such had been the case then the 
relationship between the government and the press during the Civil War would have 
been less fraught. If businessmen stood to gain from the creation of a sense of 
optimism about the prospects of peace with the dictators, the same could be said for
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the government, wary of the extreme sensitivity of foreign powers to criticism in the 
British press. Moreover, since there were very substantial investments at stake in 
Spain, there was the risk that British economic and financial predominance there 
would be undermined by Nationalist Spain’s preference for a stronger economic 
relationship with its ideological allies, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.
In the years immediately preceding the Civil War, it is clear that much of the 
conservative press reporting of international relations showed scant regard for any 
impact this might have on Anglo-German or Anglo-Italian relations. One example is 
the coverage of Italy’s invasion and conquest of Abyssinia in 1935-6. Since this was 
the first successful attempt by a fascist power to use force to expand its territory, it 
was a significant turning point in international relations. The Times, being very 
critical of the invasion, called upon the member states of the League of Nations to 
impose sanctions against Italy:” It must be plain to the whole World that Italy has left 
those nations who honour their word no choice but to take action against her.” The 
Daily Telegraph echoed the sentiments expressed in The Times. Its leader explained 
that the trouble “with Signor Mussolini [is] that whatever just grievances Italy may 
have against the League and against Abyssinia, his method of securing their redress 
has called forth the hearty reprobation of the whole World.”54 Both of these normally 
pro-government conservative papers 55 were highly critical of the Hoare Laval plan, 
by which Italy was to be bought off by promises of being permitted to keep such 
Abyssinian territory as she had overrun, providing she ended hostilities immediately.56 
The reaction of both newspapers to the publication of this plan was to claim to be 
representing a public opinion outraged at such a cynical manoeuvre. On December
til r . ,j •13 The Times leader pointed out that “the Government can hardly have mistaken the
depth and strength of the feeling raised by the general knowledge of the present 
proposals.” In addition, it warned that any “weakening in the support which this 
Country has given” towards sanctions, “will entail profound and bitter disillusionment 
and resentment at home, and lamentable injury overseas to the good repute of British 
Statesmanship and confidence in British sincerity.”57 The Daily Telegraph, whilst 
acknowledging that “the actual terms [of the plan] are not so unfavourable”, 
nevertheless, condemned them because “they represent such large concessions to the 
‘aggressor’,” and “what sticks in the throat, so to speak, is not that Italy will benefit, 
but that these gains may go to an ‘aggressor’ who has not conquered the Country, but
co
ex-hypothesi cannot be stopped, while the international brigade stood and watched.”
The conservative newspapers could also be critical at the growing restiveness of the 
National Socialist regime in power in Germany after 1933. Following the German 
remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936, the leader comment of the Yorkshire 
Post was thus, “[the] German military reoccupation of the demilitarized zone has 
created a situation throughout Europe of the utmost gravity...” and, moreover, “the 
people of Great Britain cannot look upon the endangering of the peace of Europe as a 
matter of no concern to themselves.”59 Even the right wing Observer had, from 1933, 
taken a hostile line towards the revision of the Treaty of Versailles in Germany’s 
favour. This was because, as Garvin, the editor, pointed out in February 1936, Hitler 
was the main cause of instability in Europe. Following the German remilitarization in 
1936, Garvin declared that Britain must “consider Herr Hitler’s proposals in a spirit of 
sympathy and goodwill.” Nevertheless, from the spring of that year, he was to give 
the theme of British rearmament the highest priority in the paper. Whilst now 
acknowledging the importance of an accommodation with Germany if possible, he
stressed also that the “first need for Britain is to repair her defences.”60 The Sunday 
Times made a more conscious effort to play down the significance of the German 
action in its leader on March 9th, the title, ‘No real Crisis’, being a clear attempt to 
diffuse alarm over the issue 61. Nevertheless, Hadley, the editor, “demanded of 
Germany proof of her peaceful intentions”, adding that “if such proofs proved 
unforthcoming”, then “the powers wedded to peace will have to consolidate their joint 
action for defending it. To stand firmly together may for Great Britain, Belgium, 
France, Russia or Czechoslovakia be the only alternative to their being shot at 
singly.” The stand taken at times by the leader columns in the conservative press on 
the issue of the militaristic actions of the dictators had long lasting and detrimental 
effects on international relations. The press campaign in Britain against Italy over 
Abyssinia, for example, triggered a campaign against Britain by the controlled press 
of Italy.63
The freedom of the press to report on the international situation in a way that risked 
undermining public confidence in peace and prosperity, even though this worked 
against the financial interests of the advertisers, was a freedom not shared by radio 
and newsreel.64 Given its primacy over other forms of communication, the lack of 
effective constraint on the press was even more significant.
In the mid thirties the nearest rival to the press in the dissemination of news was, of 
course, the BBC. Each had the capability to reach a large and regular audience on a 
daily basis. Writing on the merits of the BBC, Wickham Steed noted that “the public 
appeal of broadcasting lies in its independence of money making considerations.” He 
was making the assumption that broadcasting, being a public corporation, was
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therefore entirely immune from the economic pressures that constrained newspapers
and newsreel companies. Yet, financial independence is only one aspect of
independence, it was still necessary for the BBC to respond to the tastes of its public
in the same way as newspapers and newsreels.65 There were other, more serious
constraints on its freedom. Although in 1928 the ban, originally imposed in 1926, on
BBC broadcasting of controversial matters was lifted:
the BBC had to face continuing government interference in the broad­
casting of political issues whilst at the same time it failed to gain 
reasonable access to politicians because of the inability of the main 
parties to agree on an equitable means of sharing air time”.66
Until 1938, political control over the BBC was reinforced by the power of a 
government minister, the Postmaster General, to intervene in order to suppress news 
items and to place a veto on speeches containing statements on topics of political 
controversy. The correspondence in the files of the Prime Minister’s office relating to 
broadcasting policy demonstrates that there was reluctance to give the BBC greater 
freedom to debate foreign policy. From February of 1939, the BBC was permitted to 
arrange for a microphone to be placed at the disposal of the three main political parties 
once a month, for a period of forty-five minutes. However, ‘foreign affairs’ was 
excluded from the list of acceptable topics for these discussions: “on the grounds that 
broadcasts on this subject in the present state of affairs would be unwise, and that 
personal subjects in the House of Commons e.g. the Sandys' case, should also be 
banned.” 67 In fact, so tight was the government’s control over the BBC that, in the 
opinion of the Director General, “it is uncomfortably near the truth to say that the 
decision who should speak is in the hands of the Prime Minister”. R.C. Norman was 
here referring specifically to the inability of opposition spokesmen and backbench 
Conservative critics of the government to voice their opinions on the BBC. The
restrictions on the BBC were such that it was not allowed to broadcast on contentious 
issues, which “are daily canvassed in the press.”68
In official circles, newsreel was considered to be a particularly influential medium. 
As a result newsreel companies “found themselves in a very different position from 
their colleagues in Fleet Street. There was great sensitivity about the presentation of 
any political issue through the medium of film.”69 Because “the cinema was regarded 
as an exceptionally potent means of communication and of propaganda for that reason 
newsreels had to evolve an entirely different pattern of behaviour from the 
newspaper.” Newsreel companies came under considerable official and commercial 
pressures to avoid creating the impression of an international crisis. In a competitive 
market, any newsreel “which could not be absolutely relied upon to provide its 
customers with the staple items [of] royalty, the annual calendar of the sporting and 
ceremonial events of British life would rapidly find that the customers had gone
70elsewhere.” Moreover, “newsreel companies were run by their parent companies as
71a break-even advertising unit to keep their names before the cinema goers.” Hence, 
the commercial pressure “to give the public what it, or rather what the cinema-owners
said it wanted” was particularly strong. Throughout the 1930s there were repeated 
demands for a more formal means of censorship over the newsreels.72 This, in turn, 
made the companies reluctant to do anything that might provide justification for the 
restricting of their freedom, although a voluntary form of self-censorship was to 
achieve similar results. Indeed, even without a more formalised form of censorship, 
“by the 1930s a skilfully constructed and sophistically conducted system of censorship 
developed under the British Board of Film Censors.”73 Political control by the 
government was reinforced by the fact that newsreels “unlike newspapers, depended
for much of their news material, the actual news footage, on the active co-operation of 
various government agencies.” 74
It is difficult to be precise concerning how far any form of mass media was able to 
exert influence over the population. Between 1938-9 the circulation of daily 
newspapers averaged 10.48 million daily, whilst that of the Sunday papers stood at 
13.59 million.75 Given that in 1931 the population stood at just under 45 million, it 
would appear that only a minority of the total population bought newspapers. Even 
so, the PEP report on the press in 1938 estimated that in London, about 80% of the 
adult population saw a morning newspaper and approximately half saw an evening 
paper.77 Little is known, for example, of how closely read they were by individuals,
78although a survey of readers was carried out in London in 1934. There are also 
problems in assessing the impact of the cinema. Between 1934-39 the average weekly 
figure for cinema audiences went up from 18.5 million to between 20 and 23 
million.79 However, in a survey published in November 1938 in which respondents 
were questioned on the frequency of their visits to the cinema, only 49% said they 
went once a week or more, 39% went less than once a week, and a significant 
minority, 12%, never went at all.80 The figures do not assess the actual impact of the 
films and newsreel footage on those who did attend. An assessment of the impact of 
radio also presents problems. During this decade radio licences increased to a total of 
8.9 million.81 As in the case of newspapers, it is probable that radio catered for 
different types of audience; for example, depending on choice, it might be used solely 
for listening to music. Of all the forms of media communication available, the 
advantage of radio over its rivals was its potential to reach a very large audience 
simultaneously. Even so, the BBC was subjected to competition by foreign radio
stations such as Radio Luxembourg, and Radio Normandie. In 1935, Radio 
Luxembourg claimed it could reach the whole of the United Kingdom.82 Thus, 
despite being a chartered corporation and therefore in possession of a legally 
recognised monopoly, the BBC had no monopoly of access to the millions of radio 
sets in Britain. Regardless of the influence which different forms of the media were 
able to exert, it must also be remembered that in many households people would be 
subjected to the competing influences of radio, newspapers and cinema. As such, it 
would be difficult to extrapolate the individual influence of each and, in any case, it is 
likely that to some extent they reinforced each other.
Ultimately, the development of other forms of mass media in the Twentieth Century 
would lead to the displacement of the press as the principal means of information by 
which people formed their opinions. The substantial growth in cinema audiences and 
that of radio and even the advent of television, all within the thirties, presaged what 
was the beginning of a new era. Yet at the time of the Spanish Civil War, the press 
was still a vitally important source of influence and information. Indeed, it was its 
independence of political control, a freedom denied to its rivals, which made it 
particularly powerful. It would also appear, from the variety of journals on offer, that 
the press was better placed than its rivals to cater for tastes across the social spectrum. 
In contrast, the BBC, by focussing on a more middle class audience, “failed to become 
the mass medium which in terms of its technology it could have been.”83 Analysis of 
the correlation between social class and cinema, strongly suggests that the audiences 
were predominantly working class. The influence the press was considered to have on 
opinion, both at home and abroad, led the government to cultivate close relations with 
newspapers, with the aim of building support for its policy on Spain. However, the
aim of achieving general press consensus was to prove unrealistic. The partisan nature 
of Britain’s political culture in this period, when even foreign affairs had become an 
issue dividing political parties, was to undermine any attempt at achieving general 
support for government policy towards the Spanish Civil War. Hence, the 
government was forced to rely increasingly on support from those conservative 
newspapers which were broadly in sympathy with the outlook of the Conservative 
dominated coalition government. The next chapter, therefore, will focus particularly 
on the development of the relationship between the government and the conservative 
press up to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE CONSERVATIVE PRESS BETWEEN THE WORLD
WARS.
For the purposes of both this chapter and the thesis as a whole, the term conservative 
press includes both those newspapers which were under the direct editorial control of the 
Conservative Party and those which claimed to uphold conservative principles. In terms 
of ownership, the latter were entirely independent of the Conservative Party. This chapter 
will focus on two main areas: firstly, the relationship between the government and the 
conservative press throughout the period; secondly, the alignment and discourse of the 
conservative press during the first year of the Spanish Civil War.
In the inter-war period, there was a plethora of newspapers available to the British public. 
The leading national conservative newspapers, which form the basis of this thesis, were 
members of large newspaper chains, which included of course the provincial press. The 
largest of the newspaper chains were those of Baron Beaverbrook and Viscount 
Rothermere, both of whom were Conservative press barons. In 1938, for example, the 
daily circulation of the London papers owned by Beaverbrook was as follows; The Daily 
Express, 2,329 000 and the Evening Standard, 392 000. Beaverbrook also owned the 
Sunday Express which had a weekly circulation of 1, 337 000.1 In addition, Beaverbrook 
owned some provincial newspapers. The nearest rival in the conservative press was 
Associated Newspapers Limited, owned by Rothermere. Beaverbrook was determined 
that his Daily Express should supersede its rival, the Daily Mail. As part of the campaign 
to encroach upon the latter’s market, the Daily Express began openly to attack the Daily 
Mail. 2 In 1929, the Daily Mail had the largest daily circulation of all conservative papers
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at 1, 954 635. However, throughout the decade, the growth in the circulation figures of 
the Daily Express had been more substantial. Between 1922-9, circulation more than 
doubled, reaching a figure of over 1.5 million. Within the same period, the circulation for 
the Daily Mail grew by less than 200 000. By 1933, Beaverbrook was able to achieve his 
goal, and by August 1939, the Daily Express, with a daily sale of 2 543 000, was 
substantially the largest British newspaper in circulation.
Rothermere and Beaverbrook had cornered the more popular market; the circulation of 
their newspapers by far outstripped that of the quality conservative press. However, 
during the 1930s, newspapers such as The Times, the Daily Telegraph, and the Observer 
were considered to have an influence far above their relatively small circulation. As will 
be explained later, this was as a result of the intimacy of contact that existed between the 
quality conservative press and conservative ministers. Therefore, it was to these 
newspapers, especially The Times of London, that foreign governments looked for 
indications of what the British Government was thinking.
In terms of circulation figures, until January 1937, Associated Newspapers, which 
included The Daily Telegraph, the Sunday Times, the Financial Times and Kelly's 
Directory, dominated the quality market. In January, daily sales of the Daily Telegraph 
reached 520 000.4 This by far surpassed the highest figure reached by its rival, The Times, 
whose average daily circulation before the Second World War was never higher than 200 
000.5 From 1922 to 1939 the Daily Telegraph continued dramatically to increase its 
circulation reaching 750 000 by 1939.6 Allied Newspapers was predominantly a family
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concern, the Berry Brothers, Viscounts Kemsley and Camrose, were in partnership with 
Edward Illife. When, in January 1937, the partnership was amicably dissolved, Illife 
acquired 10% of the shares in the Daily Telegraph, and became proprietor of Kelly’s 
Directory. Viscount Camrose took the controlling interest in both the Daily Telegraph 
and the Financial Times, whilst his brother acquired the Sunday Times, of which he was 
editor in chief, and also the Daily Sketch.1 Camrose, therefore, emerged as owner of the 
leading quality newspaper in Britain. His brother, who was chairman of Kemsley 
Newspapers, owned the Sunday Times, the leading conservative weekly, together with a 
substantial share of the provincial press. Indeed, by 1947, Kemsley Newspapers had 
emerged as the largest newspaper chain in Britain.8
At best, circulation figures provide no more than a rough guide to the influence of a 
newspaper. The Yorkshire Post, with a very small circulation of less than 30 000, was one 
of the more influential newspapers of the period, because, in contrast to other mainstream 
conservative papers, it was prepared to take an independent stand.9 Among the business 
and farming community of the north of England the Yorkshire Post was the leading daily 
newspaper.10
Collectively, conservative newspapers had a much greater total circulation than journals 
of either liberal or socialist political affiliations. Taking into consideration national daily 
newspapers, the total circulation of conservative newspapers per day in 1938 was 
6 571 000. The weekly sale of national conservative Sunday papers, for the same year, 
was 1 826 000. The Sunday Pictorial, owned by The Mirror Group [socialist], had a
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circulation of 1 400 000. This was a greater weekly sale than that of its nearest rival, the 
conservative Sunday Express [1 337 000]. However, newspapers that either adhered to 
conservative principles or were owned by proprietors who did so, dominated the 
newspaper world.11
During the inter-war period, the term conservative was a vague one. Used as a descriptor 
for a distinct category of newspaper within the British press, it encompassed papers 
representing a multiplicity of views. This was precisely, because, politically, there was 
no clear, monolithic definition of what Conservatism was. Indeed, it is not clear if 
Conservatism has a definite ideological basis. Therefore, conservative newspapers had 
considerable autonomy in coming up with their own, individual interpretation of 
conservative principles. Moreover, it was most unusual for a newspaper to have 
formalized links with the Conservative Party. It was even possible for newspapers to 
adopt a highly critical view of the policy pursued by Baldwin and later Chamberlain and 
still be considered as conservative newspapers. This was because there was not a unified 
conservative view on foreign policy, and as we have seen in the previous chapter, still 
less on the Spanish Civil War.
As we shall see in succeeding chapters, the conservative press was to remain divided on 
the issue of the Civil War. A greater degree of consensus within the conservative camp 
was achieved but, even then, only to a limited extent, in 1937-8, with the incorporation of 
the Morning Post with the, then pro-government, Daily Telegraph.12 The Morning Post 
had been a critic of the government of Baldwin. In the spring of 1937, it had considered
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the government’s opposition to Franco’s blockade of Bilbao as unacceptable intervention 
on behalf of the Spanish Republic.13 In fact, under Baldwin, conservative press criticism 
towards the government’s Spanish policy was to come from those newspapers that were 
sympathetic to the Spanish rebels. This category included the occasional opposition of 
the Morning Post, the Daily Mail and the Observer.
The Newspaper Press Directory, an annual publication in which are listed the national 
and provincial newspapers of Britain, gives a misleading impression of the political 
principles of many of them. The Daily Express, the Daily Mail, The Times and the 
Sunday Times,u for example, are not indicated as holding conservative principles, 
although of course they did. Apart from the Daily Mail, for which no principles are 
listed, these newspapers are listed as independent. This is accurate only in regard to the 
ownership. The directory describes the Daily Telegraph as holding independent 
conservative principles, while the Morning Post is referred to as ‘Conservative’. 
Gwynne, the editor of the Morning Post, defined the principles of his paper as 
‘independent Conservative’.15 In terms of its stance on government policy on the Civil 
War, the Morning Post was actually much closer to being independent conservative [with 
a small ‘c’] than the Daily Telegraph. A more accurate reflection of the political loyalties 
of the two leading quality conservative daily newspapers was made by PEP. In its report 
on the press in 1938, it considered the political affiliations of national newspapers. In its 
opinion, both The Times and the Daily Telegraph were supportive of the National 
Government.16 With regard to British policy on Spain 1936-7, the attitude of some 
conservative papers indicates a rather different interpretation of the partisan attachments
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and political allegiances of the conservative press. The Times, the Daily Telegraph and 
the Sunday Times, given the consistency of their support to all aspects of government 
policy towards the Civil War, should be regarded as strongly pro-government. The effect 
of this was to make them into a form of free propaganda for the government. On the 
other hand, the Daily Mail, the Daily Express, the Morning Post and the Observer, 
because of their propensity to criticize government policy, were actually much closer to 
being independent conservative. They would support the government only in so far as its 
policy corresponded to their own definitions of conservative principles.
In terms of the standpoint being adopted on the Spanish Civil War, it is possible to divide 
the conservative press into three broad categories. Given the controversial and divisive 
nature of that conflict, the boundaries were not static. As we shall see later, it was 
possible for newspapers to change category in response to their changing perception of 
the war and in relation to how they viewed British Government policy towards it. 
However from the outbreak of the revolt until the resignation of Baldwin as Prime 
Minister, the alignment within the conservative press was relatively constant.
The first of the three categories concerns the one journal that was closely associated with 
political Conservatism and in effect was a party political publication. This was the
I n
Truth. The decision to acquire, for the Conservative Party, the control of the shares in 
The Truth Publishing Company was taken by Sir Joseph Ball, in June 1936. Ball’s early 
career was in British intelligence and then in 1924, the Conservative Party Chairman, 
J.C.C. Davidson, recruited him to run an intelligence service within Conservative Party
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Headquarters, the purpose of which was to infiltrate the Communist Party and Labour 
Party Headquarters. In 1930, he was to become the director of the newly established 
Conservative Research Department and from then on he was to become “Chamberlain’s 
closest and most indispensable political adviser.”18 Under Ball’s direction, Truth was to 
become the leading Conservative weekly review in the second half of the 1930s.19 The 
connection between Truth and the Conservative Government under Chamberlain 
remained unknown even to the board of the National Publicity Bureau whose funds had 
been used to purchase the shares in the first place. Ball, a close friend of Neville 
Chamberlain, was to ensure Truth was to become the mouthpiece for the expression of 
Chamberlain’s views, and that it would also be used to discredit Chamberlain’s political 
opponents.20 The expectation was that the paper would identify closely with current 
Conservative Party policy.
A second category into which conservative papers could fall was that of conservative by
inclination. In reality, these newspapers were almost as closely tied to the Conservative
government as the former category. For the government, this was the most important
category, precisely because it included influential papers such as The Times, the Daily
Telegraph, the Yorkshire Post and the Sunday Times. Ties of kinship and friendship
played a key role in cementing the bonds between newspapers in this group and the
Conservative Party. Until the dissolution of their partnership in 1937, the Newspaper
Empire of the Berry brothers in association with Edward Iliffe, dominated this category.
Both Berry brothers were closely associated with the leading figures in political
01Conservatism. Camrose was a friend of Baldwin. Furthermore, Neville Chamberlain,
46
whom Camrose first met in 1930, was to become one of his main informants on political
99affairs. Camrose was also a close friend of Sir Winston Churchill, and remained so even
9^when the latter became a fervent critic of Chamberlain’s foreign policy. Camrose’s
friendship with Churchill notwithstanding, the Daily Telegraph continued to defend the
government line on Spain. Both Berry brothers were members of The Carlton Club, a
Tory political club founded in 1832.24 Also a member of this club was the editor of the
0 ^Daily Telegraph, Arthur Watson. Kemsley was on close terms with Chamberlain, and 
so too was the editor of the Sunday Times, William Waites Hadley. When Chamberlain 
became Prime Minister, Hadley saw him on a weekly basis.26
The Astors, a newspaper dynasty of Anglo-American descent, was the other dominant 
family in this category of the conservative press. John Jacob Astor, was co-proprietor of 
The Times. His elder brother, Waldorf, Viscount Astor, was the proprietor of the 
Observer. JJ. Astor, a member of the Carlton Club, had, since 1922, been Conservative 
Member of Parliament for Dover.27 The editor of The Times, Geoffrey Dawson, was 
especially close to the centre of political Conservatism.28 Even before Halifax’s 
promotion to Foreign Secretary in February 1938, his friendship with Dawson had played 
an important part in paving the way for close contact between the editor and the 
government. This was because Halifax, as Lord Privy Seal, had a role to play in policy 
formulation at the Foreign Office. Halifax also deputized for Eden when the latter was on 
holiday. Dawson met with Halifax virtually every day. Both men had strikingly similar 
backgrounds, which helped to shape a common outlook on government and world affairs. 
Both were old Etonians, both had read ‘Greats’ at Oxford, were fellows both of All
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Souls’ Oxford and Eton College.29 The official History of The Times refers to the vitally
important contact between Dawson and Halifax:
Halifax was a tried and intimate friend of Dawson’s, an old member of the 
circle of imperialist Conservatives in which Dawson had mixed for a 
generation.. .contact between the paper and the Foreign Office became as 
close in the next two years as it had ever been.. .it was maintained at this 
personal level by a daily visit to senior officials from the diplomatic 
correspondent or his deputy.
It was through his association with Halifax, that Dawson came to know Neville 
Chamberlain. Dawson was in close contact with Chamberlain during the latter’s 
premiership, and was in agreement with the policy of appeasement so rigorously pursued 
by Chamberlain at the end of the decade. In return, Chamberlain valued Dawson’s 
opinion and “was strengthened in his own views by the knowledge that Geoffrey agreed
31 51with his policy and would support it in The Times.” Therefore, it was not always the 
case that such newspapers were being influenced to support a particular line of policy. In 
the case of The Times, for example, because Dawson shared so much of the world view of 
senior ministers he was inclined to lend the enthusiastic support of his paper towards 
advocating the government’s position. The ties based on friendship linking Conservative 
politicians with editors and proprietors of conservative newspapers, in general, helps to 
explain why a number of privately owned papers, independent of outside political control, 
became so closely identified with the Conservative Party. Furthermore, conservative 
newspaper loyalty in defending Non-Intervention, prompted the opposition press to 
launch attacks against them. In this way the term conservative press became a pejorative 
term used by the opponents of the government to criticize a press, which seemed to offer 
unquestioning obedience to the government in “the teeth of the facts.”
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The Yorkshire Post, in spite of its tiny circulation of barely 30 000 copies a day, was an 
important member of the independent conservative press category. Indeed, when, as we 
shall see, the editor, Arthur Mann, began to use the leader columns as a means by which 
to launch a sustained attack on the foreign policy of Neville Chamberlain, this caused 
considerable disquiet in leading conservative circles. The paper was part of a privately 
owned provincial chain of newspapers, the Yorkshire Conservative Newspaper 
Association. Both the Yorkshire Post and its sister paper, the Weekly Post, were among 
the oldest surviving newspapers in the country.33 Personal and family ties reinforced the 
relationship between the Yorkshire Conservative Newspaper Association and political 
Conservatism. The Beckett family, the largest of the shareholders of the company, 
formed part of provincial conservatism. Sir Gervase Beckett, the chairman of the 
company, was a Conservative Member of Parliament and, father-in-law to Anthony Eden. 
In his earlier days, Eden had even corresponded for the Yorkshire Post. He was also a 
friend of Arthur Mann.34
The third category, the independent conservative press, included newspapers such as 
the Daily Mail and the Daily Express. In terms of circulation figures this was, of course, 
the largest of the three groups. Given the propensity of such papers to offer stinging 
criticism of the government line this was a problem for the Conservative led government. 
The more popular newspapers dominated this category. This meant they had an impact 
on influencing the opinions of the British public at large, rather than aiming almost 
exclusively at a small, if influential, readership. Beaverbrook and Rothermere, the
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dominant personalities in the independent conservative press, were close friends, whose 
association went back a considerable time before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. 
Rothermere had been Beaverbrook’s mentor when the Canadian first decided to become a 
proprietor of the British press. Over the course of their long association, each helped the 
advancement of the other’s career. During the First World War, probably through the 
intercession of Max Aitken [Baron Beaverbrook], Harold Harmsworth [Viscount 
Rothermere] was appointed director general of The Royal Army Clothing Factory.35 
Later in 1918, Rothermere was one of the two sponsors who supported Aitken’s entry 
into The House Of Lords. Each had a financial interest in the other’s newspapers, and 
this was despite the competition that existed between the Daily Mail and the Daily 
Express. In fact, the friendship held in spite of the attacks on the Daily Mail by its rival.
Both Beaverbrook and Rothermere were interventionist proprietors. From 1922 until his 
retirement in 1937, when his surviving son, Esmond, succeeded him, editorial policy of 
the Daily Mail was under Rothermere’s direct control. Beaverbrook was to exploit 
certain of his newspapers for his own purposes. The Daily Express in particular, was the 
mouthpiece of the political opinions of its proprietor. In his autobiography, the editor of 
the Daily Express, Arthur Christiansen, refers to the dominant role played by 
Beaverbrook in directing the policy of the paper. Beaverbrook would telephone the editor 
daily and “used newspapers to further his own beliefs.’ However, neither Beaverbrook 
nor Rothermere exercised the same degree of proprietorial control over all their papers. 
In 1936, the Daily Mirror, although owned by Rothermere, was, nevertheless, entirely 
free from his influence on policy. In contrast to the opinions held by Rothermere, this
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paper of socialist principles was permitted to be highly critical of Nazi Germany. 
Similarly, Beaverbrook’s Evening Standard had greater freedom over the direction of 
policy than its sister paper, the Daily Express.
The politics of both the Daily Express and the Daily Mail placed them as conservative 
papers. In 1910, Beaverbrook had even entered Parliament as a Conservative Member. 
In spite of his later opposition to Stanley Baldwin, he was to retain his membership of the 
Carlton Club. In fact, his opposition to Baldwin’s leadership of party and government 
during the 1930s even led to the Daily Express becoming critical of the Conservative 
administration. Yet, as we shall see in chapter five, during the premiership of 
Chamberlain, Beaverbrook and hence the Daily Express was to become once more 
closely associated with mainstream Conservatism. Instrumental in ensuring this was 
Beaverbrook’s very close association with Samuel Hoare, a member of Chamberlain’s 
inner Cabinet. In November of 1938, Hoare’s wife wrote to Beaverbrook requesting 
financial support to enable her husband to continue his political career. On 22nd 
November, the first payment of £2000 was made, and similar payments were made in 
September and November of 1939.40
Rothermere’s views were on the far right of the Conservative Party. Until 1934, he had 
even been an early supporter of Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists.41 
Rothermere, like many Conservatives, was appalled at communism, seeing it as a greater 
threat to European civilization than fascism. Like many others on the right, his definition 
of communism was rather vague, and, therefore, the Daily Mail’s alarmist interpretation
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of left-wing influences in Republican Spain was often hysterical. Rothermere, and, 
hence, the Daily Mail, was unusual in supporting and condoning Nazi Germany.42 In this 
way, Rothermere was isolated from mainstream Conservatism. As SJ. Taylor pointed 
out in her biography of the Harmsworth brothers, Rothermere was “amongst the ruling 
classes considered dangerous, unpredictable, a wild card.”43
Within the independent conservative newspaper category, journals that catered for a more 
influential readership included the Morning Post and the Observer. However, the Daily 
Mail also had a large readership among the professional classes. Given the relationship 
between the Astors and political Conservatism, it might seem surprising that the Observer 
should be placed in the independent category. Nancy, wife of William Waldorf, was a 
Conservative Member of Parliament. She frequently met Chamberlain, Halifax and their 
colleagues in government.44 Waldorf and Halifax, contemporaries at Eton and Oxford, 
were also close friends. As a result of the connection with Halifax and 
Chamberlain,“[t]he Astors were never closer to the process of policy making than they 
were in these crucial years.”45 Even so, Garvin, the editor, made the paper an independent 
one, and during the course of the Spanish Civil War did attack government policy. 
Garvin was a close friend of Franco’s representative in Britain, the 14th Duke of Alba and
th10 Duke of Berwick. Garvin was a Spanish speaker, and like Alba a member of the 
Spanish Academy. Alba’s influence was strong enough “for Garvin to see Spain largely 
through Alba’s eyes.” 46
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Although the term conservative press encompasses newspapers of diverse opinions, links 
between conservative newspapers were formed by journalists who had worked on more 
than one conservative paper, or who had a shared background as civil servants in colonial 
administration. The influence of Alfred [Lord] Milner on the previous careers of a 
number of journalists was very important in this respect. Prior to the First World War, 
Dawson and Philip Kerr [Lord Lothian] had worked under Milner as civil servants in 
South Africa. Both men were later associated with the Round Table, a quarterly journal 
founded in 1910. The purpose of the journal was to propagate the virtues of the British 
Empire and Commonwealth. Kerr, who later worked as a journalist for The Times, was 
the first editor of the Round Table. Dawson maintained a connection with the journal, 
even editing for it after his retirement from The Times in 1941. Edward Grigg, who was 
on the editorial staff of The Times before the First World War, was also a contributor. It 
was he, who, over a lunch in 1913, first introduced the young Barrington-Ward to 
Dawson.47 Indeed after the First World War, when Barrington-Ward worked for the 
Observer, it was through his contacts in the Round Table, that Dawson learned of the 
rising new star in journalism. In 1927, Dawson offered him the post of assistant editor of 
The Times.48
In fact, frequent instances of the networking process within the conservative press can be 
seen in the careers of a number of journalists and editors. Barrington-Ward, for example, 
had been assistant editor at the Observer, where his superior on the editorial staff was, of 
course, J.L. Garvin. It was whilst he was at the Observer that Barrington-Ward first met 
Captain Liddell Hart, to whom he offered a post as correspondent of lawn tennis and
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rugby football.49 The two men were to renew their acquaintance in the 1930s, when 
Liddell Hart resigned as military correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, to take up a 
similar post for The Times. Another example of the networking process is Dawson’s 
early career in London journalism. Dawson had worked for the Harmsworth Press, which 
before the First World War owned The Times. In 1912, Lord Northcliffe, the elder 
brother of Viscount Rothermere, appointed Dawson as editor, following the latter’s return 
from South Africa.50 A further illustration can be seen in the career of W.W Hadley, an 
acquaintance of Camrose’s father. When he was still editor of the Merthyr Times, Hadley 
arranged for the fourteen-year-old William Berry [later Lord Camrose] to be apprenticed 
as a journalist.51 Having spent his whole career in the provincial press, Hadley, at the age 
of 58, decided to take up a career in the national press. He therefore moved to London 
and worked for the Daily Chronicle. When, in 1930, that paper collapsed, Camrose 
invited him to work for the Sunday Times, where first he became assistant editor, and 
then editor.52 Other examples of the networking process between conservative 
newspapers include Beverley Baxter, the columnist ‘ Atticus’ in the Sunday Times. Baxter 
had previously been editor of the Daily Express, where his assistant editor, before 
eventually succeeding him as editor, was Arthur Christiansen. Finally, as we shall see 
later, a particularly close relationship existed between The Times and the Yorkshire Post.
As we shall see, conservative newspapers were willing to be critical of government 
foreign policy and, on occasion during the Spanish Civil War, to infer and even openly 
suggest that the government adopt a firmer course of action in defence of the interests of 
British nationals who, for varying reasons, found themselves victims of that conflict.
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However, for all their differences, the conservative newspapers were united in support of 
the policy of appeasement in the first two years, at least, of the Spanish Civil War. This 
factor affected the way these papers viewed that conflict. Over and again, the principle of 
Non-Intervention was defended as keeping war out of the rest of Europe. These 
newspapers believed that the policy would contain the conflict to Spain, thereby 
preventing an alignment of the western democracies against the fascist states. The fear of 
this occurring was, fundamentally, a reflection of the consensus among Conservatives in 
general that the terrible losses of the First World War should not be repeated. In the case 
of The Times, for example, those who were most influential over the policy of the paper 
towards international relations in the 1930s were much affected in their outlook by their 
experiences of the Great War. The proprietor, Colonel J.J. Astor, who had served in the 
war, was wounded twice. His editor, Dawson, having edited The Times during the war, 
now became one of the most loyal defenders of appeasement: “he too was seeking a way 
to escape from the catastrophe of any world war.” 53 Leo Kennedy, leader writer for The 
Times during the thirties, was another who had been greatly influenced by his wartime 
experience. He had served on the Western Front between 1914-19.54 The Times foreign 
editor during the thirties, Ralph Deakin, had also served in that sector between 1916-18. 
Barrington-Ward, who had served as an officer in France, was, likewise, deeply moved by 
the war. He had also served at the battle of the Somme in 1916, the bloodiest battle ever 
fought by the British army. Thus “the conviction in later years that the fighting had not 
been worthwhile because the peace had been bungled was burnt deep into him.”55 It was 
on the Western Front in France and Belgium between 1914-1918, that the British Army 
experienced its highest casualties. Of all those who served in that sector in the years of
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the war, a total of 56% were either killed or wounded.56 Therefore, it is hardly surprising 
that such men should take advantage of the opportunity afforded by their positions within 
The Times newspaper to argue strongly for a peaceful settlement with the fascist states.
Such long-term effects of the experiences of the Great War can be detected in other 
newspapers of the 1930s. Beaverbrook, who attained the rank of lieutenant colonel 
during the war, also served in the wartime coalition government of Lloyd George. The 
effect of the war weighed heavily upon him. Thus, the Daily Express became a fervent 
advocate of both appeasement and the isolation of Britain and the Empire from any 
European conflict. Beaverbrook’s friend Rothermere had experienced personal tragedy as 
a result of the war, two of his three sons having died as a result of the wounds they 
received. Therefore, he too sought a way out of war.57 During the war, Arthur Watson, 
editor of the Daily Telegraph, had served with the Royal Field Artillery. As with so many 
others his experiences of that conflict had made a lasting impression upon his outlook on 
international affairs. Therefore, for most of the Spanish Civil War, his paper equalled 
the enthusiasm of The Times in its advocacy of appeasement, and of Non-Intervention. 
Of course, the conservative press was not alone in its horror of war, or in its experience of 
war. Yet the sons of the wealthier classes, the offspring of the leaders of conservatism 
both in politics and in the press, bore a disproportionate share of the casualties of that 
conflict.59 Hence, a consensus bom out of a shared experience of the devastation of 
continental war, offers an explanation of why so many newspapers were willing to 
support the appeasement policies of the Conservative dominated governments of the
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thirties, even in the face of mounting evidence of the insincerity of the dictators regarding 
the policy of Non-Intervention in Spain.
Consensus on the Civil War, however, depended on the extent to which the government 
could exploit its contacts with the press, both formal and informal. By the mid thirties, 
there was a variety of means by which the government could make contact with 
newspapers, in order to influence the editorial line. As we have already seen, ministers 
wanted the press to give their policies a friendly reception. Their motives were aimed at 
winning public support at home and to persuade foreign governments that British foreign 
policy did, indeed, have the support of public opinion. Newspapers, on the other hand, 
hoped for official confirmation of rumours and were, at least in part, dependent on 
official sources of information. They might, for example, find it necessary to obtain 
statistics on the actual breaches of Non-Intervention.
The oldest of the more formal and institutionalized contacts between government and the 
press were the Westminster lobby correspondents.60 The lobby correspondents, first 
created in 1885, had special privileges including the right to unfettered access to any 
Member of Parliament who was willing to speak to a correspondent directly. In the late 
thirties, there were between fifty and sixty lobby correspondents in the palace of 
Westminster. A close relationship between the lobby and the Prime Minister’s Office 
was to be developed in the course of the 1930s. Ramsay Macdonald, appointed Labour 
Prime Minister in 1929, was concerned that the conservative press barons would be 
hostile towards his administration. Hence, he established the position of a permanent
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press relation’s officer at 10 Downing Street.61 Following a civil service career in the 
Foreign Office, George Steward was to become the first incumbent of this post. He was 
to exercise greater centralization over the dissemination to outsiders of official news and
fS)views, than had ever been exerted previously. Actually, Steward was no more than a 
front man for his political master, Neville Chamberlain; “the first Prime Minister to 
employ news management on a grand scale.” Indeed, from the beginning of his 
premiership in May 1937, Chamberlain sought to persuade the press to support his policy 
of appeasing the dictators. It was Steward, a career civil servant, whose task was to hand 
out official statements to the press.64 Chamberlain’s success in managing the lobby 
encouraged him to look beyond the corridors of the palace of Westminster towards Fleet 
Street, with the aim of canvassing the support of proprietors and editors.65
The post of Prime Minister’s Press Secretary was part of a new trend in government and 
press relations during the inter-war period. It was a reflection of a greater sophistication 
in the government’s management of news. This development spawned the creation of a 
further position, the public relations’ officer. By the middle of the 1930s, these had been 
appointed by a number of departments. Among those that followed the trend were the 
Air Ministry, the Ministry of Health, the Colonial Office, the Post Office and also the 
Home Office.66 Modernization of the government’s system of news management did not 
mean more open government however. In fact, the opposite was the case. Public 
relations officers and the Prime Minister’s Press Secretary were middlemen, effectively
restricting the access of correspondents to the ministers themselves. One of the tasks of
&
these new officials was the control of information. For example, the Prime Minister’s
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Press Office released a very selective view of foreign policy, a view not always shared by 
the Foreign Secretary. 67
During the inter-war period, an increasingly important source of official contact with the 
press was the Foreign Office News Department. The origins of this department lay in the 
news department created during the First World War to act as a means of liaison between 
the Foreign Office and the press. Its role was essentially that of disseminating publicity 
and propaganda. When, in 1919, the British government authorized government 
departments to create more permanent machinery for the management of publicity, only 
the Foreign Office chose to do so: “its wartime experience of propaganda had shown 
many Foreign Office officials the potential value of publicity in time of peace.” 68 
However, the department only really began to grow in importance with the arrival of Rex 
Leeper, who was to become its head in 1935.69 Leeper, of Australian descent, joined the 
News department in 1921, following a career as the Washington correspondent for The
70Times. Unfortunately, the surviving evidence for the operations of this department 
during these years is sparse. Whyte, however, writing on this institution in the 1980s, 
gives an insider’s point of view, and thus manages to shed some light on its practices. 
According to Whyte, what is of great importance in the News Department’s relationship 
with the press “is the background non attributable briefing.” This was based on 
individual contacts between News Department officials and journalists.71 In the 1930s, 
this department perceived its role as essentially one of providing news and views that 
would counteract the complacency shown by Chamberlain and Steward towards the 
gathering international crisis.72 According to Whyte, the reputation of the News
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Department had been built on a perception of its honesty. Clearly, this sentiment 
reflected a long-standing tradition. In 1938 for example, an internal memorandum read 
that the “greatest strength of the Foreign Office News Department lay in the fact that it 
was always ready to give a coolly detached View.” 74
Reference has been made in the previous chapter to the government’s practice of 
maintaining contact with representatives from a broad spectrum of newspapers. The 
purpose behind this was to obtain as favourable a reception for its policies in as many 
newspapers as possible. However, while criticism was to be expected from opposition 
papers, the government took very seriously indeed any censure from its ideological allies 
in the media. These would suggest the existence of a deeper malaise, perhaps even a 
party out of touch with a significant element of its grass roots supporters. Hence, the 
seriousness during the 1920s of an attack on the premiership of Baldwin by an alliance of 
the Rothermere and Beaverbrook owned press. The government could not fail to be 
aware that the alliance represented the majority of conservative newspapers in circulation.
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Therefore, there were rewards for newspapers that had shown their loyalty to the 
government. James Margach, political correspondent for the Sunday Times, was one of 
three or four members of the lobby who, simply because he represented a staunchly pro- 
government paper in the 1930s, was permitted to attend exclusive lobby briefings at the 
St. Stephen’s Club. These were arranged by the director of Conservative Central Office. 
Here, of course, he would meet Conservatives only; these of course included the leading 
members of the Conservative Party. 75 Since 1917, Leeper had arranged for the 
diplomatic correspondent of The Times to have special privileges in communicating with
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the News Department. Even in the late thirties, Iverach McDonald, the diplomatic 
correspondent for The Times, was the only diplomatic correspondent with the right to 
telephone the department.
In spite of the durability of its representative parliamentary system, Britain has always 
been characterized by the secretiveness of its government. Unsurprisingly, protocol 
dictated that secrecy should pervade the relationship between government and press. 
During the 1930s, the “annual lobby reports complained strongly about the frequency
77with which the political correspondents were threatened with the Official Secrets Act.” 
The rules of the lobby itself reflect the secret culture of government. A very long­
standing rule was that the correspondent should refrain from naming his informants, but 
should instead take personal responsibility for his story and the facts within it.78 Hence, 
there was the development of a tradition in which the official inspiration of a story was 
indicated in the description of the source from which the correspondent claimed to have 
obtained his information. Margach, a lobby journalist from the thirties onwards, 
instances some of the permutations by which the identity of an informant was concealed. 
Expressions such as ‘I have it on the best authority’; ‘In well informed government 
sources’; ‘According to the most reliable quarters’; ‘circles close to the Prime Minister’ 
are all coded references to official or ministerial sources.79
Newspapers in the 1930s, particularly conservative ones, became willing partners in the 
culture of secrecy. In so doing they became part of a system of ‘insiders’. They had to
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agree to a policy of self-censorship. This was the necessary price to be paid in order to 
gain greater access to the corridors of power. It is precisely because of this that Prime 
Ministers, for example, might speak off the record to journalists, thereby bringing them 
into their confidence.80 As for lobby journalists, then as now, to maintain the confidence 
and support of their sources necessitated a policy of voluntary restraint. This has led to
Q I
what has been termed as an “informal conspiracy” among newspapers and politicians. 
Therefore, instead of being the “watchdogs of democracy”, the advocates of open 
government, newspapers deliberately agree to neglect certain stories. This is the 
necessary price of the privilege of being part of this club of insiders. Information 
becomes the exclusive right of a privileged few, with newspapers acting as brokers 
between the world of high politics and the general public. What and how news is to be 
presented is determined by the self-interest of those in control of editorial policy. In the 
1930s, even the News Department of the Foreign Office was part of this secret culture. 
This was in spite of its self appointed mission to puncture the misleading optimism being 
deliberately fed to the press by sources close to the Prime Minister. Those journalists 
whom Leeper selected to be the recipients of privileged news were made aware of the 
existence of a distinction between what could and what could not be placed in the public 
domain. In fact, most of what McDonald was told was for private information only. In 
the 1930s, contemporaries were already aware of problems that could arise from treating 
newspapers as part of a culture of insiders. By thus compromising themselves, 
newspapers were colluding in the undermining of responsible government.83
62
A further means by which official contact with the press could be made was through 
approaches to The Newspaper Proprietors’ Association. It has already been shown that 
the degree to which proprietors exerted pressure on their newspapers is a matter of some 
debate. Yet, in the course of 1938 especially, official approaches were made to The 
Newspaper Proprietors Association. This was done on behalf of the government with the 
intention of securing the support of newspapers for foreign policy. This suggests that the 
government assumed that, in general, proprietors were willing to exert influence on their 
papers. During the later 1930s, the Daily Telegraph was a less enthusiastic supporter of 
appeasement than The Times. Therefore, within official circles, an approach to Camrose 
was considered a useful exercise because he was prepared to intervene in directing the
84paper.
A very important part of the relationship between the press and the government was that 
played by the more informal links between individual ministers and newsmen. Since 
much of the evidence of these contacts was never recorded, the Dawson diary for the 
years 1936-9 is of prime importance. It provides an insight into the variety of contacts 
between this particular editor and the government. The diary records the almost daily 
meetings between Dawson and Halifax. The thirties was still the age of the house party, 
the more controversial of which were held at Cliveden, the Oxfordshire country home of 
Waldorf Astor. Such gatherings played an important role in the process of informal 
contact between government and press. Wilson, in his biography of the Astor dynasty, 
has made the following comment, “there might be useful opportunities to discuss with
or
well informed people the major items on the government agenda.” Nancy Astor, a
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dazzling society hostess, exploited the house parties at Cliveden and at her London home 
as a means of establishing close contact with the ministers of Chamberlain’s government. 
House parties provided an additional venue for personalities in the media to meet 
influential people such as government ministers. It is reasonable to assume that 
discussions at such occasions had some impact on the opinions of the guests. There were 
other social occasions during which influence could be exerted on the press. Shooting 
parties were one example. As Dawson’s diary illustrates, they provided a valuable 
opportunity for him to meet ministers, Halifax, for example, when both were on holiday 
in Yorkshire.
The gentlemen’s clubs in London were a very important milieu, a uniquely English 
institution. They were a central part of the British establishment and London society 
before the Second World War. There existed a variety of such establishments. There 
were the political clubs, such as those associated with the Conservative Party, the Carlton, 
Junior Carlton, Reform Club, Conservative Club, and Constitutional Club. There were 
also the liberal clubs such as the Devonshire Club and the National Liberal Club. In the 
course of the Twentieth Century, the demise of the fortunes of the parliamentary Liberal 
Party greatly loosened the political ties between such clubs and the Liberal Party in 
Parliament. By the mid 1930s, they were really social clubs. Other types of club 
included those associated with one or more of the armed services, sports, the arts and the
• ,  ,  » o / :ancient universities. Membership of a London club conferred a certain social cachet. It 
would be printed on visiting cards, and be included in the Who’s Who directory.87 The 
London clubs provided a focus for semi-formal and informal gatherings where the worlds
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of media and officialdom could integrate. Importantly, they provided an opportunity for 
pressure to be exerted out of the glare of the public gaze.
The Beefsteak, founded in 1876, and occupying premises near Leicester Square, was a 
talking club, in which members could approach and talk to one another without formal
OQ
introductions. Barrington-Ward was a frequent visitor. Mclachlan’s biography of 
Barrington-Ward stresses the importance of luncheons and dining out which formed an 
essential part of his daily routine.89 It was part of the process of lobbying, an opportunity 
for him to gather views and news. He dined regularly at the Beefsteak in order to meet 
typical and influential readers of The Times.90 Dawson was also a member. From 1936, 
Dawson went to the club to obtain information on Spain. In fact, his diary, for the years 
of the Spanish Civil War, records a number of instances when Spain was a topic of 
conversation over a meal at the Beefsteak .
The Other Club, founded in 1911 by Winston Churchill and F.E. Smith, had no 
permanent premises of its own, and was very different from the Beefsteak. 91 This club, 
with its membership pegged at fifty, was one of the smaller and therefore more exclusive 
of the London clubs. Colin Coote, a member in the thirties, and a leader writer for The 
Times was emphatic about its importance. During the thirties, the members who were 
anti-appeasers were in the minority, hence Churchill’s influence on the club was limited. 
However, Coote noted in his memoirs that on September 29th 1938, [Munich night], 
“advantage was taken of every chance to savage Munichite ministers. Duff Cooper was 
so roughly handled on Munich night itself that he resigned [as minister] the next
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morning.”92 Contemporaries of Coote and Churchill in The Other Club included 
Camrose. Froml926, he was chairman of the club.93 Garvin, Viscount Astor, Viscount 
Rothermere, and his son Esmond, who became chairman of Associated Newspapers in 
1937, were also members. In addition, members included those representing the worlds 
of business, the arts, politics and the armed services.94
As mentioned previously, a number of newspapermen were members of the political 
clubs associated with the Conservative Party. Within the exclusive world of a London 
club, they therefore had the opportunity to meet with leading members of the party and 
government. The Who’s Who directory for 1936, lists the following newspaper 
personalities as members of the Carlton Club; Arthur Watson, the Astor brothers, Sir 
Gervase Beckett, Beaverbrook and Viscount Castlerosse. 95Their contemporaries included 
the following leading personalities of the Conservative Party; Stanley Baldwin and his 
press advisor, J.C.C. Davidson, Anthony Eden, Viscount Halifax, Samuel Hoare, Sir 
Robert Topping, Captain Margesson, the Conservative Chief Whip, and Neville 
Chamberlain.
There were other London clubs that provided opportunities for Conservative politicians to 
meet informally with men from the conservative press. Stanley Baldwin was a member 
of the Atheneum, founded in 1824. So too were Liddell Hart, Garvin, Dawson and 
Camrose. The Travellers’ Club members included Baldwin, Orme Sargent [Assistant 
Under Secretary Of State at the Foreign Office], Gavin Strang [head of the Central 
Department at the Foreign Office], Aubrey Leo Kennedy, Garvin and Dawson. A further
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interesting example is the Marlborough Club, of which Franco’s official representative in 
Britain, the 17th Duke of Alba, the 10th of Berwick, was a member. Here, he had the 
opportunity to meet the Berry brothers, the Astor brothers and Beaverbrook.
The ties between the conservative press and the Conservative Party were also 
strengthened by the involvement in Conservative politics of some journalists from 
conservative papers. One example is Winston Churchill, who besides being a 
Conservative Member of Parliament, was a journalist for the Evening Standard, until he 
was fired by Beaverbrook, and then for the Daily Telegraph. Moreover, as a former 
member of the Cabinet, and as a founder member of The Other Club Churchill was well 
placed to exploit contacts with Conservative ministers. Indeed, because he had formerly 
been First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill had, since 1932, been allowed to see 
highly secret reports, which were made available to him by the Committee of Imperial 
Defence.96 Thus, he was privileged to receive the same intelligence as Cabinet ministers. 
Furthermore, Churchill used his contacts with ministers in an attempt to exert influence 
on government policy on Spain.97 On July 23rd 1937, Hore Belisha, the Secretary of War, 
wrote to Eden concerning a call he had from Churchill, in which Churchill suggested that 
Britain demand that Franco remove his guns which were threatening the Straits of 
Gibraltar. Churchill advised that Franco should be threatened with the use of force if he
QQ
refused to comply. Churchill was also in possession of a detailed intelligence report sent 
to him by a Non-Intervention observer on the Franco-Spanish frontier in the summer of 
1937. The report gave details of a large smuggling of arms over the French frontier. 
Such activity was in contravention of the Non-Intervention Agreement. Churchill made
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this report available to Eden, but the latter seemed unconcerned." He also corresponded 
with the Marques Merry del Val, the Francoist, former ambassador to the court of St. 
James, and with Azcarate, the Spanish ambassador in London during the Civil War.100
With his widespread connections, someone like Churchill could be of use in a wider, 
diplomatic sense. In June 1937, Lord Samuel, leader of the Liberals in the House of 
Lords, wrote to Churchill, hoping to enlist his support in securing an armistice in 
Spain.101 Another correspondent for a conservative newspaper whose international 
connections the British government attempted to exploit was General A.C. Temperley 
[military correspondent for the Daily Telegraph]. Temperley was acquainted with the 
German Minister of War, General Von Blomberg. On October 29th 1937, Eden wrote to 
Temperley, requesting him to persuade Von Blomberg to use his influence on Franco to 
desist from mass killings, and to adopt a policy of moderation in the territories under 
rebel control. Eden at this time was particularly concerned about reports of massacres by 
the insurgents in Asturias.102 Temperley agreed to write to Von Blomberg, who replied,
I
that in this matter, he was unable to exert any influence upon Franco.
Men representing the worlds of conservative press and politics moved in a similar social 
environment. In this way, some degree of consensus was more likely to become 
established. However, Liberal and Labour politicians, and the proprietors and editors of 
the journals sympathetic to the parliamentary opposition, operated within a different 
framework from the conservatives, and also, to some extent, from each other. For the 
Labour parliamentary party, there was no equivalent of the political gentlemen’s clubs,
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such as those associated with the Conservative Party, where Labour Members of 
Parliament could meet with editors and proprietors. In contrast to Labour, Liberal 
politicians and newspapermen did move in club circles. Sir Walter Layton, editor of The 
News Chronicle, was a member of the National Liberal Club.h04 Hubback, in his 
biography of Layton, referred to the editor as moving in radical liberal circles. As a 
result, an alternative consensus to the conservative one on domestic and foreign affairs 
was formed out of the interaction of another group of like-minded people in Whitehall, 
Westminster and in clubs to which they belonged. In the liberal circle to which Layton 
belonged were the following: Cambridge economists J.M. Keynes, Herbert Henderson, 
Dennis Robertson; ex civil servants such as William Beveridge, Josiah Stamp, Arthur 
Salter; businessmen such as Ernest Simon, Seebohm Rowntree, Gilbert Murray, Graham 
Wallace, Ramsay Muir; politicians such as Noel Baker, Charles Masterman.105
The position of The Times of London deserves further attention precisely because, as we 
shall see later, it was regarded abroad as the semi-official mouthpiece of the government 
and highly influential. How exactly pressure was directly exerted on a particular paper is 
not often easy to illustrate, yet one way of exploring attempts at influence can be seen in 
letters to the editor. Of course, the practice of writing to the editor with a view to having 
the letter published was not exclusive to The Times. However, in that paper, letters to the 
editor were given particular coverage. Not only were they accorded a full page, but letters 
were also printed alongside the leader column as well. In addition, correspondence to 
which the editor wanted to draw attention was printed under a column headed “Points 
From Letters”, and, on occasion, referred to in the editorial itself.
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Individuals of influence, or groups representing influential interests wrote to The Times 
on a whole range of issues relating to the Spanish Civil War. For instance, in the summer 
of 1936, a variety of letters was published concerning the issues at stake in the Civil War. 
One example was a joint letter, whose signatories included Hewlett Johnson, Dean of 
Canterbury, an advocate of the Republican cause. The letter pointed out that the 
Republican regime was a democratic state “fighting against military despotism and 
fascism.”106 An example of a joint letter from an influential economic interest group was 
that from the ‘Committee of British Ship Owners Trading To Spain’, outlining, in the 
summer of 1938, the case for the defence of their rights to trade in a war zone.107
A number of the letters referred to individual articles, thus providing evidence of the 
influence of the paper on certain individuals, including Spaniards from both sides of the 
conflict. The leader column “The Spanish Vortex”, which appeared on August 19th 1936, 
provoked a variety of correspondence, including a letter written by a pro rebel landowner 
from Andalusia, who felt it necessary to respond to what he interpreted as criticisms 
about the nature of the insurrection.108 From the Republican side, a letter written by Jose 
S. De Lizaso, a representative of the Basque Government, concerning the leading article 
on the destruction of Guernica, published on May 5th 1937, stated, “[y]our leading article 
on Guernica today is an effective retort to the allegations of the Nazi press in 
Germany.”109
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Influence is not easy to assess. What criteria influenced the selection of letters to be 
published is an important factor in assessing how representative the letters actually were 
of all the Civil War correspondence which was received by the editorial offices. Indeed, 
the process of selection involved the judgement of the editorial staff and, on occasion, 
may have even reflected bias. For example, no letters were published on the subject of 
the Italian defeat at Guadalajara,in the spring of 1937, nor on the arrival to Britain in late 
May of 4 000 Basque refugee children from the besieged city of Bilbao. In the priority 
given to individual correspondence, bias may have been reflected in the positioning of 
letters on the page. For example, letters on a particular theme were listed under a heading 
e.g. “BOMBED BRITISH SHIPS.”110 Again, the size of headings, and, indeed, which 
column of the letters’ page they appeared were means by which a subtle form of bias 
could be enacted. A further problem concerning the issue of influence regarding the 
correspondence to The Times is that the motives of the correspondents themselves are not 
always clear. For example, were they writing to the editor or to other correspondents? 
Certainly, in the correspondence columns, on one level, it was possible to see a debate 
between competing influences. Take, for instance, the letters concerning the bombing of 
British ships. On July 1st 1938, the paper printed a letter on this issue from E.N. Bennett, 
M.P.111 That letter triggered correspondence from a variety of quarters, particularly those 
offended by his accusations. However, much of the correspondence strayed from the issue 
of whether or not British registered shipping, engaged in traffic to Republican Spain, had 
the right to be protected. For example, Lord Cecil, who had been minister for blockade in 
the First World War, wrote in reply to Bennett, denying the allegation that he was still 
minister after the signing of the armistice and, therefore, responsible for the continuation
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119of the blockade conditions against Germany during the armistice period. Later, on July
fU
6 , Captain Alfred Dewar, Royal Navy, took issue with Bennett concerning the duration
119of the blockade imposed against Germany. The correspondence that had been thus 
generated diverged significantly from the more central question raised by Bennett’s letter. 
This was the Nationalists’ right to impose a blockade of Spanish Republican ports, since, 
in effect, a state of war existed in Spain. After all, the British government had, in the 
First World War, imposed a blockade on German ports. Indeed, the correspondence, or, 
rather, that which the editors agreed to publish, failed to address the key question of 
whether Franco’s Spain constituted a legitimate authority rather than merely resulting 
from an insurrection against the legal authority of the Spanish government.
The focus of the chapter will now turn towards the divergence in the presentation of news 
by the press. This differed greatly among even conservative newspapers.114 In the 
national papers owned by the Berry brothers, editorial opinion was expressed less subtly 
than in The Times. In accordance with the custom of quality newspapers at the time, the 
Daily Telegraph and the Sunday Times still reserved the front page for advertisements. 
Nevertheless, on the top right hand comer of the page there would appear, in bold 
lettering, the current news item to which the editor wished to draw the attention of his 
readers. These papers also made extensive use of bold print to draw attention to what the 
editor considered to be key points. This technique was applied both to the summary of 
main articles as well as to particular paragraphs within the article itself. An important 
difference between these papers and The Times can also be seen in the space allocated to 
the leader column. In The Times this was officially the only place where opinion was
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expressed and, as a result, this occupied virtually the entire page. In the other two papers, 
however, it was usual for the leader column to be smaller and space would be made for 
other regular opinion articles written under a pseudonym, for example ‘Pertinax’ in the 
Daily Telegraph or ‘Scrutator’115 in the Sunday Times. In fact, articles by ‘Scrutator’ 
were always more substantial than the leader comment. In this respect the approach 
adopted by the Berry owned papers towards leader columns was similar to that of most 
other conservative papers. In the Observer, for example, opinion was also conveyed in a 
weekly column, ‘The World Week by Week’, which appeared on the same page as the 
leader column.
The divergence of The Times from the practice of other conservative papers was due to a 
number of factors. Firstly, the striking similarities among its main rivals in the quality 
market, the Berry owned papers, was, until 1937, due to the influence of the joint 
ownership of these papers. Also, Camrose was determined to drive up the circulation 
figures of the Daily Telegraph to make it the leading quality conservative paper. In the 
drive to increase the circulation of the Daily Telegraph, variations in style reflected a 
conscious attempt to differentiate it from The Times. Moreover, it would appear that 
changes to the style of the Daily Telegraph were reflected also in the Sunday Times. 
Fundamental to the uniqueness of The Times was the way in which it perceived itself as 
representing very closely the views of the government.116 This was to have a profound 
influence on the way in which news and opinion could be presented. Since the tradition 
of this paper was that opinion could be expressed only in the leader column, space was 
reserved elsewhere for the presentation of news but not for the expression of opinion.
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This imposed constraints on journalists such as Liddell Hart who were denied the 
opportunity to express their concerns about government policy on Spain. The task of the 
leader writer was not to express his own, personal view, but that of The Times itself. This 
was because of the paper’s role as part of the British establishment. Both at home and 
abroad, it was perceived as the semi-official mouthpiece of the British government. In 
practice, the viewpoint of The Times had to be defined by the editor or his deputy. The 
Dawson diary for the later thirties contains a number of examples in which the editor 
revised and redrafted leader articles written by his subordinates. In fact, from the 
evidence of his diary, it seems that the editor was more concerned about the leader 
articles than about any other item in the paper. For this was where his support for 
appeasement and, therefore, sympathy for the German and Italian perspective was most 
consistently defended.
In its presentation of news on the Spanish Civil War, The Times strove to give the 
impression that it was neutral. This is because it accepted and supported Non- 
Intervention as a genuinely neutral policy. However, the neutrality of the paper was a 
facade. The Times was simply more subtle regarding its prejudices. The distinction made 
by the editors between opinion and news was never hard and fast. Highly opinionated 
articles were on occasion allowed to appear outside the leader columns, for example, the 
Guernica articles by George Lowther Steer in April and May of 1937. Thus Barrington- 
Ward’s refusal to print Liddell-Hart’s articles in the news columns on the grounds that
117they were too opinionated was not true. The reason why Liddell-Hart’s articles on 
Spain in 1937 were not printed was because they disagreed with the official view of The
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Times. As in the case of other newspapers, the editor could emphasize the importance of 
certain themes both by the order in which items appeared and by the space allotted to 
them. The omission of leader comment on controversial issues in the Civil War was 
another subtle means by which editorial influence could affect the paper. The number of 
occasions upon which The Times failed to pronounce its opinion, was surprising given its 
importance to, and resonance with, those sections of the British public most concerned by 
the Civil War. Just like other papers, The Times decided the issues to which it wished to 
draw attention. The selection of items upon which to comment in the leader column is as 
clear a reflection of bias as any.
There were clear differences of presentation between the quality newspapers and the more 
popular press. The Observer and the Daily Mail were unusual among the conservative 
papers in that they were open about their preference for a rebel victory in Spain. The 
overtly subjective standpoint of the Daily Mail was indicated not only in the leader 
comment, but also in the presentation of news within the paper, which, on the issue of the 
Spanish war, had made no pretence of neutrality. Attention was drawn to the key 
headline of the day by its inclusion, in block capitals, on the first page. The main article 
appeared on the same page as the leader column. The by line of the main article in the 
leader column was, unlike other conservative papers, in very large capital letters. 
Furthermore, the leader column was entirely devoted to the expression of opinion. The 
attitude of the Daily Mail reflected that of its proprietor and editor in chief, Viscount 
Rothermere. Rothermere’s horror of communism was reflected in the Daily Mail's 
presentation of the Civil War. Since the conflict was reported as a struggle between
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communism and civilization, the sympathy of the paper could be for no other cause than 
with the rebellion. The paper confidently predicted the victory of the uprising long before 
either the Morning Post or the Observer was prepared to do so. The headlines in the
tliDaily Mail also revealed clearly the partisanship of the paper. On July 27 1936, the 
headline “VICTORY OR TERROR” was presented to readers as the stark choice in 
Spain.118 On page 10 of August 1st 1936, the headline for a series of articles on the Civil 
War was, “ROUT OF SPANISH RED ARMY.”119 During that month, the paper was 
concerned with the prospect of the French Popular Front government coming to the 
assistance of the Spanish Popular Front regime in Madrid. The hostility of the Daily Mail 
towards such a development was clearly shown in the following leader by line, 
“FRANCE’S RED PERIL.”120 Confidence in the early victory of the rebel forces was 
demonstrated in the following byline for the leader column, “RED ROUT CERTAIN.”121
The Daily Express, influenced by Beaverbrook’s views on isolation, supported the policy 
of Non-Intervention because it aimed to contain the War to Spain. As in the case of its 
rival, the Daily Mail, its leader columns too were devoted to expressing opinion. Indeed 
unlike other conservative papers, the leader column was aptly entitled “OPINION”. 
Again, unlike other conservative papers, in order to emphasize certain points, words in 
Italics or in block capitals appeared in the leader column. An example of this technique 
is the following extract in support of Non-Intervention, which appeared in the leader 
column for August 3rd 1936:
the best thing you can do about it [the Civil War] is do nothing - if two
countries fight each other in Europe it is their affair. If one European
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country divides into two parts, and the parts fight each other it is their 
affair. Either way, it is not OURS.122
Unlike other conservative papers referred to in this chapter, news articles appeared on the 
first two pages of the paper. In this way the Daily Express was similar to the way news 
was deployed in papers such as the News Chronicle and the Daily Herald. The subjective 
tone of the paper, like that of the Daily Mail, was reflected in leader column by lines. 
Unlike those of the Daily Mail, however, they reflected the isolationist views of 
Beaverbrook towards conflict in Europe. On August 26th 1936, for example, the by line 
on an article supportive of Non-Intervention was, ‘AS FOR US- Keep out!’123 Later, on 
both August 28th and 29th, the Daily Express defended its stand on Spain against those 
who criticized the paper for not being neutral. ‘As We See Things’124 which appeared on 
28th argued that the paper had reported both sides in the Civil War fairly. In ‘What We 
Think’ and ‘What We Did’ the following day, the paper again defended its neutral stance. 
Moreover, the paper took exception to the charge being levelled against it by the Labour 
Party that it was backing the rebellion in Spain.
Whether or not they made clear their preference for a rebel victory, for the duration of the 
Civil War, all national conservative papers supported the policy of Non-Intervention. In 
effect, whether intentionally or not, such a stand meant supporting the denial to the legal 
government in Spain of its right, under international law, to purchase arms abroad. The 
restitution of these rights was, of course, essential if the Republic was to stand any chance 
of crushing the insurrection. Although it is true that there were many sympathizers of the 
Franco cause either working for, or readers of, conservative newspapers, this pro rebel
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bias was not reflected equally across conservative papers. This was due to a number of 
factors. Firstly, the style and tone of the more popular Daily Mail meant it could be 
blatant in expressing its pro-rebel opinion. Secondly, Beaverbrook, who we shall see 
later, was more sympathetic to the Republican cause, was keen that the Daily Express 
should maintain the appearance of neutrality. Thirdly, the educated readership for which 
the leading quality papers catered was reflected in the lack of sensationalism in the 
presentation of news. Unlike the more popular conservative papers, the by lines in the 
leader columns merely indicated the theme for the following article. In the Observer 
opinion column, ‘The World Week by Week’, by lines briefly described the theme of the 
following article. The claims made by quality papers and especially The Times that they 
were impartial prevented them from expressing sympathy for the Spanish Nationalists in 
a more overt way. It would have undermined the claim made by these newspapers that 
the policy of Non-Intervention, which they were defending, was as neutral as they 
maintained. However, as we shall see in later chapters, claims of impartiality in the 
conservative press were never quite convincing enough for those journalists who became 
increasingly concerned at the failure of their papers to realize the potential danger to 
Britain of a Nationalist victory in Spain.
The attitude of the Morning Post deserves special consideration. It was misleading to the 
point of cynicism. H.A. Gwynne, the editor, who had autonomy over editorial policy, 
maintained the fiction that the paper was neutral even though he was strongly sympathetic 
towards the rebel cause. On August 3rd 1936, the leader column reiterated its opposition 
to any outside assistance to the struggle in Spain, including the dispatch of Italian planes
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to Franco: “It is therefore most definitely to be hoped that the affair of Italian aeroplanes 
in French Morocco will prove to be nothing more than the irresponsible escapade of 
individuals.” However, the dispatch of aeroplanes to the beleaguered rebel forces in 
Spanish Morocco was vital to secure the transport of the troops across the Straits of 
Gibraltar, which at the time, were patrolled by the Spanish fleet. The arrival of the troops 
saved the rebellion on the mainland from certain defeat. At this time Gwynne was 
corresponding with the Marques Merry del Val, to whom he expressed his support for the 
rebellion. The Marques also performed a valuable service to Gwynne in getting his 
correspondents over the French frontier to report from rebel Spain.126 Indeed, by the 
spring of 1937, the attitude of the Morning Post was overtly pro-Franco, critical of the 
British government for refusing to recognize his government as a belligerent power. This 
was in spite of the fact that at this time Nationalist military success in Spain was heavily 
dependent on the continued supply of men and material from both Germany and Italy. 
Such action was, of course, in defiance of the principle of Non-Intervention, which the 
paper had readily defended in the previous August.
Truth also deserves special consideration because of the partisan stance it took at the 
outbreak of the war. Alone of the conservative papers, Truth was overtly sympathetic 
towards the Republican cause. This was curious given the financial control of the paper 
by the Conservative Party. Also, unlike other papers, the main focus of Truth was on the 
presentation of opinion rather than on achieving a balance between opinion and news. 
The lengthy editorial ‘Entrenous’ focused on a range of topics and issues. It was always 
the first article, and covered a number of pages in each edition. As the war progressed
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Truth adopted a rather ambivalent attitude towards the Spanish Republic. On July 22nd, 
for example, the first issue after the outbreak of the war, ‘Entrenous’ expressed an 
opinion in favour of the Spanish government. In so doing, it was to turn on its head the 
Kerensky thesis, used in official Conservative and civil service circles, to justify a hostile 
attitude towards the Spanish government. Indeed, in Truth, the Spanish rebels were 
compared with the Bolsheviks who, in 1917, threatened the Kerensky regime in 
Petrograd. As if directly addressing the conservative critics of the Spanish government, 
Entrenous wrote, “experience should warn professed lovers of order, who think that the 
overthrow of the Republican moderates is to be desired.”127 Thus, the right-wing rebellion 
was portrayed as being as much of a threat to British interests abroad as the Bolshevik 
overthrow of the Provisional government in Russia had been a quarter of a century 
previously. Nevertheless, in the following week in a special article, “Hopeless Spain”, 
the opinion expressed was more in tune with the official Conservative view of the war: “it 
is one of the worst features of this tragical business that there is so little right and so much
1 98wrong on both sides.” The ambivalence in the attitude of Truth was probably a 
reflection of the gradual change in editorial policy following Ball’s takeover of the 
publication the previous June. Financial control did not give full editorial control to 
Joseph Ball, hence the paper retained links with its radical and liberal traditions, and this 
would account for the sympathy that was expressed for a democratic regime in Spain.
The discussion will now turn more specifically to an analysis of terms of discourse 
employed by different conservative newspapers, with particular reference to the selection 
of words and phrases. Not surprisingly, there was a clear distinction between papers of
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right wing views compared with those papers which adopted a more moderate position. 
Newspapers which took a position overtly in favour of the Spanish Nationalist cause 
denied the legitimacy of the internationally recognized Republican regime in Madrid. 
The emotive language used to describe both the rebels and the Republican government 
reinforced this. In such papers the Republican authorities were associated with violence, 
chaos and the breakdown of law and order, all of which justified Franco’s taking up of 
arms against the lawfully constituted authority of the Spanish government. Take, for 
example, the Daily Mail leader of July 20th titled ‘Death Grips Spain’. Paradoxically, the 
challenge posed to law and order in Spain, by the military rising, was portrayed as an 
attempt to reimpose law and order, denied to the country by the “weak government of the
1 9Qleft”. A further example of the association of the Republic with the collapse of law and 
order, hence justifying the attempt to overthrow it can be seen in the lead article of the 
Observer for August 30th 1936, which carried the headline ‘WOMEN AND CHILDREN 
BURNT ALIVE’.130 In this instance, the absence of the rule of law in Republican held 
areas being exemplified by an alleged atrocity. These papers also took it upon themselves 
to challenge those who, quite correctly, held the view that the Republican regime 
represented the legal authority in Spain. Take, for example, the Observer which, on 
September 12th 1937, argued against what it saw as “[t]he elementary nonsense of still
1 31talking of Valencia as ‘the government of Spain’”.
In their discourse concerning the two sides in Spain, ideological labelling played a very 
important part in the process by which right wing papers continued to deny the legitimacy 
of the Republican government. The latter was never referred to as the government of
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Spain; the term government was always couched in qualified terms such as ‘the Valencia
government/ authorities’ or the ‘red government’. Indeed, the reference to ‘red’ was
intended to bring it into association with Communist Russian influence. Hence, the
rebellion could be further justified as a patriotic uprising against an authority which,
effectively, was providing a gateway for the infiltration of foreign, communist menace,
firstly into Spain and thence into Western Europe. Commenting on the capture of Malaga
by the Nationalist forces, the leader of the Daily Mail contrasted the patriots as
represented by the forces under Franco, compared with the “murderous barbarians who
1 1 0take their orders from Moscow”. In its editorial comment on the fall of Malaga, the
Morning Post also contrasted what it saw as the loyal Spanish cause, represented by the
111Nationalists compared with the Republicans. Indeed, Franco was compared with the 
crusaders of the reconquista of medieval Spain fighting against a foreign invader
tVirepresented by the “savage and godless tyranny” of his opponents. Later, on July 19 
1937, the same paper returned to the theme of the reconquista, confident that the modem 
cmsaders would, as their forbears had “rolled back the path of Islam”, roll back the new 
and, in the eyes of the editorial, more serious threat of ideological communism.134 In 
referring to Franco as a modem crusader, the Morning Post but also the Observer, 135 
were, in effect, denying the reality that it was Franco who, in the summer of 1936, had 
participated in an invasion of the Spanish mainland. Ironically, the so-called modem, 
patriotic cmsade in defence of Catholic civilization was, in the first weeks of the war 
heavily reliant on Muslim troops transported across the Straits of Gibraltar from Spanish 
Morocco.
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Right wing conservative papers entered into discourse with those whom they saw as 
sympathizing with the Republican authorities. Ironically, given the tone of many of their 
articles on the Spanish war, these papers were also critical of what they perceived as
tVipartisan reporting. On September 27 1936, the Observer, for example, was critical of 
what it saw as the “obstinate convention which persists of dubbing the one side the 
‘Government’ and the other side the ‘rebels’” as being “wholly untrue and unfair to the 
facts”. Later, in a lead article written by a Francoist sympathizer, Arthur Bryant, the 
Spanish Nationalists were referred to as having “been deliberately misrepresented in the
1 77press of this country as a gang of blood thirsty rebels”. Similar sentiments were
tliexpressed earlier by the leader column of the Morning Post on May 8 1937. In a clearer 
reference to the part of newspapers in the propaganda offensive against the Nationalist 
side, blame was placed on the influence of left wing sympathizers of the Spanish 
Republic whose alleged ingenuity enabled them successfully to influence public opinion
1 78against the Nationalists.
At least in the early stages of the war, papers associated with more moderate opinion 
within conservative press circles represented both sides as equally to blame for the 
violence and bloodshed in Spain. On August 21st 1936, for example, The Times leader 
questioned both the democratic nature of a Republican government which failed to 
prevent the shooting of prisoners by “extra-legal and unofficial organizations” and also 
the patriotism of the rebels since the latter “brought Moorish troops to Andalusia”.139 In 
fact, newspapers of more moderate views saw the war as being fought between two 
extremes. This theme is, perhaps, aptly summed up in the Yorkshire Post leader for July
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21st 1936, which viewed the struggle as “a ruthless clash between two extremes”.140 
However, as we shall see later, from the late winter of 1937, a number of more moderate 
conservative papers were to adopt a more partisan view in favour of the Nationalists.
As will be shown more clearly in later chapters, what appeared to be a consensus in the 
conservative press in support of government policy on Spain was an illusion. For 
newspapers where those in control of editorial policy were especially enthusiastic about 
the rebel cause in Spain, government policy would be defended as long as it did not 
appear to harm the prospects of a Nationalist victory. Hence, the Observer, the Daily 
Mail and the Morning Post cynically defended the neutrality of a policy of Non- 
Intervention because it hindered the prospects of a Republican victory in Spain. In 
newspapers which were more closely associated with political Conservatism, the 
emphasis was on creating the impression that the Spanish Republic was not a sister 
democracy, and therefore not entitled to the same right of purchasing arms abroad as any 
other legally recognized government. Most conservative papers clung to the facade that 
they were upholding a genuinely neutral policy, and were thus less honest than, for 
example, the Daily Mail that had never tried to conceal its partisan viewpoint. However, 
the development of the Civil War over the course of three years was to place relationships 
between journalists and editors in pro-government papers under strain, as the genuineness 
of British neutrality towards the conflict came increasingly under question.
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CHAPTER THREE. GOVERNMENT AND PRESS IN THE EARLY
STAGES OF THE CIVIL WAR.
When news broke in London about the outbreak of the military uprising in Spain the 
government sought to bring newspapers across the political spectrum into a broad 
consensus in support of its policy on Spain. As will be shown, this necessitated a 
manipulation of the press, in the process of which, correspondents were deliberately 
misled, both about events developing in Spain and the intentions of the government 
towards her. In a representative political system, the democratic function of a newspaper 
is to expose policy for public debate and censure. This, however, was undermined in the 
interest of what the National Government perceived to be the wider national interests at 
stake, both in the Peninsula and beyond.
Apart from Britain, all of the Great Powers of Europe sent military supplies to either of 
the two sides in the Civil War and, in the case of Germany and Italy, military units as 
well. Yet, as has been discussed, in spite of this apparent neutrality on the part of the 
British government, there was hostility towards the Spanish Republic.1 By the summer of 
1936 parallels were being drawn between contemporary Spain and events in Russia 
during the autumn of 1917.2 However, until the end of the war the most important 
concern of the British Government was the international impact of the Civil War. It was 
this dimension which, far more than internal Spanish politics, was to influence and 
thereby shape British policy. By the early summer of 1936, Neville Chamberlain, one of 
the most influential ministers of Baldwin’s Cabinet, publicly announced the need for
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Britain to repair its relations with Italy, following the Anglo-Italian dispute caused by 
Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia.3 On July 22nd, the French Prime Minister, Leon Blum and 
his Foreign Secretary, Yvon Delbos, arrived in London for talks with their British 
opposites concerning a new treaty to replace the now defunct Treaty of Locarno. If this 
were to take place there would need to be a new five-power conference of the former 
Locarno powers, which were Britain, France, Belgium, Italy and Germany. There was the 
real risk that the international complications produced by the tumultuous events in Spain, 
in the summer of 1936, would jeopardize these moves towards concord among the 
Western European powers. In August 1936 Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, wrote/* I 
am very unhappy that this terrible Spanish question should now come to complicate our 
troubles in Europe.”4 Chamberlain shared Eden’s concern over the threat to the prospects 
for a new Locarno conference now being posed by the Spanish war. In his diary for 
August 2nd he noted,
the foreign situation has not improved. The Civil War in Spain has provoked 
dangerous reactions. We have issued invitations for a five power Locarno 
conference but have hitherto been unable to get the Germans or Italians to 
announce the date though they have not refused to take part.. .5
The international implications of the Civil War in Spain were to make it the dominant 
issue preoccupying British diplomacy until the autumn of 1938. It was for this reason 
that the British government was so concerned at how its Spanish policy was to be 
presented and interpreted in the press. In its dealings with newspapers in general, the 
government sought to promote the view that its policy towards the Civil War was 
genuinely neutral. It was extremely sensitive to any suggestion in the press that its policy 
was one of malevolence towards the Spanish Republic. When, on August 10th, for
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example, the Daily Herald published an article by its proprietor, Lord Strabolgi, which 
suggested this, so concerned was the government that Strabolgi received a letter from 
Lord Halifax, replying to his accusation. In the letter, Halifax stressed that the purpose of 
the policy of Non-Intervention, far from being an act deliberately aimed at disadvantaging 
the Republican cause, was “to prevent outside assistance from prolonging the war.”6 
What might have appeared as over reaction to an article in an opposition newspaper was, 
in fact, the response of a government anxious to maintain domestic consensus on the 
issue of the Civil War. If sections of the British press were to put forward the view that 
the government was actually in favour of the rebels, this would provoke a reaction among 
sympathizers of the Republican cause and possibly compromise the government’s 
relations with the insurgents and their allies.
As has already been shown in the previous chapter, it was not just from newspapers of 
liberal or left wing sympathies that the Conservative dominated government was likely to 
face opposition. Then, as now, all newspapers represented a multiplicity of views 
amongst both their journalists and readership. Even Truth occasionally criticized 
government foreign policy. Thus, on August 19th 1936, when conservative papers were 
generally supportive of the government’s efforts to secure Non-Intervention, Truth was 
critical of the failure of the government to prevent the export of civil aircraft to Spain.7 In 
fact, newspapers varied in the degree of journalistic freedom that they allowed. Whilst 
the leader columns of The Times almost invariably lent support to the government line on 
Spain, because of the relative freedom allowed to journalists, articles were printed in the 
news columns which caused great offence to both Germany and Italy. Such articles had
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the effect of undermining the government’s policy of appeasement, a policy to which The 
Times was also committed. However, even the support of The Times leaders could not 
always be taken for granted. For example, on August 1st the leader was critical of the
Q
government for its past failure to define its foreign commitments more clearly. As for the 
Yorkshire Post, its support for government policy was clearly conditional on the basis that 
it was, indeed, neutral. This conditional support was evident in the leader comment of
tliSeptember 14 1936. Referring to the Spanish Republican authorities, the Yorkshire Post 
pointed out, “it is natural that a certain sympathy of principle should have attached at the 
outset to a government properly elected, as far as we could judge, on a wide suffrage, and 
therefore apparently in a position of loyal defence.” 9
It was imperative for the government to conceal its prejudices towards the Spanish 
Republic; otherwise there was little chance of securing a broad consensus in support of its 
policy even within the conservative press. In the event, even its closest supporters in the 
conservative press, including the editor and deputy editor of The Times, remained 
unaware of the actual state of affairs. An example of this deception is that, despite the 
close contact that existed between the editorial staff of The Times and official circles, in 
August 1936 Barrington-Ward could write the following to Dawson, “the FO view has 
been hitherto that the insurgents would be beaten in a long war though it might be a very 
long war.” 10 In fact, the Foreign Office neither expected the war to be long, nor saw any 
possibility that the insurgents would lose. Throughout the war, Barrington-Ward never 
lost his conviction that the policy of the government was genuinely neutral.
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During the summer of 1936, a cause of concern in London was the awareness that the
Popular Front government in France was facing persistent pressure from its supporters to
assist the Spanish government. When the French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
attended talks on the Treaty of Locarno in London, British pressure was applied on them
to reverse the earlier decision of the French government to sell arms to the Spanish
government.11 However, both Germany and Italy were determined to assist the rebellion.
Clear proof of Italian intervention came on July 30th with news of Italian aeroplane
crashes at sea and also in French Morocco. These aeroplanes were part of a shipment of
aircraft to Spain following requests made by the insurgents to both Italy and Germany.
This development brought with it the danger that the French government might once
again reverse its policy concerning the transit of arms across its frontier with Spain.
Throughout August, therefore, the British government gave support to a French initiative,
which was the setting up of an International Agreement on Non-Intervention in Spain. In
spite of initial Foreign Office reservations concerning the French proposal, only two days
1 0after receiving it in London, the British government was to give it its full support. After 
all, Non-Intervention would strengthen the position of Leon Blum in France, and enable 
him to resist the very strong pressure on his government to intervene in support of the 
authorities in Madrid. In this way, non-intervention, while it was to work against the 
interests of the Spanish government, would, it was hoped, serve a more important 
purpose; namely to prevent the division of Europe into rival blocs, with Britain and 
France alienated from the axis partnership. Baldwin was to express his fear of this when,
th • •on 26 July, he talked with Eden privately concerning the developing civil war crisis in 
Spain.13
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Throughout August, Non-Intervention was the dominant issue in the foreign news 
columns of the national press in Britain. The British government enjoyed a consensus of 
support for its efforts to achieve all round Non-Intervention, a consensus that cut across 
partisan lines. In fact at no other point in the Civil War was the government able to 
secure such broad press support for its policy. There were a number of reasons why, in 
the first few months of the conflict, so many newspapers of divergent political sympathies 
were willing to support the government. Firstly, newspapers saw a connection between 
events in Spain and the developing international crisis in Europe. This, in turn, seemed to 
justify what was in effect the denial to the Republic of its legitimate rights to purchase 
arms abroad. Hence, it seemed that Non-Intervention could be justified on pragmatic 
grounds. It would prevent the division of the European states into rival camps, with each 
camp supporting either the Government or the rebellion in Spain. After all, such an 
alignment of powers could lead to the outbreak of the second major European war in less 
than a generation. Thus, British newspapers that were ideologically sympathetic towards 
the Spanish Government nevertheless supported Non-Intervention on the grounds that it 
was in the national interest. The Manchester Guardian, for example, on August 6th 
declared itself in favour of Non-Intervention because it was a means of confining the war 
to Spain.14 Previously, its diplomatic correspondent, Voigt, had written, “the spread of 
intervention would be a disaster, for it would mean that the European nations would be 
divided into partisans of the Spanish loyalists and partisans of the rebels.”15 Voigt, 
however, was supporting a policy that placed the Spanish Republic at a disadvantage, and 
this despite the fact that he, like his paper, was clearly a sympathizer of the Spanish
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Government. Contrary to the view that prevailed in official circles, Voigt believed that 
the victory of Franco would be a disaster for British interests: “such a Spain might easily 
affect the military balance of power in a manner unfavourable to Britain and France.” 
The liberal News Chronicle was also to write in favour of Non-Intervention. On August 
8th, for example, the view of the leader was “it is clear that intervention on both sides 
would almost certainly lead to open war in Europe.. .plainly therefore the urgent need is 
to prevent intervention on either side.”16 Concerning Non-Intervention, the attitude of the 
liberal/left press was little different from that of the conservative press on this issue. 
Take, for example, the attitude of the Daily Telegraph. It supported Non-Intervention 
because to contain the struggle to Spain “should be the earnest and prompt endeavour of
1Hall governments of good will.” Similar attitudes were expressed in the Truth, which 
believed that “it is only by strict all round non-intervention that the possibility of a more 
widespread and worse disaster can be avoided.”18 “Scrutator” of the Sunday Times agreed 
that the urgent task of Spain’s neighbours was to adhere to Non-Intervention “to prevent 
the struggle from spreading.”19
A second factor encouraging the broad consensus in the press in support of Non- 
Intervention was that, initially, there was support for this policy from all the parties in 
Parliament. In the case of the Labour Party, which was the main opposition party, Non- 
Intervention attracted strong grass roots support, within the Trades’ Union Congress, for 
example. The General secretary of the TUC, Walter Citrine, “succumbed readily to 
Anthony Eden’s arguments in defence of non-intervention; Citrine, like many at the time 
believed that effective non-intervention would help the Spanish Republic.”21
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There was, as has been demonstrated in the previous chapter, a variety of means at the 
disposal of officials and ministers whereby journalists and editors could be brought into 
the government’s confidence and persuaded of ‘their duty’ to support the official line at 
this particularly difficult juncture in international relations. The Dawson diary shows 
how, in the first months of the war, semi-formal gatherings provided opportunities for 
leading names in newspapers to be informed both of government policy and the 
importance which ministers and officials attached to the connection between events in 
Spain and international relations in general. As early as August 5th, Dawson’s diary refers 
to a meeting with Halifax at the Beefsteak during which Spain was discussed.22 That a 
connection was made between events on the ground in Spain and the wider international 
concerns of the British government can be seen in a later extract on August 11th. Once 
again, Dawson refers to lunching with Halifax at the Beefsteak. In this instance, they 
discussed Spain and, in particular, “Blum’s courageous refusal to intervene.” Following 
this particular meeting, Dawson wrote to Barrington-Ward, informing him of the day’s 
discussion with Halifax; emphasizing to his deputy the international complications 
provoked by the war, especially the attempts which the British government were at 
present making to secure the support of Germany and Italy for Non-Intervention.24
In the summer of 1936, lobby briefing of journalists was, of course, a very important 
means by which sources close to the government could provide them with information 
concerning the official view on Non-Intervention. Within articles written by 
correspondents at this time, especially diplomatic correspondents, phrases pointing to
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official influence are numerous. For example, four days after the British government 
imposed a unilateral ban on the sale of arms to Spain, the diplomatic correspondent of 
The Times referred very closely to the statement given to the press by the Foreign Office 
in the following: “it is hoped, therefore, that the British government’s action in giving 
practical support to the French lead, in advance of the full assent from Germany and Italy, 
will have a steadying effect.” Similarly, the political correspondent of the Daily 
Telegraph wrote in a way which demonstrated official influence: “the announcement by 
the Board of Trade covers civil ‘planes. Great Britain warmly supported the French 
proposal from the beginning. She has taken unilateral action, and in doing so, has gone 
further than any other nation.”
It is not surprising that journalists were influenced by official sources in the way they 
reported on government policy. After all, journalists attended briefings in order to obtain 
news. What is important is that in both of the examples quoted, there is evidence that the 
briefing was used to mislead the press. Indeed, as has already been shown, contrary to the 
opinion expressed in the Daily Telegraph that from the outset the government was 
unanimous in support of Non-Intervention, the Foreign Office had initially been sceptical. 
If correspondents seemed to be over enthusiastic regarding the likely success of Non- 
Intervention, this is what the government wanted to be conveyed, in order to build support 
for this policy at home as well as abroad. Vansittart, the Permanent Under-Secretary of 
State at the Foreign Office, took a keen interest in lobbying the press. Contrary to the 
official view being given to the correspondents that unilateral British action would 
influence other more reluctant nations to abide by Non-intervention, his own view was
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that, within official circles, there was little optimism regarding this. Vansittart made clear 
his own scepticism concerning Non-Intervention in a letter to Eden in September. 
Writing on the issue of German and Italian intervention he commented, “I still don’t see 
what we can do about it. Critics are of course bound to say that the Committee sitting 
here is ineffectual, but none of us really expected that it would achieve much.” 27
Britain’s unilateral stand on Non-Intervention, which was being presented through the 
lobby as both a firm indicator of the government’s commitment to neutrality and an 
incentive to other nations to follow suit. Yet, throughout the war, Non-Intervention was 
to work against the interests of Loyalist Spain. The policy, which succeeded in 
preventing the Republic from obtaining sufficient supplies abroad, could not prevent the 
Axis powers from assisting Franco. As for the purpose of the Non-Intervention 
Committee, this, as Vansittart explained to Eden, was not to make Non-Intervention 
effective, but to provide a forum for the improving of relations between the democracies 
and the dictator states: “a real committee would probably achieve no useful purpose and 
would make still fainter the prospects of the five power conference which are in any case 
none too bright.” 28
At the beginning of the war, the prevailing view in the leader columns of the London 
daily conservative papers was that there was little to choose between the rival sides in 
Spain. Both were criticized for atrocities. Therefore, the consensus was that whichever 
side emerged as the victor, there would be a dictatorship, not a parliamentary form of 
government on the British model. As mentioned in the previous chapter, since they
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continued to support Non-Intervention, this limited the extent to which these newspapers 
felt they could express any partisan view concerning the conflict in Spain. Therefore, on 
September 22nd, Gwynne, editor of the Morning Post, wrote to the Marques Merry del 
Val: “you will understand that as long as our government takes up the attitude of non­
intervention I feel bound to observe and follow more or less, their policy. I need not
9Qassure you that my warmest wishes are with the Junta.” The Daily Mail, avowedly in
support of the rebellion, even criticized the British government for what it saw as its
failure to protect British nationals in Republican held territory.30 Indeed, on August 26th,
Truth attacked the partisan reporting of the War by the Daily Mail, pointing out its failure
to inform its readers of the atrocities committed by the insurgents following the capture of 
^ 1
Badajoz. However, never did the Daily Mail actually oppose the policy of Non- 
Intervention. This was a significant constraint on the freedom of manoeuvre of a paper, 
which had once been a fierce critic of Stanley Baldwin both as leader of the Conservative 
Party and as Prime Minister.32
The broad press consensus that had united liberal, left and conservative papers in support 
of government policy could not last. None of the powers supporting the rebel cause was 
enthusiastic about registering support for Non-Intervention. In fact negotiations intended 
to draw up an international agreement dragged on throughout the month of August. By 
the time an agreement was reached at the end of the month, Germany, Italy and Portugal 
had intervened extensively on the side of the insurgent cause. Furthermore, the Non- 
Intervention Agreement, when it had eventually been drawn up, proved to be inadequate 
to the task of stopping the flow of supplies and men to Spain.33 The consensus in support
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of government policy began to break down. The first indication of its being under strain 
became apparent in the middle of August. This was in response to the failure of the 
British government to prevent the exporting of civil aircraft to Spain. On August 14th, for 
example, the Daily Herald went so far as to accuse the Board of Trade of “deliberately 
leaving the door open for the sending of planes to General Franco.”34 Indeed, as the 
quantity of foreign aid reaching the insurgents became abundantly clear, the general delay 
in completing all round Non-Intervention provoked general exasperation within the 
liberal/left press. On August 18th, for example, the leader writer for the News Chronicle 
called upon the British and French governments to set a date by which Germany and Italy 
must accept the French proposals and advocated firmness against the Fascist powers if 
they continued to delay. The article warned, “[t]he man who runs away knows he cannot 
run indefinitely. Some time or other he will find himself up against a wall. Democracy
c
stands with its back to that wall at this moment.” The nature of the comments bemg 
made in the liberal/left press was in sharp contrast to those appearing in the conservative 
press. Whereas conservative newspapers could express disappointment and even 
impatience at the delaying tactics of Germany, Italy and Portugal, at no point was there 
criticism of the stand taken by the British government on this particular issue. Instead, 
the conservative press continued to be supportive of the ‘efforts’ being made by the 
government to make Non-Intervention effective.
There is no evidence, during the late summer, that the government was particularly 
concerned at the breakdown in the press consensus in favour of Non-Intervention. Given 
the refusal of Franco’s foreign supporters to refrain from helping him, it must have been
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expected that such a consensus would be short lived. This, of course, is indicated in 
Vansittart’s letter to Eden on September 30th. Moreover, the government could still 
count on the continued support of a range of leading newspapers which, like The Times, 
were associated both at home and abroad with the views of the Conservative dominated 
National Government. Yet as we shall see, there were occasions when the liberal/left 
press could compromise Britain’s relations with the dictators.
By September, the government’s difficulties with the press were becoming exacerbated 
by the continued intransigence of the fascist powers. The most obstinate of the supporters 
of the rebel cause was the Portuguese dictatorship. The Salazar regime was the last to 
accept Non-Intervention, and the last to agree to send a representative to the Non- 
Intervention Committee in London.36 Although at this stage the British government was 
still anticipating an early victory for the rebellion37, there was, nonetheless, growing 
concern among official circles in London over the likely impact of Portuguese 
intransigence upon the attitude of the French government. The longer Portugal held out, 
the more obvious it became that Non-Intervention was not viable. In fact, throughout the 
Civil War, Portugal was of great use to the insurgents in Spain as a source of foreign aid. 
Supplies were transported into rebel held territory after having been unloaded at 
Portuguese ports. There was the danger that the Portuguese attitude would not only 
encourage French sympathizers of the Spanish Republic to increase pressure on the 
French government to lift the ban on the export of arms to Spain, but that it would 
undermine support for Non-Intervention among the Labour party and the Trades’ Unions 
in Britain as well. In spite of this, however, the British government was most reluctant to
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alienate Portugal. Her alliance with Britain was of crucial importance to British strategic 
and imperial interests.
In August/September, much publicity in sections of the French and British press, for 
example, was given to the role played by the Portuguese authorities in undermining Non- 
Intervention. The effect of this was to stimulate criticism of Portugal in both countries, 
and, with regard to Britain, to compromise relations with the Salazar regime. Whereas, in 
the case of France it has been argued that criticism of Portugal was from the left-wing 
press, in the case of Britain, criticism included elements of the liberal press, such as the 
News Chronicle and Manchester Guardian.39 On August 25th, for example, the headline 
on the front page of the News Chronicle read, “Portuguese Capital As Real Headquarters 
Of Spanish Rebels”.40 The leader column for the Manchester Guardian for the following 
day audaciously questioned the point of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, given Portugal’s 
resistance to diplomatic pressure from Britain. Such resistance was in spite of Britain’s 
promise to defend her against attack from a hostile Spain 41 Even when Portugal did 
finally accept the Non-Intervention Agreement, the attitude of the News Chronicle to 
Portugal’s acceptance was sceptical. This was because of Portugal’s continued 
reservations towards Non-Intervention. On September 10th, the leader article in the News 
Chronicle, which concentrated on the absence of a Portuguese delegate at the first 
meeting of The Non-Intervention Committee, was titled “The Wrecker.”42 Indeed, the 
article followed the earlier example of the Manchester Guardian by questioning the 
purpose of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Clearly, the attitude of the liberal and left
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press in Britain played a part in contributing to the difficulties faced by the British 
government in its protracted negotiations with the Portuguese government.
The view being expressed by the liberal/left press towards the Anglo-Portuguese alliance 
made it imperative that those papers supportive of the views of the National Government 
should put forward the official view and, in addition, demonstrate a sensitivity towards 
Portugal as a ‘special case’. This was because the Portuguese government was 
particularly sensitive towards any criticism of Salazar’s regime at a time when Anglo- 
Portuguese relations were strained because of the Spanish Civil War.43 As an example, 
when the News Chronicle printed articles accusing Portugal of intervening on the side of 
the insurgents, the Portuguese ambassador felt compelled to issue the British press with a 
formal denial of these accusations. The Portuguese had taken particular offence at the 
claims of the News Chronicle that Portugal had assisted the Rebels in the bombing of 
Badajoz, and that Portugal was handing over any refugees from Republican Spain to the 
insurgents.44 During September, pressure from government sources was exerted on the 
press. After all, the focus of European diplomatic activity for most of this month was on 
the specific issue of Non-Intervention. Therefore, the Foreign Office News Department 
would have been preoccupied with putting across the official view both on this matter and 
on Portuguese intransigence regarding it. When confronted with high-ranking members of 
the Portuguese embassy, angry at the reporting of their country by British newspapers, 
British Foreign Office officials could do no other than explain that in a democracy 
nothing could be done to restrain the press. Behind the scenes though, pressure was 
being exerted to persuade the press to show tact in its handling of Portuguese affairs 45
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As in the previous month, an attempt was made to influence reporting through the 
dissemination of news to diplomatic correspondents. As would be expected, the 
government was to find more success in persuading those conservative papers, which had 
most consistently supported it during August, to offer their support to the government’s 
position on Portugal.46 As a result, the treatment of Portugal in the pro-government press 
was entirely different from that in the liberal/left press. The pro-government press 
sympathized with the difficulties faced by the British government over Portuguese 
intransigence in the face of intense French and British diplomatic pressure. Yet it never 
criticized the Portuguese attitude. The inference to be drawn from this is that such 
newspapers were aware that criticism would have undermined British policy towards the 
Salazar regime. The Truth and the Yorkshire Post, for example, expressed the confidence 
that under diplomatic pressure, the Portuguese would eventually concede to the British 
requests and send a representative to the Non-Intervention Committee. On September 9th, 
the day of the first meeting of this committee, the lead article in Truth claimed that “[t]he 
British and French Governments between them ought to be able to obtain the withdrawal 
of the reservations which she [referring to Portugal] attached to her acceptance to the 
scheme.”47 The lead article in Truth was still expressing this confidence on September 
16th, a week later 48
Since there was little positive comment to make about the Portuguese position, Portugal 
did not feature prominently in the leader articles of the pro-government press in the early 
months of the Civil War. The general lack of editorial comment on the negative attitude
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of Britain’s oldest ally was an act of deliberate omission. As we shall see, a policy of
prudent omission was practised on several occasions by a number of conservative
newspapers during the Civil War. Indeed, in the Yorkshire Post Portugal did not feature
in the leader columns for September at all. It was a subtle way of registering sensitivity to
the government’s plea for newspapers to show tact in the way dictatorships were reported.
In effect, such newspapers were imposing a policy of self-censorship. Pro- government
papers, on those few occasions when they did print leader comment on Portugal,
expressed sympathy for her position. As is clearly shown in the tone of the leaders, this
was a conscious attempt at countering criticism at home, both of Portugal and of the
extreme patience of the British government towards her. On August 26th, there was a
deputation to Eden and Halifax led by Walter Citrine, General Secretary of the TUC, and
Arthur Greenwood, deputy leader of the Labour Party. The purpose was to discuss with
the Foreign Minister the unloading of war material in Lisbon, destined for export to the
insurgents in Spain. The next day, the Daily Telegraph published a leader on the
Portuguese position; expressing sympathy for the Portuguese dilemma created by the
Civil War. It seemed to offer a way out of the problem caused by Portugal’s continued
breaches of Non-Intervention. It suggested that effective Non-Intervention would be
possible even without Portuguese co-operation:
if other states of Europe fulfill their obligations faithfully and stop all the 
export of munitions which might find a way into Spain not only to Spain 
but to the Peninsula, there is little war material in Portugal itself which 
could cross the frontier.49
Importantly, the solution that it suggested would avoid the need for further pressure being 
applied by Britain on Portugal, with the inevitable harm to Anglo-Portuguese relations.
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t\\In its lead article on Portugal on September 6 , the Sunday Times expressed its sympathy 
for the Portuguese dilemma. It empathized with the Lisbon authorities, arguing that in a 
country with a poverty stricken working class, it was natural for the government to 
sympathize with a rebellion against the left-wing government in Spain. According to the 
Sunday Times, this was a pragmatic policy to prevent the spread of Communist 
propaganda into Portugal from Republican Spain, where it could so easily act as a 
stimulus for opposition amongst the poor towards the Salazar dictatorship.50 In its leader 
column for September 16th, Truth treated sympathetically the Portuguese reluctance 
regarding Non-Intervention.51 For good or ill therefore, the pro-government newspapers 
ably assisted the aims of British foreign policy regarding Portugal, at a time when Anglo- 
Portuguese relations were particularly strained.
Of course, newspapers make a conscious choice of what to print. The evidence of 
Portuguese assistance to the Spanish rebels was available to the right-wing as well as the 
left-wing press. Alpert, in A New International History o f the Spanish Civil War, refers 
to the probability that the British Government was reliably informed of the extent to 
which the Portuguese were assisting the Spanish rebellion.52 There is no reason why the 
pro government press would automatically sympathize with Portugal, since even papers 
whose editors or proprietors expressed their sympathy for one or more of the right-wing 
European dictatorships, could, at times display an ambivalent attitude towards them. As 
we have seen, Viscount Rothermere, for example, was strongly sympathetic to Nazi 
Germany. However, he was also an advocate of rearmament especially of Britain’s air
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defences. He was to write of his fear, during the thirties, of the possibility “that Germany, 
newly armed with modem weapons, would endeavour by aerial force to re-establish 
herself in her old position.”53 Even though he was writing following the failure of 
appeasement, during the first few months of the Second World War, as we shall see later, 
he allowed, or at least did not prevent, the editorial of the Daily Mail from criticizing 
German planes for their part in the destruction of Guernica. The conclusion to be drawn 
is that certain papers were persuaded to support the government line. As the press 
consensus on the Civil War broke down, and the liberal/left press increasingly adopted a 
line sympathetic to the Spanish government, it was natural for conservative papers to 
support the British government line on Spain. However, this narrowing consensus still 
depended on the Civil War being viewed in simplistic, ideological terms, as a conflict 
between the extremes of left and right.
In the late autumn of 1936, developments on the ground in Spain, in particular the failure 
of Franco to take Madrid, were to prove a watershed, transforming the rebellion into a 
prolonged civil war. Furthermore, the recognition of Franco as the legal mler of Spain by 
both Germany and Italy was to have a profound impact on the conflict. By their action, 
the fascist governments had committed their reputations to the success of the Spanish 
rebels. German and Italian recognition was to lead to increased intervention on their part 
to secure Franco’s victory. Within Britain, the effect of this was to increase opposition 
towards the dictators. As far as British interests were concerned, there was a further 
complication in that the prolongation of the war increased the dependence of Franco on 
his foreign backers. This threatened Britain’s ability to reassert its status as the dominant
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foreign influence in Spain once the war was over. British policy regarding the Civil War 
had to adjust to the new circumstances. The conflict could no longer be dismissed as a 
temporary crisis.
During the autumn, the more serious breaches of the Non-Intervention Agreement 
threatened its survival and opened the first split in the parliamentary consensus on Spain. 
The government was mainly preoccupied with the international complications of the war. 
The Spanish conflict was proving to be a source of major disagreement among the 
European powers. The British government’s concern was that disagreement between 
nations over Spain would jeopardize what it considered to be the far more pressing matter 
of the signing of a new five-power pact between France, Britain, Belgium, Germany and 
Italy. The Soviet Union was threatening to intervene on the side of the Republic and, 
because it made public the extent of fascist power infractions, it stimulated the growing 
hostility within both Britain and France towards the fascist states. The printing of the 
Soviet denunciations in the pages of the British and French press came at a particularly 
difficult time for the British government now faced with the beginnings of a breakdown 
in the parliamentary consensus on Spain. In an atmosphere of crisis, Prime Minister 
Baldwin had refused the request made by Attlee, leader of the opposition, for an early 
recall of Parliament so that Spain could be discussed. Nevertheless, he felt obliged to 
concede that Spain should be discussed when Parliament did reconvene on October 29th.54
The available evidence suggests that Russian sources did, indeed, try to use the foreign 
press as a means by which to advertise the breaches of non-intervention by those powers
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favourable to Franco’s cause. Mention has already been made of Koestler who, went to 
Franco’s Spain as war correspondent for the News Chronicle. Unknown to the rebel 
authorities, his brief was to find evidence of German and Italian military intervention. 
Koestler was employed as an agent of Willy Muenzenberg, head of Comintern’s West 
European AGITPROP department. In this role, Muenzenberg was in charge of the 
Comintern propaganda campaign in favour of the Spanish loyalist cause.55 No doubt it 
was hoped that by having a correspondent inside rebel territory, evidence could be 
gathered concerning breaches of non-intervention, evidence that could be publicized 
outside Spain. There were other means by which sources close to the Soviet government 
could attempt to influence the British press. In early October, contrary to agreed 
procedure of the Non-Intervention Committee that its proceedings be kept secret and that 
only agreed official communiques be presented to the outside world, the Russian charge 
d’affaires in London, Kagan, made a public statement. He condemned the Spanish 
rebels’ use of Portugal as both a base for operations and as a conduit for military supplies 
obtained from their supporters abroad. Kagan must have been aware that the press would 
have taken notice of his statement. Indeed, the News Chronicle devoted to it, substantial
t i l  c / :column space on the first two pages of its October 8 issue. Soviet government circles 
in Moscow also had the opportunity both to manipulate the foreign press and to break
tf iwith the protocol of the Non-Intervention Committee. On October 14 , for example, the 
News Chronicle published an article by its Moscow correspondent who had been given 
access to a note concerning the grievances of the Russian government, which was to be 
presented to the Committee by Ivan Maisky, the Russian ambassador to London, on his 
return to Britain. Needless to say, the note should not have been disclosed to the press,
116
yet this did not deter the Soviet authorities, nor was the News Chronicle prevented from 
printing it either. The same sources also attempted to undermine the support for the 
British government. Take, for example the following comment made by the Moscow 
correspondent of the News Chronicle:
Although the closest secrecy is maintained in official circles it is learned that the
British government is putting difficulties in the way of all who wish, in respect to
ro
the Russian note, to call an early meeting of the committee.
The British government would have preferred for there to be as little publicity as possible 
to be given to the breaches of Non-Intervention, because of the impact this might have in 
Germany and Italy.59 Indeed, diplomatic considerations were to weigh heavily on the 
government when it decided how to handle the matter of Italian breaches of Non- 
Intervention.60 In order to deflect attention away from Italy, the British government 
encouraged counter accusations against Russia. Its strategy was to argue that the real 
purpose of the Russian government in raising these allegations was malevolent, aimed at 
preventing a rapprochement among the western powers. The government was assisted in 
this by the Soviet government’s public admission that it was sending arms to the Spanish 
Republic.61 Moreover, the intelligence available to the British government concerning 
foreign intervention in Spain contained very precise details on Russian intervention in 
particular.62
Whether or not the British government actually believed that the Russian intervention was 
more extensive than that of Germany and Italy, this was the line that it sought to see
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established in the British press. It wished to imply that not only were Russian infractions 
more serious but that Russia was attempting to break up the Non-Intervention Agreement. 
In the autumn, the government was especially concerned at the harmful effect that the 
press might have on Britain’s relations with right-wing dictatorships. As for the News 
Department of the Foreign Office, it was preoccupied with attempting to stop the 
publication of stories suggesting that Britain’s relations with the fascist powers had 
deteriorated as a result of the war.63 The government, therefore, did what it could to 
encourage the press to adopt the view that it was Russia, which posed the real threat to
iL
European peace. Since from September 13 , the press had ceased to be invited to 
meetings of the Non-Intervention Committee, correspondents had perforce to rely upon 
official sources for news about the committee’s deliberations.64 Thus, there was provided 
the ideal opportunity for the News Department to manipulate the way in which news was 
reported. On October 9th, the day the Non-Intervention Committee was to meet to discuss 
the Soviet allegations against the fascist powers, the diplomatic correspondent of The 
Times expressed criticism of the way in which the Russian government presented its 
allegations. He referred to the more sinister political agenda of the Russian government in 
raising these matters before the committee in the first place. The correspondent wrote, 
“propagandist considerations are thought to have been the more likely to influence Soviet 
policy in view of the present discussions of the Labour Party in Edinburgh.”65 The phrase 
“are thought to have been” provides a clear example of the oblique way in which official 
sources were alluded to in the press.
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Official circles in London sought to manipulate the British press in other ways. By 
making public their concerns at foreign assistance to the rebel cause, the Soviet 
authorities had played into the hands of those in British establishment quarters who saw 
an opportunity to portray the Russians as being irresponsible in their breach of protocol. 
In a very lengthy article written by the diplomatic correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, 
the influence of ministers/ officials in London is clearly visible:
The threat [Russian military intervention in Spain] is regarded as a political move 
intended to embarrass Mr. Blum’s government and to a lesser extent that of this 
country.. ..So far as this country is concerned Moscow apparently seeks to 
embarrass the government by creating fresh difficulties with Labour at a time 
when the fullest co-operation of industry is essential to carry through the 
emergency rearmament programme. 66
In wake of Maisky’s publicizing of the note from his government in advance of its
discussion by the Non-intervention Committee, official sources in London attempted to
influence the press into seeing the reasonableness of the British case. Again, by
providing a selective and, perhaps, subjective summary of the British note in reply to the
Russian note, there was the opportunity to manipulate the way in which correspondents
reported. The article written by the Daily Telegraph diplomatic correspondent, following
a briefing by British officials is a good example of this. According to the information
received by the correspondent, all of the issues raised in the Russian note were in the
process of being dealt with. A further example is the article by the Daily Telegraph
diplomatic correspondent for the following day. Whereas the day before he only inferred
the unreasonableness and possibly malevolent motives of the Russians, these motives
were now stated explicitly: “Marked irritation is being freely expressed by ministers at
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what is regarded as a mischievous attempt by the Soviet Union to utilize the Non- 
Intervention Committee for propaganda purposes.”
The impact of lobbying of the conservative press from circles close to the government did 
not produce uniform reporting, yet it seems unlikely, at this stage at least, that this 
reflected conflict within government circles concerning Spanish policy. Unlike that of the 
Daily Telegraph, the diplomatic correspondent for The Times reflected the views of those 
in official circles who sought to play down the significance of the harm done by Russia to 
the international agreement on Spain. In general, the reporting stressed the hope that the 
Non-Intervention Committee would continue to function: “In London it is hoped that the 
committee will be able to continue its labours without serious interruption.”69 On 
October 12th, the article written by the correspondent expressed the hope, felt in certain 
official quarters, of the ability of the London committee to continue: “it is a source of 
satisfaction to authoritative opinion in this country that the slender structuring of non-
70intervention should have survived the buffetings to which it was exposed last week.” In 
order to downplay the harmful effects of the Russian note, certain quarters were 
successful in persuading The Times to report on it in a positive way, rather than to stress 
any alleged malicious intent on the part of the Russian government: “The latest Russian 
note is intended to remedy this [lack of proposals to strengthen Non-intervention] 
deficiency.”71 It is possible that the same quarters were instrumental in persuading the 
diplomatic correspondent to play down the significance of the note when it was published 
in the paper the next day. This is because, only the text and a description of the note was
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published. In complete contrast with the Daily Telegraph there was no reference to any
77disquiet in official circles, nor, interestingly enough was there any editorial comment.
No doubt the officials who had informed the lobby correspondents had hoped also to 
influence the editorial line of the paper. There is evidence for the success of this policy 
in the leader column of The Times for October 9th. The leader which referred in detail to 
the Russian allegations against Italy showed that the writer, in this case Leo Kennedy, had 
discussed the matter with the diplomatic correspondent, as he made reference to the
79 •correspondent’s own article also published that day. Moreover, the Dawson diary for 
October/ November shows his preoccupation with Spain. Given his concern with this 
issue, he could obtain clarification either from discussion with his diplomatic 
correspondent, or through his contacts within government. Indeed, in the diary entries for 
October 8th and 9th, specific references are made to the allegations made by the Russians 
in the Non-Intervention Committee.74 Any discussion between ministers and Dawson 
would be conducted with the knowledge that the editor did, indeed, intervene in the 
writing of leader articles.
The crisis in the Non-Intervention Committee continued throughout October with the risk
tlithat Russia might withdraw her membership. On October 24 , the diplomatic 
correspondent of The Times whilst acknowledging, perhaps with relief, that the Russian 
government would continue to play a role in the Committee, nevertheless still pointed out 
the Russian transgressions of Non-intervention. The information on which his 
accusations were based had come from official British sources. Indeed, the article
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appeared three days after the Cabinet was presented with the British intelligence report
concerning Russian aid to the Spanish Republic. Clearly then, the evidence suggests that
the government presented this information to the Non-Intervention Committee knowing
that this would be picked up by the press during its official briefing. On this occasion,
Dawson’s own political prejudices would have ensured the co-operation of The Times in
portraying Soviet motives less than favourably. The way in which officials presented this
news to the press indicates that their aim was to create the misleading impression that
Russian intervention was more pronounced than that of Italy. The correspondent stated,
this British information based on first hand evidence was circulated to the 
committee yesterday. It is understood to cover three cases of Russian 
intervention on behalf of the Madrid government through Spanish ports 
and, as a fourth case, certain Italian activities in the Balearic Islands.
The provenance which is given for this source is that it is British, and hence, by 
implication, neutral. In this case, the government was selective in what information it 
gave concerning Spain. This was done to give newspapers the misleading impression that 
Italian intervention was insignificant. In actual fact the intelligence report presented to 
the government had specified not one but a number of cases of Italian breaches of Non-
nf\Intervention. Clearly, the government was concerned at how such breaches on the part 
of Italy might be reported. The reason for this was its likely effect on the Italian attitude 
towards the Non-Intervention Committee, and even more importantly towards the 
proposed five-power conference.
Throughout October, in an effort to discredit the Russian government further, official 
sources continued to exploit the dependency of the press for information concerning Non-
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tV»Intervention. On October 26 , The Times published a second article written by its 
diplomatic correspondent citing further evidence of Russian breaches of Non- 
Intervention. This article, lengthier than that written on the 24th, was the first occasion on 
which the journalist gave explicit instances of Soviet transgressions of the Non- 
Intervention Agreement. Before detailing these, he referred to the “trustworthy first hand 
evidence” made available to the British government concerning the violations of the
77Agreement. Once again, evidence given in the article must have come from the 
intelligence reports available to the government. As before, the correspondent had been 
given a completely misleading impression of the extent of Italian intervention in Spain 
compared with that of Russia. Once again, The Times had been duped into giving to its 
readers an inaccurate view of Italian activity in Spain. The War Office had sent the 
Foreign Office a detailed report on foreign intervention in Spain making it clear that 
Italian and German intervention was far more extensive than that of Russia. Yet it was 
decided that this new and reliable evidence should not be given to the press. In the words 
of Roberts, an official at the Western department of the Foreign Office, “it is intended 
solely for our information, not for communication to the Non-Intervention Committee or 
to any outside persons.” 78
The pernicious effects of official influence on the press can be seen in the reporting of 
other conservative newspapers concerning Russian infractions of Non-Intervention. For 
example, on October 9th the diplomatic correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, like that of 
The Times for the same day, repeated the view held in official circles that the real
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intention of the Soviet government was to drive a wedge between the democracies and the 
fascist states:
Government circles in London have been unfavourably impressed by Russia’s 
action in making her accusation public.. .the opinion is held in London that 
it is a political move, intended to embarrass Mr. Blum’s government and to
70a lesser degree that of this country.
There was a further problem for the British government in Russia’s persistent criticism of 
Portugal. Russia accused her of allowing her ports to be used for the unloading of 
contraband. On October 14th, the Russian government even called upon Britain and 
France to impose a blockade of Portugal in order to enforce her compliance with Non-
OA •
Intervention. The Russian allegations were raised at the meeting of the Non-Intervention 
Committee at the end of the month. This, of course, was a further embarrassment for 
Anglo-Portuguese relations, as were the activities of the unofficial left wing “Committee 
of Inquiry into the alleged breaches of the Non-Intervention Agreement in Spain.” On 
October 3rd, a report based on British and American newspaper sources concerning
O 1
German, Italian and Portuguese intervention, was published by this committee. In fact, 
the longer the war in Spain dragged on, the more the obvious sympathy of the Salazar 
regime for the insurgents would complicate Anglo-Portuguese relations. As far as the 
critics of government policy were concerned, the continued reluctance of Britain to apply 
pressure on Salazar not to assist Franco was further evidence of its malevolence towards 
the Spanish Republican cause. Hence, the British government applied pressure on 
Salazar not to follow the German and Italian example of recognizing Franco. At its 
meeting on October 28th, the Cabinet discussed the harmful effect of press reporting of 
Portuguese infractions of Non-Intervention. Indeed, throughout October, official sources
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had continued in the attempt to influence the way in which Portuguese issues were dealt 
with in the press, most probably with an eye to how the articles would be interpreted in 
Lisbon. A clear example of this policy can be seen in the article written by the diplomatic 
correspondent of the Daily Telegraph on October 26th, two days prior to the Non- 
Intervention Committee enquiry into the Russian allegations against Portugal. In the 
article, the journalist stated that warm support has been given to Portugal by the British 
government: “It is satisfied from its own sources of information that there is no evidence 
that Portugal has not kept to the agreement since she became party to it.84 In fact, as we 
have seen, the British government knew from its own sources of information that since 
signing the agreement, Portugal was consistently in breach of Non-Intervention. Clearly, 
one of the government’s staunchest allies in the press was being misled. This was, 
ostensibly, in the interests of national policy, the aim of which seemed to be the 
prevention, at all costs, of the alienation of the Western dictator states.
As already shown in the leader comment of certain newspapers, there was, within certain 
conservative press circles, a large degree of sympathy for the Salazar regime. Thus it was 
hardly surprising that such papers should be willing to offer sympathetic treatment of the 
Portuguese position. However, regardless of their sympathies, conservative papers 
catered for a broad constituency. As indicated in the letters to the editor, The Times, for 
example, included among its readers not only those who sympathized for the rebel cause 
but also sympathizers and even advocates of the cause of the Republic. Such readers 
most probably would have been disturbed at allegations that Portugal was enabling the 
Nationalists to secure supplies from abroad thereby undermining the Non-Intervention
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Agreement. Throughout the war, The Times maintained the illusion of neutrality towards 
the conflict; active support for the Portuguese position could raise questions as to how 
neutral The Times actually was. As we shall see in the next chapter, in the wake of a 
press war against Britain by the inspired Italian press, Dawson refused to bow to official 
pressure to publish leaders, aimed at bridge building in Anglo-Italian relations. It is very 
plausible that on that occasion Dawson felt that opposition against such a policy, amongst 
both readers and employees, would have offset any possible good, which might have been 
done if he had agreed.
There are a number of possible explanations for the willingness of conservative press 
editors to take the risk of alienating both staff and readers, by advocating the Portuguese 
position in their leader columns. Firstly, there was the historic link; Portugal was 
Britain’s oldest continental ally and, Britain had pledged herself to defend Portugal in the 
event of an attack by a hostile Spanish government. Another factor influencing the press 
was the attitude of the Portuguese government to Russia’s persistent criticisms of it 
concerning the issue of Non-Intervention. Indeed, official Portuguese irritation at the 
British government for its role in the committee was also being expressed. The 
Portuguese government criticized the British for violating procedure by bringing the latest 
Russian allegations to the attention of the Non-Intervention Committee. Diplomatic 
correspondents were led to believe that Portuguese anger was acute; on October 28th, for 
example, the article written by the diplomatic correspondent of the Daily Telegraph read, 
“I understand Great Britain is strongly criticized.”85 On the same day, the article written 
by the diplomatic correspondent of The Times referred to the British government being
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“strongly attacked” by the Portuguese.86 My contention is that because Portuguese 
anger was being directed against the British government for its actions in the Non- 
Intervention Committee, official circles sought to manipulate the way lobby 
correspondents interpreted British actions. This was to create the impression that the 
government had not acted unfairly. Take, for instance, the article written by the
tlidiplomatic correspondent for The Times, which appeared on the 29 . Summarizing what 
he had learned about the British response to the Portuguese allegations, he wrote, “[t]here 
had been no suggestion that the British government were adding their own weight to the 
Spanish charges”, inferring thereby the neutral position of the British government.87 The 
line taken might have been the result of collusion between a journalist and an official 
source. Another possibility is that through the selection of information to be 
disseminated to the press, an attempt was being made by the government to foster the 
illusion of British reasonableness. Official concern at the potential harm that could be 
done by press reporting on Anglo-Portuguese relations was almost certainly influenced by 
anxiety concerning the use of Portuguese ports to transport supplies to the Spanish rebels. 
It was feared that the Axis powers would be in a position to take advantage of any 
opportunity to undermine British influence on the right wing dictatorship in Lisbon. 
Should a hostile Italy threaten both the safety of British shipping and even of British 
control of the Suez Canal, then Portugal and her overseas possessions in Africa were of 
vital importance, since they lay along the alternative Atlantic/Cape route, which 
connected Britain with her Empire in the Far East. Finally, as already stated, Russian 
criticism of Portugal provided an opportunity for officials to present ‘evidence’ to show
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that Russian intervention on the side of the Republic was greater than support given to the 
rebels, and that, therefore, her intentions were purely malevolent.
In spite of attempts by official sources to play down the significance of Italian, German or 
Portuguese infractions of the Non-Intervention Agreement, their intervention in Spain 
was to take new forms which had the effect of escalating the international crisis caused by 
the Civil War. Between 9th and 19th November, units of the German regular armed forces
oo
were dispatched to Spain. These were to form part of the Condor Legion. Italo- 
German assistance to Franco was also to tip the naval balance of power decisively to 
Franco. With the assistance of both the German and Italian fleets, he was able to disrupt 
the sea borne trade to the Spanish Republic.89 Emboldened by the increase to his 
international prestige afforded by German and Italian recognition of his government, and 
the subsequent increase of foreign military and naval aid to his cause, Franco declared a 
blockade of the Republican port of Barcelona. Since neither of the two sides in Spain had 
been accorded belligerent rights, any interference with foreign shipping by blockade 
patrols would be illegal. In fact it would constitute an act of piracy. The situation was 
especially difficult for Britain, which possessed the largest merchant fleet in the World. It 
was relatively easy for foreign owned ships to acquire British registration, securing 
thereby the diplomatic and naval protection of the world’s leading sea power. Thus, there 
was the real risk of an international incident on the seas around Spain, bringing the 
British government into conflict with either Franco or his foreign supporters.
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As the War dragged on into the autumn, the consensus even within government and 
official circles over the direction of policy was coming under strain. At the outbreak of 
fighting in July, the Cabinet had agreed that Franco should be recognized as the legal 
ruler in Spain once he had taken Madrid. However, the blockade issue complicated 
matters precisely because it threatened to put British ships in conflict with the insurgents. 
As a result of Franco’s declaration, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Samuel Hoare, 
felt it imperative that his regime be recognized as a belligerent power. This would make 
the blockade legal, and would avoid the possibility that Britain would be drawn into 
conflict with the insurgents, should they attempt to detain British merchant ships. Eden, 
however, was adamant against the granting of belligerent rights to Franco in advance of 
his capture of Madrid. In fact, from the late autumn his attitude towards the Civil War 
was to change. This was a direct consequence of the increased level of German and 
Italian aid to Franco. Therefore, until his resignation as Foreign Secretary in February of 
1938, Eden was determined to make Non-Intervention effective.90 At an emergency 
Sunday Cabinet on the blockade issue on November 22nd, the division within Cabinet 
appeared to have been healed by a compromise solution. Belligerent rights would not be 
granted to Franco. To avoid the possibility of a confrontation between Britain and the 
Insurgent authorities, it was also decided that British registered shipping was not to be 
allowed to carry arms to Spain from any port. Thus the new legislation, the ‘Merchant 
Shipping, Carriage of Munitions to Spain Bill’, would close a loophole left open by 
earlier Non-Interventionist restrictions on British ships. The earlier restrictions had only 
prevented the export of war material from British ports.91
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The legislation marked a shift in British policy in the war. Needless to say, it was the 
subject of much comment in the press. In spite of the compromise reached in Cabinet 
between the opposing views of Hoare and Eden, the way in which the blockade was 
discussed in the press illustrated the disunity of the government on the issue of the war. It 
was becoming increasingly clear that the government was not able to speak to the press 
with a united voice. Comments made by both the leader articles and the lobby 
correspondents of a number of leading conservative newspapers gave the impression that 
the government was considering the granting of belligerent rights to Franco in the near 
future. Moreover, the same articles were clearly reporting what they had been told in 
official press briefings. On November 24th, the day after Eden announced to Parliament 
the measures the government intended to introduce, the Daily Telegraph published an 
article from its diplomatic correspondent, who, quoting from the “best informed 
quarters”, wrote that, in the near future, belligerent rights would be granted to Franco. 
The diplomatic correspondent of The Times agreed with that of The Daily Telegraph that 
belligerent rights would soon be granted, and that this had been “semi officially explained 
last night”. However the comments by these correspondents were in sharp contrast to 
the policy formulated in Cabinet.
Contrasting with reports in the quality conservative press was that of the diplomatic
t V icorrespondent of the Manchester Guardian on November 24 . His article made clear the 
division within official/government circles between those who supported the granting of 
belligerency rights to Franco and those who were opposed to it. The diplomatic 
correspondent pointed to the competition between these groups for the support of the
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press. Unlike those of either The Times or the Daily Telegraph, this correspondent was 
strongly influenced by the Edenite view against the granting of belligerent rights.94 
Whereas the correspondents for the two conservative papers had suggested that 
government circles expected belligerent rights to be granted to Franco in the near future, 
the opposite view was stated by the diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester 
Guardian. As to the views of the British government, the opening phrase of the article 
pointed very strongly to an official source: “the view was taken that to recognize [Franco 
as a belligerent] so soon after they [insurgents] have been recognized by Germany and 
Italy, would have led to widespread misunderstanding.”
Why should official sources be giving the press the impression that the government was 
seriously considering granting these rights? First of all, there was still no real 
centralization imposed over the dissemination of news and views from official sources to 
the press; a state of affairs that had been less important when the government had been 
united over Spanish policy. Yet, the possibility had always existed for ministers to follow 
their own agenda when briefing the lobby. A notable example of a minister who had 
occasionally taken advantage of this was Sir Samuel Hoare and he, of course, wanted 
belligerent rights to be granted to Franco immediately.95 Secondly, the issue of the Civil 
War was progressively to isolate Eden from his colleagues in Cabinet. In the main, 
ministers were less concerned about the dependence of Franco on German or Italian 
support than with the need to achieve a more durable understanding with the fascist 
states. Ultimately, this majority view was to undermine the efforts of Eden to make Non- 
Intervention more effective. It is conceivable, even at this stage, that in encouraging
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rumours among certain newspapers that the British government was seriously considering 
granting belligerent rights to Franco, those ministers or officials who were their 
inspiration were thinking of the likely reception of these stories by Germany, Italy and 
insurgent Spain. After all, as has already been stated, foreign governments looked to 
British newspapers for coded references to the true intentions of the British government 
on those matters of policy that could not be made more explicit in public. Meanwhile, Sir 
Samuel Hoare (albeit unsuccessfully) was to use his influence in Cabinet in an attempt to 
turn the Merchant Shipping Bill into a malevolent measure with which to strangle the 
Republican war effort. He wanted it to cut the Republic off from a whole variety of 
supplies from abroad, many of which could not be classified as war material.96
Treatment by the press of the Merchant Shipping Bill highlights some of the difficulties 
in determining the ways in which newspapers were lobbied. Central to the problem, is 
that government and press relations were conducted in secret; the rules of non-attribution, 
of course, obligated journalists not to name their sources. In this secretive world, it was 
not always clear even to insiders, just who had been the inspiration of particular stories 
that appeared in the press. Also, in a democratic state where it was not simply a question 
of newspaper editors being directly informed of what they could and could not print, 
contact between the media and the government often took a semi-official or even 
unofficial form. While contact between a correspondent and individuals close to 
government circles is indicated by phrases in newspaper articles, what is never clear is 
where that contact took place and whether other journalists were present. Whilst it is 
clear that on a number of occasions correspondents were being given a misleading version
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of events, it is likely that, at least in certain cases the correspondents themselves were 
willing participants in the deception. Indeed, the strong inference that the evidence came 
from government sources, added to the supposed reliability of the story being presented in 
the paper. Finally, editors and indeed proprietors were subject to influence. As 
mentioned previously, Dawson makes quite clear that, conversations, on the subject of 
Spain, took place with leading ministers or officials at the Beefsteak, for example. 
However, the content of the discussion inevitably went unrecorded. It may be that he was 
being asked to support a line of policy, or an attempt was made to secure his co-operation 
in the suppression of certain types of news, in view of its possible effects on international 
relations. As will be shown in later chapters, the editor and his deputy did suppress and 
even amend certain articles, yet such action may, on some occasions at least, have been 
prompted by their own interpretation of the effect of the article abroad, rather than due to 
any outside pressure.
News that first German and later, Italian, units of the armed forces were arriving in Spain 
had, of course, the effect of increasing the difficulties faced by the government. Indeed, 
the news reports that appeared in the British press gave very specific details about the 
actual number of foreign troops arriving in Spain. The dispatch of the Italian units of the 
CTV in December was conducted without any concern for secrecy, and the build up of 
Italian forces in Spain was to be far more substantial than that of Germany.97 
Furthermore, the CTV was very substantially reinforced throughout the Civil War, as a 
consequence of which, it was to play a key role in the major battles of the war. Press
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reports of the arrivals of the German and Italian units would only provoke further anti- 
German and anti-Italian feeling among the British public, compromising the policy of 
appeasement. As a result of the arrival of German and Italian troops, British policy 
towards the conflict underwent a further shift. The Cabinet decided to support a French 
initiative for a Franco-British appeal to Italy, Germany, Portugal and Russia. The aim 
was to persuade those powers most guilty of intervening in the Civil War to support an 
armistice in Spain. Official circles in London did not retain much faith in the French 
proposal, yet to support it publicly would, of course, divert attention away from the 
actions of both Germany and Italy in Spain. Furthermore, it would put pressure on the 
French government to resist calls for the abandoning of Non-Intervention.
fhIn spite of government reservations, when, on December 9 , the Foreign Office News
Department informed the press of the armistice initiative, the official sources were
deliberately upbeat. The effect of this can be seen in the reception of the news in a
number of leading conservative papers. On December 10th the view of the Yorkshire Post
was that “there is some reason to doubt whether one, at least of the dictatorships is
anxious to drive intervention in Spain to the point at which it would involve a European
war.”98 The confidence expressed in this paper reflected the views of diplomatic
correspondents for conservative papers in general. Their articles revealed the official
inspiration for both their stories and their confidence in the success of the initiative. For
example, the diplomatic correspondent of The Times wrote,
if however, non-intervention were to be made binding and effective by 
agreement between the powers, even at this date however it might be 
found possible to make a united approach to the two sides in the hope of
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99arranging an armistice.
The leader article in the Daily Telegraph came to the same confident conclusion as that of 
The Times. It emphasized the importance of achieving the agreement of the European 
powers in order to bring the war to an end. In the leader devoted to this particular issue, 
the official inspiration for the confidence being expressed was clearly shown in the 
phrase, “it is felt in London.”100 Even The Morning Post, in spite of its desire for an 
outright victory for the insurgents, betrayed the official influence in its coverage of the 
initiative: “The action of the British and French governments has nevertheless given 
much satisfaction in diplomatic circles.” 101
Reference has already been made to the use of conservative newspapers as an unofficial 
means of communication with the German and Italian governments. Over the issue of 
Axis power military intervention in Spain, the evidence strongly suggests that their 
support, especially that of The Times, was being sought by the government. News 
columns relayed the confidence of official circles of the positive benefits to Germany 
should she adopt a more neutral policy towards the conflict. No doubt, the editor was 
concerned that overt fascist military assistance to Franco would encourage the expression 
of public hostility towards them, thereby provoking the officially inspired German and 
Italian press into making less than spontaneous reactions against Britain. Indeed, 
throughout December, The Times offered consistent support to the official line that 
warned those powers that intervened in the war of the likely consequences for 
international peace. On December 22nd, Barrington-Ward met Eden at the latter’s 
request, in order to discuss Spain. The importance that Eden attached to the way in which
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The Times supported the government line was demonstrated by his expression of extreme 
gratitude to Barrington-Ward. Because of the standing of The Times abroad, Eden felt 
confident that its warnings would give encouragement to the more moderate elements 
within the German government who would argue against the escalation of German 
military intervention.102 The deputy editor was only too willing to continue to lend the 
support of his paper. For two days after the meeting with Eden, the leader asserted that 
foreign intervention in Spain threatened to escalate the conflict to other areas in 
Europe.103 This assertion was repeated in the leader for December 28th.104 The leader of 
24th had coincided with a further Franco-British appeal to Italy, Germany and Russia; 
requesting their co-operation in halting the sending of ‘volunteers’ to Spain. At their 
meeting on December 22nd, Eden had expressed his doubts to Barrington-Ward that the 
moderates could prevail in Germany, and Barrington-Ward shared Eden’s misgivings.105 
Such privately held pessimism did not dampen the enthusiasm of The Times in its 
advocacy of the armistice idea. That Barrington-Ward was willing, even at the risk of 
compromising the integrity of The Times itself, to lend his support to the government at a 
time when it was energetically attempting to secure international co-operation, is a 
reflection of the especially close relationship which existed between this newspaper and 
the Conservative dominated National Government. The support of The Times was 
especially important considering the rumours about the rapid German military build up in 
Spain which were being circulated by other newspapers; a factor likely to be the cause of 
a press war, even, perhaps, of a diplomatic crisis between Britain and Germany.106
136
Some officials, in order to deflect attention away from the German and Italian military
presence in Spain, used the opportunity afforded by press briefings to persuade
correspondents that the German presence was only at a volunteer and, therefore,
unofficial level. Of course, their motivation was the desire to do everything possible to
limit potential damage to Anglo-German relations. The success of these attempts can be
seen in a number of conservative papers. Consider, for example, the report of the
diplomatic correspondent of the Daily Mail on December 2nd. He confidently declared,
there was no official knowledge that they [German troops] had been 
transported in bulk or with equipment or arms. It was pointed out that 
if such had been the case the authorities would certainly have received 
information of the movement.107
On the same day, the diplomatic correspondent of the Morning Post pointed out that 
according to “official circles” there was no evidence that the Germans “wore uniforms, or
10ftwere troops, or showed any military formation.” In fact the information being supplied 
through the lobby was false. Indeed, nothing could have been further from the truth. The 
Condor Legion detailed for service in Spain was, after all, a unit of the Luftwaffe. Spain, 
in fact, would become the laboratory testing ground for the new Blitzkrieg tactics, which 
the German forces were to employ with devastating effect in Poland, Western Europe and 
the Soviet Union during World War Two. In order to ensure that senior Luftwaffe 
officers received combat experience, Goering, Minister for Aviation and head of the 
Luftwaffe, was deliberately to rotate the command of the legion.109 Moreover, on the 
same day that these misleading stories appeared in the British press, the Secretary of State 
for Air informed his colleagues in Cabinet that it had been known for some time that not 
only were German aeroplanes being used by Franco’s forces but that these were being
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maintained by German personnel. This comment was in sharp contrast to the official line 
being put out through the lobby that the Germans arriving in Spain were non- uniformed 
volunteers.110 In fact, from late August, the War Office in London had been aware that as 
well as bomber aircraft, Germany had sent pilots and mechanics to the insurgents in 
Spain.111
The government, however, continued in its inability to provide a united front in the way 
in which the news of the German and Italian military intervention was reported to the 
press. The lack of unity within the government is demonstrated in the response to Eden’s 
extreme concern over the arrival of Italian troops in Spain in mid December. For he 
nevertheless failed, at the Cabinet meeting on December 16th, to persuade his colleagues 
to support a stronger line of action against Italy for her part in escalating the crisis in 
Spain.112 The continued erosion of the united approach in government circles over the 
Civil War had far reaching effects. The Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, 
Vansittart, was becoming increasingly concerned at the German activities in Spain. As 
has been stated previously, he had formed an especially close contact with F.A. Voigt of 
the Manchester Guardian . Voigt was a member of the Z Organization. This was an 
intelligence service run for the benefit of Vansittart. Its purpose was to keep him 
informed about developments inside Nazi Germany. Far from wishing to downplay the 
potential threat of Nazi Germany to British interests, Vansittart and Leeper were agreed 
that its full implications should be publicized in the press. Therefore, both men used the 
News Department to give journalists their own assessment of conditions in Germany and 
the state of German rearmament. The aim of their briefings was to encourage a
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pessimistic view of Germany. Vansittart was especially open in his communication with
11^Voigt, who wrote a number of articles concerning the German influence in Spain. 
These appeared at various intervals in the first six months of the Civil War. On 
December 2nd, for example, in complete contrast to the officially inspired stories 
appearing that day in the conservative press, Voigt, as diplomatic correspondent of The 
Manchester Guardian, stressed the significance of German military intervention in Spain. 
He gave very specific details about how both troops and supplies were being exported to 
Spain, and how the German authorities were at pains to maintain the secrecy of this 
operation.114 It cannot simply be coincidence that Voigt’s article appeared on the same 
day that the Cabinet received confirmation of the arrival of regular German troops in 
Spain. Whether Voigt’s information came from his own contacts in Germany or was 
provided by his contacts in the News Department is not clear. What is certain is that he 
was writing with Vansittart’s approval. A serious consequence of this, of course, was the
t V iimpact of such articles on Germany and Italy. On December 16 , the Home Secretary 
informed his colleagues in Cabinet of the damage being done to Anglo-German relations 
as a result of the publicity which was being given to the German military intervention in 
Spain, one effect of which was to intensify anti-German feeling in Britain.115
The experience of the first six months of the Civil War did not augur well for the 
government in the future. After all, it was at this, the early phase of the conflict that the 
government had several advantages in its efforts at building a broad consensus of support 
for its policy concerning Spain. Firstly, the government could argue, quite convincingly, 
that Non-Intervention in Spain was indeed linked to appeasement in Europe. Secondly, at
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the outbreak of the fighting, Parliament was about to go into recess. Therefore, the 
essentials of Non-Intervention policies could be drawn up out of the glare of the political 
opposition. Thirdly, there was widespread support across the country in favour of Non- 
Intervention. Yet, the press was able to maintain sufficient independence in order to 
mount an effective opposition to the government. During the parliamentary recess, it was 
sections of the liberal and left press which pointed out the flaws of Non-Intervention, as 
being a policy which succeeded in undermining the Republican war effort but which also 
failed to stop Franco receiving help from abroad.
By the end of the year, it was becoming clear that the Civil War was going to have a 
continually divisive effect on public opinion at home, and would undermine efforts to 
appease both Germany and Italy. The failure of Franco to take Madrid, the 
transformation of the uprising into a civil war caused by this, together with increasing 
foreign assistance to Franco, forced the British government to reconsider the influence of 
the press both at home and abroad. By November, the government had specific evidence 
that press criticism of German and Italian activity in Spain was detrimental to British 
diplomatic relations. With the collapse of the negotiations for a new five-power 
conference to replace the defunct Treaty of Locarno, the Non-Intervention Committee in 
London was to be the means by which Britain would try to improve relations with both 
Germany and Italy. It was thus symbolic and indeed apt, that the Non-Intervention 
Committee would meet in the Locarno room of the Foreign Office. Official circles in 
London came to the conclusion that the press had a part to play in improving international 
relations. Given that the Spanish Civil War had become an issue dividing the Great
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Powers, if the press could be persuaded to express faith in the ability of those nations to 
refrain from taking sides in Spain, it was hoped this would lessen tension in Europe. 
Thus, newspapers were being asked to put across an official point of view, a view in 
which among government circles there was very little confidence.
In a parliamentary state, the ability of the government to secure the compliance of the 
press was, of course, limited. The first six months of the Civil War had demonstrated the 
obvious fact that the government was more likely to find support from the ranks of the 
conservative press. It was in these newspapers that support for the official line was 
strongest, since they were more willing to co-operate in the broader strategy of the 
government whose priority was the appeasement of Germany and Italy. Yet, even if 
editors and proprietors were in general agreement with the course of national policy and, 
as a result, would suppress certain items of news, such action was, as we shall see later, to 
provoke criticism from journalists working for those papers who did not share the 
confidence of their employers in the policy being pursued. Also, all newspapers fell foul 
of the dictators by printing articles describing their intervention in Spain. Thus, on the 
basis of the evidence available, it appears that the government saw the value of 
newspapers as an ally, but also their potential to undermine its support and to mobilize 
opposition. The British government operated in a closed political system, with power 
being weighted firmly towards the Conservative dominated coalition government. Even 
so, such was the divisive impact of the Spanish Civil War on British opinion, that even 
amongst conservative newspapers there was to be no consistent support for the 
government line. The independence of the press, combined with the controversial nature
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of the Spanish Civil War, had, by the end of 1936, caused the press to be regarded in 
official circles as something of a loose cannon, which could not be ignored.
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CHAPTER FOUR; THE STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN A CONSERVATIVE
CONSENSUS IN THE FACE OF GROWING AXIS INTERVENTION IN THE 
WAR.
1937 was a problematic year for government and conservative press relations. The 
continued and much publicized intervention by both Germany and Italy in the Civil War 
had a destabilizing effect on official attempts to maintain consensus, such as there was, in 
the press in support of government policy. Moreover, the ever-growing divisions within 
government circles regarding the Spanish Civil War exacerbated the difficulty of 
maintaining consensus. As a result, government press strategy was undermined by the 
continued inability of official sources to speak with one voice when communicating with 
the press.
Cockett, in Twilight o f Truth, claims that the visit of Lord Halifax to Germany in 
November of 1937 was of crucial importance in the development of government and 
press relations.1 According to this view, it was not until then that Halifax, and, as a result, 
the British government, became aware of the extent to which British press criticism of the 
dictators could actually harm Anglo-German relations. Thus, on his return, Halifax urged 
his colleagues in government to persuade the press of the need to damp down criticism of 
the dictators. At the time the significance of the Halifax visit was exaggerated. Claud 
Cockbum, editor of The Week, claimed that at Cliveden, on the weekend of 23rd' 24th 
October, a plot was hatched between the Astors, the proprietors of The Observer, and
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their guests.3 This involved sending Halifax to Berlin, to offer Hitler a ‘free hand’ in 
Europe in exchange for his abandonment of German claims for colonies in Africa.4
However, the Halifax visit of November 1937 has to be placed within the wider context 
of the Anglo-German contacts that preceded it.5 As we have already seen, long before 
1937, in fact, there can have been no doubt as to the effect of British press criticism of the 
fascist States. British newspapers, since they had correspondents posted abroad, were 
well used to the dilemma posed by British journalists, for whom press freedom was the 
norm, reporting from countries, such as Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy, where the media 
was heavily censored.6 Such juxtaposition was likely to lead to friction between British
t l i  •foreign correspondents and the host country. On April 6 1934, the right-wing daily the 
Morning Post fell foul of the Nazi authorities. The critical reporting of the Nazi 
government by its Berlin correspondent occasioned an attack on the paper by the Nazi 
Volkischer Beobachter. This was to lead eventually, in December 1936, to the expulsion 
from Germany of the paper’s Berlin correspondent.
After 1933, contact between the British press and the highest levels of the Nazi 
government in Berlin had been established through the visits of a number of leading 
editors and proprietors. The high level of the contacts that the representatives of the 
British media had managed to establish meant that they must have been aware of the 
attitude of the German government towards criticism by the British. For example, 
William Warldorf Astor had visited Germany as part of a Christian Science delegation. 
Whilst there, he had the opportunity of witnessing Hitler’s temper. When the German
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Chancellor asked why Britain was so unfriendly towards the Nazis, Astor replied, “it 
cannot be otherwise as long as you persist in your policy towards the Jews.” At this
Q
comment “Hitler went literally berserk and had to be calmed down by his aides.” 
During June 1936, Barrington-Ward spent four days in Berlin. Here, he had the 
opportunity of talking with Rudolf Hess, the Deputy Fuhrer.9 Viscount Rothermere, with 
whom Hitler seemed very impressed, made several visits to Berchtesgaden, Hitler’s 
retreat in the Bavarian Alps. The first visit was in September 1936, the second in 
December 1937, and the final one was in May 1938. Rothermere and his son, Esmond, 
were two of the only four foreigners invited to attend Hitler’s first dinner party as 
Chancellor at his official residence in Berlin.10 On this occasion, they had the opportunity 
to meet leading members of the German political establishment, including Goebbels, 
Goering, and Von Ribbentrop.
Von Ribbentrop, who became the German ambassador to London, was very confident of 
his ability to establish close links with the British establishment, in order to facilitate an 
improvement of the relations between the two countries. Beaverbrook had met both 
Hitler and Von Ribbentrop during a visit to Germany in 1935. In an attempt to establish 
friendly relations with Beaverbrook, Von Ribbentrop invited him to visit Germany for the 
Olympic Games in 1936.11 Von Ribbentrop also attempted to establish a connection with 
Dawson. In 1936 therefore, he asked Tom Jones, who was accompanying Lloyd George 
on a visit to Germany, to request Dawson’s help in getting his son, Rudolph, into Eton.12 
Dawson met Von Ribbentrop during the latter’s capacity as ambassador13, and in April 
1937 Dawson visited Germany.14 The inference to be drawn is that there was a conscious
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attempt by the German authorities to canvass the support of the British press, which they 
regarded as an influential British institution. This would offer some explanation as to 
why access to the highest levels of the Nazi leadership was given to proprietors and 
editors. The evidence would suggest that long before Halifax’s visit to Berlin, there 
could not have been much room doubt in the minds of the Fleet Street establishment of its 
own potential for damaging Anglo-German relations.
By 1936, the dilemma facing the press was that while it did not wish to exacerbate 
tension in Europe between the democracies and the dictator states, editors and proprietors 
were genuinely appalled by the behaviour of the dictators. It would be very difficult for a 
newspaper such as The Times, with its reputation for the integrity of its journalism, to be 
consistently sympathetic to the sensitivity of dictators to press criticism. After all, neither 
Hitler nor Mussolini had any regard for the freedom of his own press, nor for the civil 
rights of his own citizens. In any case, the anomaly between unstinting praise in the leader 
columns compared with the evidence of the brutality of their regimes as made available in 
the news columns would have raised questions concerning the independence and, indeed, 
quality of journalism in The Times. The problem faced by the British press at this time 
was paralleled in international relations by the difficulties being faced by western 
democratic governments in dealing with the more aggressive dictator governments of 
Germany and Italy. The 1930s was a particularly dangerous and uncertain period. The 
collapse of representative government in Germany and the rise of National Socialism 
altered the established rules of international relations. Nazi Germany, in particular, 
showed a blatant disregard for international treaties signed in the twenties and thirties, to
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which, unlike the ‘dictat’ at Versailles, she had been a willing party. It was ultimately to 
prove impossible for British and French statesmen to find a modus vivendi with Fascism. 
The growing opposition of the press towards both Germany and Italy was to be a constant 
reminder to the British government of the limited extent to which any effective 
accommodation could be reached between diametrically opposed systems of government.
From January 1937 onwards, Italian and German intervention in the Spanish Civil War 
caused further divisions in the British Cabinet, which resulted in the progressive isolation 
of Eden from most of his colleagues. Eden, unlike most of his ministerial colleagues, was 
becoming increasingly concerned at the strategic implications of the assistance being 
given by Mussolini and Hitler to their Spanish protege. The press realized such 
implications also. Only the liberal and left press were critical of government policy on 
the Civil war on the grounds that it was prejudicial to the interests of the Republican 
cause in Spain. Where criticism now appeared in sections of the conservative press, it 
was concerned with the military involvement of both Axis powers on behalf of the 
Nationalist cause. This, in turn, triggered a hostile reaction among the government- 
controlled newspapers in both Rome and Berlin. In the period leading up to November 
1937, there were to be a number of such instances which, in turn were to persuade both 
government and press of the capacity of an independent press to inflict damage on 
relations between Britain and the dictator powers.
During January 1937, several articles appeared in the French press on the supposed build 
up of a German military presence in Spanish Morocco. On January 9th, The Times
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published an article written by its Paris correspondent, David Scott, which stated, “Ceuta 
is being turned into a formidable fortress by German engineers and German heavy 
guns.”15 The British government, in the hope of being able to refute French press reports, 
approached The Times, requesting that a special correspondent be sent to the Spanish 
zone in Morocco. It was hoped that the influence of The Times would help to ease 
international tension, especially that between France and Germany, which the reporting of 
the rumours in French newspapers had provoked. However, the special correspondent 
sent out by The Times did nothing to allay the rumours that were appearing in French 
newspapers. On January 12 , The Times published his article. It referred to Melilla as a 
German naval base and also mentioned the establishment of a German submarine depot 
there. This would have obvious and long-term implications for the freedom of French 
and British traffic through the Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore, the aerodrome and 
seaplane station, which it was also claimed that the Germans had established, were, 
according to the correspondent, occupied by German technical staff. In addition, it was 
claimed that the aerodrome was used by German Junker and Domier aircraft and Spanish 
aircraft. The Germans were also supposed to have established a base at Tetuan.16 As well 
as the substantial military and naval activity, the correspondent described the German 
economic penetration of Spanish Morocco: “The Rif iron mines and the less important 
iron mines near Melilla are being reorganized by German experts and the bulk of their 
products, it is believed, is now going to Germany.” In the conclusion of his article, the 
correspondent referred to attempts made by the Germans to undermine French imperial 
authority within neighbouring French Morocco because the “ Nazis present themselves as 
true protectors of the Arabs.”
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The threat posed by this article to both Anglo-German and Franco-German relations was 
taken seriously by the Foreign Office in London. The lengthy article, which encouraged 
the nightmare vision of the French authorities, that the Germans were indeed exploiting 
Franco’s dependence upon their help in order to advance their own strategic interests in 
North Africa, had come at a particularly unfortunate juncture. The previous day, Hitler 
had made a public pledge to France promising to respect the territorial integrity of French 
and Spanish Morocco. The editorial in the Daily Telegraph on January 12th was 
optimistic about Hitler’s assurances to France.17 Moreover, the article of its Paris 
correspondent for the same day was confident that, following Hitler’s assurances to the 
French, there would now be an easing of the tension between the powers. Yet, despite the 
much higher circulation figures of the Daily Telegraph, the status of The Times of 
London abroad was such, that its lengthy article largely confirming French fears was 
viewed with great concern by official circles in London. The Times article, written by 
Scott, was reprinted in the French colonial newspaper Petit Morocain based in 
Casablanca. The British Consular General at Tangier sent a copy of it to the Foreign
Office News Department in London. Leeper’s response was that “The Times should not
1 8have printed the article.” George Mounsey, head of the Western European Department 
at the Foreign Office, also expressed both concern and exasperation since the article 
appeared just as tension between France and Germany was easing: “[t]his article was 
published here first after the final French and German assurances had been exchanged 
and the atmosphere was slightly improved.” Indeed Mounsey, in his memo, concluded 
that if the French press by contributing to scare stories did not succeed in bringing about a
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European war, the English press stood a fair chance of doing so. Even allowing for 
exaggeration, official circles in London had a clear understanding of the impact of the 
British press on international relations. Furthermore, the episode was another example of 
the belief in British official circles that the conservative press could be a useful ally in 
easing tension between Britain and the dictatorships. After all, the crisis caused by the 
special correspondent’s article had been the result of official lobbying of The Times to 
send out a reporter. The concluding comment of one foreign office official on the affair 
was, “ we shall be very careful of encouraging correspondents in the future if they are 
going to let us down in this way.”19
Given the closeness of its association with the National Government, it is hardly likely 
that The Times ever intended to compromise Britain’s relations with Germany, or to 
exacerbate Franco-German tension over Morocco. However, the British government 
acknowledged that even if the stories of German military penetration of Spanish Morocco 
were exaggerated, there had certainly been considerable German economic activity there.
tHEden pointed this out to his colleagues during the Cabinet meeting of January 13 . He 
informed them that large amounts of iron ore required for the German armaments 
industry were being shipped from Spanish Morocco to Germany.20 Nevertheless, it was 
an issue that the British government wanted played down and Eden reminded his 
colleagues that it was the government that had asked The Times to send a special 
correspondent to Morocco. Later, the Nationalist authorities invited both British and 
French correspondents to visit Spanish Morocco. The intention was to dispel finally the 
rumours relating to German military and economic activity. The Royal Navy destroyer,
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HMS Vanoc, called at Ceuta and Melilla and on board were special correspondents from 
the British press. The reporters from the conservative press concluded that the allegations 
made against the Germans with regard to Spanish Morocco were false. On January 14th 
Christopher Martin, the special correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, denied that a 
German stronghold had been established at Ceuta.21
The reports sent back by the special correspondent for The Times contrasted with those 
reports of the German military build up printed in the same paper only a few days before. 
Having toured both Ceuta and Melilla, the correspondent tempered the allegations made 
only a few days before by his newspaper. Take, for example, the following statement 
from a report published in The Times on January 15th: “[a] rapid tour of the Tetuan and 
Ceuta areas confirms the view that no military incursion has been made by the 
Germans.”22 In a report titled “UNCENSORED”, and published in The Times on January
tfi18 , the same correspondent emphasized the freedom he had been granted to travel in the 
rebel held zone. However, he was not allowed to travel to Melilla, nor were the British 
officers of HMS Vanoc, although they too were invited to inspect Spanish Morocco. 
Although the correspondent did not actually refute allegations that there had been 
considerable German activity, he stressed the economic rather than military 
intervention. The view of some officials in the Foreign Office in London was that The 
Times had not gone far enough in backtracking from its earlier alarmist style of reporting. 
Yet this was in spite of the fact that on January 24th another correspondent based in Paris 
had denied there was any evidence of a significant German presence in Spanish Morocco. 
In fact, the correspondent had largely retracted the allegations that had come previously
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from this source. Nevertheless, once again, the British Consul at Tangier questioned the 
veracity of the article. This was no doubt because the Paris correspondent did not 
categorically refute all the allegations of significant German activity in Spanish Morocco. 
Indeed, he advised that the situation in Melilla required careful watching.24
In fact, the government shared the concern of The Times regarding the strategic as well as 
the economic implications of developments in Spanish Morocco. Reports concerning the 
construction of anti-aircraft and coastal artillery facilities along the Spanish Moroccan 
coast, which might endanger the freedom of Mediterranean shipping and even the security 
of Gibraltar itself, were taken seriously by the British authorities in Gibraltar. In the 
course of 1937-8, it was a matter for repeated discussion in government, and internal 
government documents reveal that official concern was far greater than the government 
was prepared to admit publicly.25 Clearly, there were those in official positions such as 
the British Consul at Tangier who, in view of the delicate nature of international relations 
in the later thirties, did not want the British press to print a more or less accurate 
assessment of the threat posed to long term British strategic and economic interests by the 
German presence in Spanish Morocco. There are different possible explanations 
explaining the change in tack, particularly in the attitude of The Times. On the one hand, 
given the evidence that both official and ministerial circles were concerned at the possible 
impact the earlier reports might have on Anglo-German relations, it is probable that the 
editor or his deputy would have been informed of the attitude of the government on this 
matter, and that pressure was exerted. A further explanation is that the Nationalist 
authorities sought to diffuse the crisis provoked by the publication of stories concerning
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the build up of the German military presence in Spanish Morocco. After all, they invited 
journalists to visit the area where, ostensibly, they had freedom to write uncensored 
dispatches. This would have provided the opportunity of reassuring journalists and 
visiting British naval officers. By restricting access to those areas of Spanish Morocco 
the rebel authorities wanted them to see, they could also prevent the sending back, to 
London, of accounts which might indicate a German military presence if, for example, 
access to Melilla had not been denied.
The Moroccan crisis is significant also as an example of how even the foreign press might 
create tensions between Britain and Germany. The Paris correspondent of a British 
newspaper for example, could pick up scare stories in the French press. After all it was 
the appearance of articles in French newspapers that had initially prompted the 
government, via The Times, to investigate allegations of German intervention in 
Morocco. The response provoked in the Foreign Office by those first reports is a clear 
demonstration that, nearly nine months before Halifax’s visit to Berlin, official circles 
were already convinced of the power of the press either to damage or to assist the policy 
of appeasement.
In the spring of 1937, Italian reverses in battles near Madrid were to be the cause of a 
serious deterioration in relations between Italy and Britain. As we have seen, the problem 
for the conservative press was that, publicly, the British government remained committed 
to Non-Intervention in Spain. The continued presence of Italian and German units 
fighting on the side of the Nationalist forces was a flagrant breach of this agreement.
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Previously, in the late winter of 1937, Italian units of the CTV had played a key part in 
the campaign to capture the southeastern coastal city of Malaga, held by the Republicans 
since the beginning of the war. In February the city fell. The confidence brought about 
by this in Italian military circles encouraged General Roatta, formerly head of Italian
• • 77Military Intelligence and currently head of the Italian units serving in Spain, to demand 
a bigger role for the CTV in the fighting in Spain in general.28 Franco, while not wishing 
to relinquish his overall control over military operations, agreed to an Italian led offensive 
to the north east of Madrid near the town of Guadalajara. The offensive, which began on 
the 8th March, although successful at first, became bogged down in mud, with the onset of 
bad weather. The slowing down of the Italian advance made possible a Republican 
counter- offensive on 18th March. The psychological effect of the victory on the Republic 
was great. Not only were the crack Italian Black Shirt and Littorio divisions defeated, but 
also the capture of the town of Brihuega from the Nationalists represented the first 
Republican victory of the Civil War.
The British press reported on Italian difficulties in great detail. Simply by reporting 
Italy’s breaches of Non-Intervention in Spain, the conservative press was instrumental in 
undermining any sympathy among its readership for the Italian predicament. On March 
11th, Eugene de Caux, The Times correspondent in Madrid during the Civil War, 
estimated that there were 15 000 Italians taking part in the battle of Guadalajara.29 On 
March 22nd, the headlines in The Times on the Italian defeat at Guadalajara read, 
“MADRID TROOPS PUSH ON “ ITALIANS RETREAT; and “BIG CAPTURES OF 
WAR MATERIAL.”30 The correspondent also declared,
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[t]he defeat at Brihuega was drastic and decisive. The Italian losses out here 
have been very heavy. The roads and fields round Brihuega are strewn with 
rifles, gas masks and other war material thrown away.
Yet, from Mussolini’s point of view, more serious than the losses of men and material 
was the damage to his prestige. Earlier, he had boasted of Italian military prowess. 
Indeed, as The Times correspondent pointed out, “[a]fter losing Brihuega the Italian 
forces it is stated here, did not attempt to make a stand.” In The Daily Telegraph, the 
headlines on the Italian defeat were, “BIG CAPTURE OF ARMS BY GOVERNMENT 
FORCES”, and, “RETREAT FROM BRIHUEGA IS THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT 
RETREAT OF THE NATIONALISTS SINCE THE CIVIL WAR BEGAN.” 31 Heniy 
Buckley, the Madrid correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, like de Caux, listed the 
material left behind by the retreating Italians. In addition, he drew attention to the capture 
by Republican troops of documents in which the Italians admitted to the presence of some 
50 000 men in Spain.
In the spring of 1937, the ability of the British government to exert pressure even on 
conservative papers was, of course, hampered by the too obvious fact that Italy was in 
clear breach of Non-Intervention. Much to the concern of the British Foreign Office, the 
continuation of Italian intervention in the Spanish struggle only encouraged further anti-
tliItalian feeling in Britain. Leeper in a memo of April 7 to his colleague, Sir Orme
Sargent, showed his awareness of the difficulty of government efforts to persuade the
press to show greater sensitivity towards Italy at this time:
What is disturbing about Italy’s Spanish policy is that it is being conducted 
with so flagrant a disregard for feelings aroused in this country that what
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originated as anti-Communist policy and not anti-British may develop into a 
violent and acrimonious dispute between England and Italy.
The difficulty that Leeper foresaw, resulting from Italian actions in Spain, was not helped 
by the refusal of The Times to agree to his suggestion that it print articles reviewing the 
British and Italian outlook on the major questions which divided the two countries, and 
which “envenom their relations.” Leeper’s motive was to persuade The Times to use its 
influence abroad to improve British relations with a dictatorship. Although hostile 
towards the Spanish Republic, his main concern in international affairs was how to 
counter the threat posed by the emergence of Nazi Germany. His solution was to achieve 
an Anglo-Italian rapprochement, thus driving a wedge between the fascist States, in the 
process of which Germany would be isolated in Europe. For Leeper, the Spanish Civil 
War was really a contest between the communists and their opponents in Spain. 
Therefore, foreign intervention had only muddied the waters. In referring to how the 
press viewed the Civil War, he wrote that if Non-Intervention had been effective and “the 
issue were purely between Franco and Valencia [then] the result might be very 
different.”34 In Leeper’s analysis, the overt support of Hitler and Mussolini for the 
Spanish Nationalists encouraged a hostile attitude in Britain towards Nationalist Spain 
and made it difficult for the News Department to cultivate sympathetic treatment for 
Franco in the British press. Therefore, he wrote, “[i]t will not be easy to get any 
sympathy for Franco so long as he is backed by the people who are most disliked here 
[Hitler and Mussolini].”
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Those conservative newspapers that had given extensive coverage to the Italian 
intervention in Spain saw no reason why intervention by either Italy or Germany should 
be a stumbling block to the policy of appeasement. The entry in Dawson’s diary for 
March 21st, for example, shows that he was dismissive about the Italian defeat at
i f  •
Guadalajara: “No great news -Italian ‘volunteers’ on the run in Spain.” In general his 
diary in the years of the Civil War reflected his dislike of the Spanish government, to 
whom on numerous occasions he referred as the “Reds”. Clearly, given Dawson’s right 
wing political views, the epithet was meant to be pejorative. Significantly, there was no 
reference in The Times leader columns to the Battle of Guadalajara, nor was there any 
reference to the Italian refusal to withdraw troops from the Spanish war. Following the 
defeat, the Italian government publicly announced its refusal to withdraw any troops from 
Spain. Had the editor or his deputy wanted to express the disapproval of the paper in the 
strongest possible terms, it would have been delivered in the leader column where the 
opinion of The Times was pronounced. The evidence would suggest, therefore, that the 
editorial staff were trying to contain the inevitable decline in Anglo-Italian relations, 
towards which even The Times had contributed. The leader in the Daily Telegraph made 
light of the Italian refusal, arguing that far more serious would have been “[rjefusal on the 
part of Italy to take any further share in the efforts to prevent reinforcements and 
munitions going to Spain.”36 It expressed confidence that Italy would not deviate from 
international co-operation. This was shown in the following: “[a]s yet the powers have to 
contemplate no such [change in] attitude on the part of the Italian government.” This 
newspaper’s confidence in Italian good faith continued unabated. On March 27 , for 
example, the leader comment was as follows: “at present no reason exists for believing
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that Italy will relax the restrictions which, in common with other powers she has imposed
7^on volunteers.” Thus both The Times and the Daily Telegraph which had contributed to 
the crisis in Anglo-Italian relations in the spring, were attempting, albeit in rather 
different ways, to minimize the crisis. The Times editorial policy was based on a policy 
of omission, with no discussion of Italy in the leader columns, whereas in the Daily 
Telegraph, the emphasis was on ‘talking up’ the prospects of Italian co-operation in the 
Non-Intervention Committee.
In spite of the efforts made by the editors of The Times and the Daily Telegraph to tone 
down criticism of Italy’s breach of the Non-Intervention Agreement, the effect of British 
press treatment of the battle of Guadalajara on Anglo-Italian relations was both 
immediate and of more lasting implication for international relations, than had been The 
Times reporting of German infiltration of Morocco in the previous January. The Italian 
ambassador to London, Count Grandi, raised the Italian objections with Viscount 
Cranbome, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Grandi told the minister of 
Mussolini’s annoyance at British press reporting of the Italian defeat. Indeed the issue 
was raised in the discussions of the British Cabinet at its meeting on March 24th. This 
was only two days after the appearance in the British press of the first reports of the 
Italian defeat.38 Indeed, the discussion was no doubt influenced by the fact that the British 
ambassador to Rome, Sir Eric Drummond, had recently been informed by Count Ciano, 
the Italian foreign minister, of the Italian government’s displeasure at the reporting by 
British newspapers of the recent Italian defeat in Spain. 39 As we shall see later in this 
chapter, the affront to Mussolini’s vanity caused by the Guadalajara articles was to
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initiate a crisis in Anglo-Italian relations, which was to fester throughout the ensuing 
months.
During the spring and summer of 1937, the Nationalists gradually completed the conquest 
of Northern Spain. The eventual loss to the Republic of the industrial areas of Asturias 
and of the Basque Provinces was a severe blow to the Republican war effort. Since 
Britain was dependent on the import of Spanish raw materials for her armaments 
industry, Nationalist military successes also increased their economic bargaining position 
in their relations with Britain. The Germans and Italians also continued to play a major 
role in the campaigns. The German military “seized the chance to use Spain as a living 
laboratory for their own military programme. Spanish civilians were the first Europeans 
to suffer the devastating consequences of dive bombing and carpet bombing 
techniques.”40 In the Northern Campaign, such techniques were used to deadly effect 
against the Basque towns of Durango and Guernica. The bombing of Durango and 
Guernica provoked a mixed response from the conservative press. George Steer, the 
special correspondent for The Times at Bilbao, placed the blame for the destruction of 
Guernica on the Nationalists, and referred specifically to the involvement of German 
aeroplanes. Following widespread condemnation of the attack on Guernica, which 
Steer’s article had done much to create, the Nationalist authorities began to concoct the 
story that retreating Basque defenders had destroyed the town.41 However, on May 6th 
The Times printed a lengthy article by Steer denying this version by the Nationalist 
authorities. Steer wrote, “the statement issued from Salamanca that Guernica was 
destroyed by “Red” incendiaries is false.” 42
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In order to strengthen his initial report, Steer gave specific details of the types of German 
bomber aircraft that had been used in the attack. Whereas the leader column of The
thTimes had been silent about the Italian involvement at Guadalajara, on April 28 , the day 
of Steer’s first article on Guernica, the leader column denounced the German air raid as 
counter-productive, and likely to stiffen rather than to undermine Basque resistance.43 
The Daily Telegraph, whilst acknowledging the responsibility of Nationalist planes for 
the attack, made no specific reference to the role played by German machines. The 
Yorkshire Post was more ambiguous about the causes of the destruction of Guernica. In 
its first reference to the air raid, on April 28th, it referred to Basque accusations against 
Germany.44 On April 28th and 30th, it reported the Nationalist denial of any responsibility 
for the bombing. The Morning Post acknowledged the destruction of Guernica as an 
atrocity, but refused to accept that the Nationalists were automatically to blame, and 
advised “the suspension of judgment until inquiry has established the unquestionable 
facts.”45 On April 28th, the Daily Mail published an article on the raid, and surprisingly, 
given the sympathies of the paper, pinned the blame on Germany: “more than 8oo 
civilians were killed in three and a half hours of bombing by German aeroplanes.” 46 
Another paper sympathetic to the Nationalist cause, The Observer, similarly laid the 
blame on Germany: “there can be no mincing of words about so horrible and stupid an 
atrocity. Little doubt remains that it was the exclusive work of German aeroplanes and 
German bombs.” 47
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The varied response of the conservative press to the destruction of Guernica was a further 
illustration of the dilemma faced by the press in its dealings with the fascist powers. 
There remained a consensus among conservative papers that the Civil War posed a risk to 
European peace, and conservative papers wanted to avoid the nightmare scenario of an 
alignment of Britain and France against Germany. Yet, their perception of the fascist 
powers was influenced by their distaste for the internal policies of both Italy and 
Germany, as well as for their external policies as demonstrated in Spain. The 
conservative press could not refrain from condemnation of the attack on open towns in 
Spain. After all, since the development of bomber aircraft after 1918, fear of the 
devastation of such attacks on defenceless civilian targets had taken hold of the popular 
imagination. Dawson, although in favour of improving relations between Britain and 
Germany, expressed this dilemma in a letter on May 11th 1937: “The news reported in 
The Times is confirmed in every detail by an independent eyewitness in The Daily 
Express today.”48 Later, on May 23rd, whilst acknowledging the annoyance which Steer’s 
article of April 28th had caused amongst official circles in Berlin, Dawson admitted, “its 
accuracy has never been disputed.”49
The policy of The Times was to play down the significance of the attack on Guernica. In 
this, Dawson was motivated by wider considerations, namely the probable effect on the 
German government of condemnation of the attack. Therefore, as Dawson explained to 
Daniels,
there has not been any attempt here to rub it in or to harp upon it. I have 
always been convinced that the peace of the world depends more than 
anything else upon our getting into reasonable relations with Germany.50
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Indeed, only a week after it printed Steer’s report, the leader column was lending its
t ilsupport to a policy of building bridges with Germany. On May 5 , therefore, the 
comment was, “[t]he identity of and nationality of the pilots are not yet known.”51 The 
Daily Telegraph also lent its support to the policy of bridge building. On April 30th, the 
same day as it printed a page of photos showing the aftermath of the bombing raid, the 
leader comment focused on a criticism of the Trades’ Union Congress for passing a 
motion condemning Germany for the attack. In the opinion of the leader, such action was 
a departure from Non-Intervention. Taking advantage of the fact that the same resolution 
called for a rally in support of the Republican cause, the leader pointed out “that 
humanitarian protests lose all their value when combined with a passionately expressed 
desire for the success of one party in the struggle.”
During the course of 1937, the handling of the issue of Guernica by The Times is 
illustrative of its greater concern to avoid offending Hitler as opposed to Mussolini. 
Hence, in spite of the evidence of German responsibility in the atrocity as presented even 
by its own correspondent, Steer, and regardless of the impact which the reporting of the 
attack had on crystallizing anti-German sentiment in Britain, the paper presented a leader 
article, the clear purpose of which was to repair the breach in Anglo-German relations. In 
spite of the backtracking by The Times, the Guernica articles in the British press provoked 
strong reaction from the authorities in Berlin. On April 29th, the German press, almost 
certainly responding to official instructions, replied to Steer’s allegations of the previous
il.
day by denying that German aeroplanes were responsible for the attack. On May 4 , the
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British ambassador to Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson, cabled to London, expressing his
concern at the effect of Steer’s article on Anglo-German relations:
Should it be established that they [The Times' editors] have been misled 
by their correspondents, they would be well advised to make a handsome 
retraction. Both His Majesty’s Government and The Times have much more 
to gain from such an attitude than they can possibly lose.54
Daniels, since 1912 The Times correspondent in Berlin wrote a series of articles in which 
he outlined the wave of anger against his paper for the way in which it reported on 
Guernica. In these, Daniels alluded to the official inspiration for the Anglophobia now
tliappearing in large sections of the German press. For example, on May 4 , he stated that 
the signal for the campaign of propaganda against Great Britain “had been given by the 
official German news agency”.55 On May 6th, the German ambassador, Von Ribbentrop 
called at the Foreign Office to complain to Eden of the “incorrect and tendentious 
allegations made in part of the British press with reference to the alleged destruction of 
Guernica”.56 A further indication of the official displeasure in Berlin at the way in which 
British newspapers reported on matters such as the destruction of Guernica or the role of 
German airmen in Spain, was the involvement of the secret police. They confiscated an 
edition of The Times for a dispatch entitled ‘Bombing of Guernica’ and editions of the 
Daily Telegraph, News Chronicle and Daily Express for carrying stories about a German 
airman who had been captured by the Spanish Republican authorities.57
Concern at the deterioration of Anglo-German relations during the previous six months 
prompted Philip Kerr, later Lord Lothian, to visit Germany. The purpose of the visit was 
to establish the causes of the deterioration of relations between Britain and Germany.
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Therefore, Kerr met with leading members of the Nazi regime, including Hitler. At a 
meeting with the German Chancellor on May 4th, Kerr took notes and summarized 
Hitler’s observations concerning “the fantastic items in the British press regarding the 
supposed German actions in Guernica”. Kerr also noted, “it was clear that these 
tendentious reports in The Times and other papers greatly upset the Chancellor, and 
accounted for the rather heavy atmosphere during the first hour of the discussion.” 
Comwell-Evans, the interpreter at the interview, made an attempt at reassurance:
the true face of England could not be read in the newspapers. The 
British people yearned for good relations with Germany. When the 
situation had so greatly improved, as at the present time, some 
mischance such as press reports [Guernica] gave certain evil forces 
an opportunity to check progress.58
Kerr, as has been stated before, moved in the same Round Table circles as Dawson, for 
whom he worked as a correspondent for The Times. On his return from Germany, Kerr 
was a guest at a house party at Cliveden, where he had the opportunity to discuss with 
Dawson his high level talks with Hitler, Goering and Schacht.59 Doubtless, Kerr would 
have made clear to Dawson what he interpreted as Hitler’s opinions on the effects of The 
Times reports on Anglo-German relations in general. It is also likely that Dawson raised 
the matter with Neville Chamberlain, whom he met two days later.60 This is indicated by 
the presence in the files of the Prime Minister’s office of a copy of the transcript of Kerr’s 
interviews with the German leadership.
Anglo-German relations continued to be threatened in the course of the year by 
international crises resulting from the Civil War. In June, both the observation scheme
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imposed on the Spanish land frontiers with Portugal and France and the naval patrol
scheme broke down. The elaborate schemes, the purpose of which was to stop the flow
of men and material from abroad, collapsed on 22nd. Following two incidents in which
German warships, engaged on Non-Intervention duties, were subjected to attack by
Spanish Republican air and sea forces, both Germany and Italy withdrew from the naval
patrol. Of more immediate concern, from the point of view of London, was the
impending visit to Britain of the German Foreign Minister, Von Neurath. An invitation
had been extended by the British government for the German Foreign Minister to attend
talks in London on ways of improving Anglo-German relations. In preparation for the
visit, Eden had exerted pressure on The Times to avoid printing anything that might
threaten its prospects. Lothian had wanted to publish articles on his visit to Germany.
Dawson was willing to agree, thinking that the impending visit of the German Foreign
Minister would provide a good setting.61 However, Eden, fearing the possible impact on
the forthcoming visit, was most anxious that the articles should not be printed. He
therefore requested that Lothian suspend their publication: “the good effects which we
hope thus to achieve in promoting Anglo-German relations, however, may be seriously
jeopardized if expectations are aroused.” He continued, “whatever may be done to
emphasize the personal character of the views expressed by you, they will inevitably be
regarded as inspired by HMG. They may lead to a dangerous misconception of the
visit.”62 Eden made a similar appeal to Dawson on June 18th:
It is very important that we should be able to have fruitful conversations 
in an atmosphere which is free from controversy.. .The influence of The 
Times is immense abroad... it is regarded as representing very closely the 
views of HM Government. I very much hope, therefore that you will see 
your way to postpone their publication.
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Given the fact that Eden had not seen the articles, Dawson was surprised and not 
especially happy about the request but nevertheless agreed to suspend publication.64
In spite of the government’s success in persuading The Times to refrain from doing 
anything that might jeopardize it, the proposed visit was eventually cancelled at the 
insistence of the German government. As a result, there was further discussion in British 
government circles of the part played by the British press in intensifying poor relations 
between Britain and Germany. It was agreed that such poor relations were a direct result 
of the way in which the press continued to report on German intervention in the Spanish 
Civil War. On June 23rd, Sir Neville Henderson notified London of the angry reaction in 
the German press to British press handling of claims that Spanish government submarines 
had attacked the German warship, the Leipzig.65 In Henderson’s view, the Volkischer 
Beobachter was critical of The Times, for its “patronizing advice”. The conclusion of the 
News Department official who read Henderson’s telegram was that “the attitude of the 
British press has undoubtedly helped to embitter the incident”. In fact, The Times, at 
least, had attempted to minimize the incident, no doubt in deference to Anglo-German 
relations already seriously strained by the Civil War. In its leader for June 23rd, The 
Times, although it raised doubts as to the veracity of the German claims that the Leipzig 
had been subjected to a deliberate torpedo attack by Spanish government submarines, was 
nevertheless muted in its criticisms of the German response, which after all was to 
withdraw from the Non-Intervention patrol of the Spanish coasts. The effect of German
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action was to undermine the control plan to which British officials had devoted so much
time. Yet The Times leader article offered an olive branch to Germany with the following:
British opinion has not been readier to hear and enter into the substantial 
case which Germany has to make against Europe, never readier to attempt 
the practical adjustments necessary to give Germany reasonable satisfaction,
Europe a deeper sense of stability, and the world a more settled chance of 
getting on with the elementary business of earning and bettering its livelihood.66
However, this was not enough to appease the anger of the German government towards 
The Times. Its hostility towards the paper continued into the summer. In August, the 
German government expelled Norman Ebbutt, The Times Berlin Correspondent. This 
was in spite of the fact that on August 17th, The Times leader had made a further attempt 
to placate Germany. While defending the professionalism of Ebbutt, the leader offered 
yet another olive branch. The desire of the editors to assist in the appeasement of 
Germany is reflected in the following: “The notion that there can be no dealings with 
fascism as with national socialism has found no countenance in these columns.”
In the late summer, support grew for stronger representation from official quarters to 
persuade editors and proprietors of the need for British papers to tone down their 
criticism of German and Italian activities in Spain. Indeed, so serious was the problem 
that, in the view of some in official circles, it posed a threat to peace in Europe. On 2nd 
July the British ambassador to Rome wrote to Sir Robert Vansittart at the British Foreign 
Office on the subject of the anti-British articles that were appearing in the Italian press 
during the summer months. The strict control over the press in Italy suggests that the 
articles were voicing the views of the Italian government. The ambassador wrote,
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“Mussolini is now putting out a string of articles which have a strongly anti British 
basis.”69 He commented on the anger that had been provoked in Italy at the Guadalajara 
articles in the British press: “Italians of all classes including strong anti-fascists feel 
profound resentment against the accusations of Italian cowardice published in the British 
press”. The ambassador drew the conclusion that Mussolini’s tactics in the press war 
were designed to whip up war feeling among the Italian people against Britain noting that 
“it is unpleasantly reminiscent of the techniques used in the early months of 1935 to bring 
Italian public opinion up to a pitch for his Abyssinian activities.”
No less an authority than the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey, blamed the British
press for what he considered to be the growing belief in Italy that Britain intended to
attack her in the near future. On July 23rd he voiced his concerns on this matter to Eden:
The people and even officials of a country that has lived for so many years 
under dictatorship, with a controlled press, undoubtedly tend to impute more 
than they should to hostile press articles in foreign countries, and fail to realize 
how impossible it is under a democratic system to control the press. The 70Spanish affair has, of course, added to the atmosphere of mutual suspicion.
Hankey also drew attention to the importance of Guadalajara and stressed that the 
“reckless jibes of the British press and their failure to make allowances for the difficulties 
that brought about the disaster at Guadalajara must have been most galling to a man of 
Mussolini’s temperament.” Hankey suggested that there be an agreement between the 
governments of Britain and Italy “to do their best to put a stop to press propaganda 
against the other nation, and, whenever possible, officially to repudiate false and 
tendentious news.”
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t V iOn August 16 , Halifax issued a draft circular to HM missions abroad, calling for their 
assistance in ensuring that British correspondents in foreign countries sent “accurate news
71and views back to Britain.” He suggested that the correspondents be encouraged to
consult with HM missions on a regular basis and that these missions be made aware of
what British correspondents abroad were reporting,
in order that they may themselves furnish me as early as possible with 
accurate information regarding important items of foreign news, which 
are appearing in the British press as being issued by British news agencies...
In issuing this directive, Halifax was demonstrating his own concern at the likely 
interpretation abroad of the existence of a hostile attitude in Britain fostered by the British 
press. He was attempting to prevent the escalation of a press war with fascist countries. 
The extent of his concern may be seen in the following extract taken from the draft 
circular:
the task of the correspondent abroad is often performed in circumstances of 
great difficulty particularly in countries under a dictatorship or semi­
dictatorship...The journalist is under pressure to be first with the news, and 
has to take risks.
Concern within British official and ministerial circles regarding what they considered to 
be the impact abroad of press articles, was not confined to the articles appearing in the 
conservative press. Indeed, as we have seen, both ministers and officials commented on 
the impact of the British press in general. However, in the view of leading ministerial 
and official circles, the role played by conservative papers contributed to a deterioration 
of relations between Britain and the fascist dictators. The point was that even among its 
closest allies in the press, the government could not rely on conservative papers not to
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offend the dictator governments. The impact abroad of the conservative press was, of 
course, of particular embarrassment to a Conservative dominated government. The 
position of The Times was especially important given its reputation as the semi-official 
mouthpiece of the British government. Indeed, on occasion, both The Times and its 
readers were reminded of this by articles that appeared in the controlled press of Germany 
and Italy. Take, for example, the official German news agency communique of May 3rd. 
Above all the papers which had reported on the destruction of Guernica by German 
aircraft, The Times was selected for special criticism, because it was considered to 
represent British Government policy “in semi-official form”.72 By the late summer of 
1937, Halifax, now convinced of the sensitivity of Hitler and Mussolini towards British 
press criticism of their activities in Spain, was taking what steps he could to bring the 
press under control.
Coexistent with the difficulties experienced by the conservative press in attempting to 
diffuse tension between Britain and the fascist states, there was, throughout 1937, 
growing concern at the prospect of the type of regime which would rule in Spain should 
the Nationalists succeed in defeating their Republican opponents. Contrary to Leeper’s 
analysis in the spring of 1937, the conservative press was not against the Spanish 
Nationalists; in fact the majority of conservative papers either openly or tacitly favoured 
the rebels. As has been previously mentioned, papers such as The Times, the Daily 
Telegraph, the Sunday Times, the Yorkshire Post and the Daily Express which 
consistently proclaimed their neutrality towards the conflict, by defending Non-
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Intervention, had, in effect, adopted a position inimical to the interests of the legitimate 
government in Spain.
As the year 1937 drew on, it became increasingly likely that the Nationalists would win 
the war. For that reason it would be impossible for editors of conservative newspapers to 
allow articles to be printed which assumed anything other than cordial relations between 
Britain and the new regime in Spain. In the main, the conservative press was subtle. The 
pro-government conservative press, at least, continued in a policy of not publicly stating 
pro-Franco sympathies. However, sympathy with the Nationalist cause amongst those 
who controlled editorial policy could still be detected in a number of ways. The 
terminology used by newspapers was a very important way in which ‘their’ tacit 
sympathy for the Spanish Nationalists was revealed. Increasingly, the conservative press 
referred to the anti-government forces in Spain as the Nationalists, rather than the 
“rebels” or “insurgents”. These were the preferred terms used by the anti-Franco left and 
liberal press, which, throughout the war, never wavered in their opinion of the Republican 
authorities as the only legitimate government in Spain. The term “Nationalist” was that 
adopted by the insurgents themselves as the label for their cause. It conferred a degree of 
legitimacy on a rebellion, a legitimacy which foreign newspapers could consolidate by 
agreeing to use it on a more or less continual basis. The Daily Telegraph, for example, 
earlier and much more consistently than The Times, referred to the anti-government 
forces as the Nationalists, and used the term not solely in the news columns but in the 
leader columns as well. The use by The Times, well into 1937, of the term ‘insurgents’, in 
leader columns and even in reports from correspondents based with the Nationalist army,
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did not reflect an anti rebel bias. Merely, it was the case that the Daily Telegraph was 
more overt than The Times in displaying its preference for the rebels. For example, its 
leader comment on the fall of the city of Malaga in February stated, “ the situation has so 
dramatically changed within a few days that nothing can now deprive the Nationalists of 
final victory.” 73
In fact, compared with the way in which it had reported on the Nationalists earlier in the 
war, in the course of 1937 there was a discernible shift in the terms of discourse 
employed by The Times. In short, there was a shift from seeing both sides in the conflict 
as evenly matched, whether in military resources or the barbarity of the methods used in 
the fighting. For example, it accepted that the fall of Malaga was significant. In its view, 
“Franco looks like retaining the initiative which he has not lost since the Civil War 
began”.74 A shift was, however, most discernible in the way both Spanish sides were now 
being described. As shown in chapter two, The Times had, in the first months of the war, 
failed to see any difference between the two sides, associating each with murder. On May 
18th, for example, the editorial now read “[t]he Nationalists, after the first few weeks 
were able to stop the unauthorized killings, the authorities at Madrid and Barcelona took 
no steps for months to prevent the nocturnal butchery of men, women and children.” 
The phrase “unauthorized killings” could be interpreted as the responsibility of zealots, 
acting without official sanction, whereas the description of those atrocities committed on 
the Republican side implies either that the authorities were unable or, more seriously, 
unwilling to prevent them. The language used to describe the killings on the Republican 
side becomes more emotive by the use of the term “butchery”. The reader is given no
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details of the victims of the Nationalists, but the alleged viciousness and brutality of those 
who were defending the Republic is emphasized by the inclusion of women and children 
among the dead.
The supposed brutality of the Republican regime compared with the allegedly more 
orderly state of affairs in rebel Spain, made possible an advocacy of the rebels as a
iL
legitimate cause. On July 15 The Times leader argued for the granting of belligerency 
rights to the Nationalists since “[i]t has been usual to grant belligerent rights to rebels or 
insurgents when they were in a position to form an organized government and when the
7 (\rebellion assumed the form of a war”. The leader also argued that both these conditions 
applied in the case of General Franco. Two days later, the leader suggested that Franco 
had far more popular support than did his opponents, and questioned the legitimacy of the 
Republican regime.77 This was significant given its timing, a year after the military rising 
against the Republican government began in Spanish Morocco.
In their handling of news from those areas of Spain under the control of the Nationalists, 
newspapers of conservative principles were subjected to various pressures which severely 
restricted their freedom of action. Editors were aware of the atrocities being committed 
by the Nationalist forces following the occupation of Republican held territory. For 
example, in the private and confidential correspondence written from France, special 
correspondents working for The Times informed editors of developments which could 
not be published in the columns of the paper, lest the correspondent be expelled. 
Nationalist censorship of the press was very strict, according to Harold Cardozo, Daily
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Mail special correspondent with Franco’s forces, “ generally speaking, every conceivable
7Robstacle was placed in the way of the war correspondent in Nationalist territory”. 
Cardozo referred to the long waiting times he was forced to endure before being 
permitted an interview with a member of the Nationalist press bureau at Salamanca. 
According to James Holbom, The Times special correspondent with the Nationalist 
forces, such were the restrictions being imposed upon correspondents during the spring of 
1937, that “[facilities for obtaining reliable information or seeing military operations are 
still very poor and no good stories may be expected until this side has a spectacular
70victory at Bilbao or elsewhere.” In general, the delay in receiving cabled messages from 
their correspondents based with the Nationalist side provoked an irritated response from 
The Times editors. As early in the war as mid November 1936, Deakin, wrote to William 
Stirling, the first special correspondent of The Times to be stationed with the rebels, 
expressing his frustration at the delays and pointing out that if the present state of affairs
• • O Acontinued it would be necessary for him to be withdrawn. Of course, the correspondent 
could attempt to send out an uncensored dispatch from Hendaye, but as Holbom informed 
Deakin, “I might be asked to leave, and it would be inconvenient to have no 
correspondent in [the rebel] part of Spain, when something of real news interest
Q1
occurs.” This was no unrealistic fear, the Nationalist authorities were wary about which 
foreign newspapers they would allow to send correspondents into their territory. For 
example, they “refused to allow a single correspondent of any left-wing newspaper into 
their territory”.82
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The Nationalist Press Bureau forbade correspondents to report that there were German, 
Italian and Portuguese troops fighting in Franco’s armies. A way around this, of course, 
was to drive to the French frontier, in order to send back to London an uncensored 
dispatch, taking care to warn the editorial office against publishing the name of the 
correspondent. However, even this was risky as Noel Monks, Daily Express 
correspondent was to discover when, his name was added to an article he had written on 
the defeat of the Italians at Guadalajara. He was brought before Franco himself, 
threatened with the firing squad and expelled from Nationalist Spain. Correspondents 
were forbidden to print news of anything that might be interpreted as an atrocity, even if it 
was “something the [Nationalist] troops bragged to you they did”.84 Not only would it 
have been edited out of the dispatch, but the correspondent would “get a sharp reprimand 
from the chief censor”.
For various reasons, correspondents of conservative papers reporting on the situation 
following the capture of Malaga and Bilbao, for example, focused on the relief provided 
by the incoming Nationalist forces to the starving inhabitants, and on the restoration of 
normality after the fighting.85 This, together with the failure of the conservative press in 
the main to see any threat to Britain of a Franco victory, despite the closer connection 
between Nationalist Spain and the Axis, is an example of the more sympathetic treatment 
of the Nationalists by the conservative press.86 Apart from any political preferences on the 
part of editors and proprietors towards the Nationalist cause, given the progress of events 
on the ground in Spain, this sympathetic attitude seemed to be pragmatic. The fall of 
Malaga in early February made the chances of a revival in Republican fortunes grow ever
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dimmer, a fact recognized by The Times, which analyzed the Nationalist capture of the 
sea port as being of great strategic importance. This was because it strengthened the 
influence of the Nationalist forces in the Straits of Gibraltar.87 With the fall of Gijon in 
October, the conquest of Northern Spain was complete. The rapid conquest of territory 
on the mainland within the first year of the war not only deprived the legal government of 
Spain of its effective authority over most of the country and its inhabitants, but from the 
autumn of 1937 the Republic was increasingly dependent on what supplies it could 
import from that part of the Mediterranean coast still under its control. However, both 
ports and shipping to the Republic were vulnerable to Italian naval and aerial attack.
Important as the effort to develop good relations with Franco’s Spain was considered to 
be, there were, nevertheless, growing misgivings even among government circles 
regarding the future direction that the Nationalist regime backed by the Axis powers 
might take. This concern naturally grew with the military balance swinging decisively in 
favour of the rebellion. Throughout the conflict, both Germany and Italy repeated their 
assurances that they had no territorial ambitions in Spain or in its overseas possessions. 
Meanwhile, Franco had on various occasions given his assurances that he would not cede 
any part of Spanish territory as a result of services rendered to his cause. However, the 
regime that he was in the process of establishing in the course of the year drew attention 
to the prospect of close ties between the New Spain and the fascist states once the war 
was over. In April, Franco adopted the twenty-six-point programme of the Spanish 
Fascist movement as the manifesto for his government. In effect, this act created a one
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party fascist state. In July, Franco publicly announced to the United Press that, like 
Germany and Italy, Spain would be totalitarian.
Political developments in rebel Spain made it difficult for the conservative press in 
Britain to write favourably of the development of internal domestic policy in Franco’s 
Spain. This was, inevitably, the result of his regime increasingly resembling those fascist 
states, which had come under criticism in Britain during the course of the year. Even The 
Times correspondent in Nationalist-held Vitoria voiced his concerns about the April 
decree: “it is the first step in the creation of a totalitarian state in a country which has 
always had strong tendencies towards regionalism and where individual independence is
oo
a marked characteristic of its citizens.” That this comment was published in The Times 
is significant because it represents the expression of opinion in a news column, something 
that it was the policy of Dawson and his deputy not to allow.89 The Daily Telegraph 
doubted that the decree imposing unity upon the Falange and Carlist political parties in 
Franco’s Spain, in order to create a one party state, would actually promote political 
unity. The leader declared, “merging the Fascist and Carlist parties is expected to lead to 
discontent in Nationalist Spain. Already mutinies are reported.”90 The opinion of the 
Yorkshire Post was likewise sceptical of the ability of Franco to impose a totalitarian 
regime in the long run.91 Thus developments in rebel held territory were pushing 
conservative papers to adopt, against their will, a more critical attitude towards the 
internal domestic policies of the Nationalist authorities. Correspondents, sympathetic to 
the rebel cause, who were stationed in the Nationalist zone, complained of their treatment 
at the hands of the authorities. Journalists reserved sharp criticism for Luis Bolin,
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Nationalist press officer at Franco’s headquarters in Salamanca: “Bolin was soon detested 
by foreign newsmen, even by those who personally sided with the Nationalist cause.” 
Even Monks, who admitted to liking Bolin wrote, “[h]e had a cruel streak in him.” 
Journalists compared facilities provided for them in the Nationalist zone unfavourably 
with those enjoyed by their contemporaries in the Republic: “Cables containing red 
propaganda, from Madrid or Valencia were transmitted with a fairly lenient 
censorship.”94 It was not just that correspondents and their editors were frustrated at the 
difficulty in covering the conflict from the Nationalist side, but the rebel authorities 
complained to The Times, for example, that too little coverage was being given in this 
paper to their cause. According to Deakin, “The authorities serving General Franco still 
complain that we publish too little news from their side.”95 Deakin went on to state that 
“we want more, but it is apparently not to be had, and every message limps into London a 
worthless and emaciated apology for news.” Yet, in spite of the difficulties and 
frustrations imposed upon them by the Nationalist authorities, it would appear that 
editors, mindful of the influence of their papers on international relations, still remained 
willing to suppress the publication of news and views which would seriously threaten 
British relations with the ‘New Spain’ after the war. Hence criticism was restrained.
In April, Franco declared a naval blockade of the coast of Northern Spain. This was a 
policy designed to starve Bilbao into surrender. This created difficulty for the British 
government, because it affected an area of trade in which British ships were involved. 
Since Franco was not recognized as a belligerent, interference with foreign ships by 
Nationalist vessels, outside the three-mile limit beyond the Spanish coasts, would be an
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t V iact of piracy. On April 12 , Baldwin announced in The House of Commons that the 
British government did not recognize the blockade as legal, but advised British ships that 
since the waters around the port were mined, they should not proceed. The government 
had adopted a curious policy; it neither wished to be seen as being forced by Franco to 
recognize him as a belligerent, nor did it want incidents involving British ships off the 
coasts of Spain to jeopardize relations with the victorious party there. It was very 
controversial, and lay the government open to the charge from its parliamentary critics 
that, by discouraging ships from trading with Northern Spain, it was aiding the starvation 
of Bilbao.
The support of the traditionally loyal conservative press to what amounted to a change of 
British policy in the Civil War was once again predictable. In this instance, not only the 
traditional supporters of the government in the press, but also the overtly partisan 
journals, such as the Observer and the Daily Mail, defended the case put forward by 
ministers in Parliament, that there had not been any change in British policy of neutrality 
regarding the instructions to British ships. The consensus among virtually all the leading 
conservative papers was that the information given to them did not in fact constitute a de 
facto recognition by the British government of the blockade. In this, the attitude of most 
conservative papers was to identify very closely with government policy.96 It was the 
opposition press that drew attention to the pro Franco implications of the policy. The
fhManchester Guardian leader comment on April 13 , was highly critical of Baldwin’s 
speech in Parliament the previous day: “a rebel leader recognized by us neither as a 
lawful government nor as a belligerent can with a few mines and some hypothetical
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bombs create an ‘effective blockade’ that is what Mr. Baldwin has now in truth 
conceded.”97
In the course of 1937, the failure of the conservative press to point out the strategic threat 
to Britain of a Nationalist victory was in sharp contrast to the warnings that appeared in 
the leader columns of the liberal and left press. However, this omission, the conscious 
policy of those in control of editorial policy, caused conflict among the staff of 
conservative papers.98 Journalists felt that given the editorial policy towards the reporting 
of the Civil War, it was not possible for them to present the alternative view in their 
papers. In that way, a policy of censorship was being imposed on staff whose opinions 
were sharply divided on events which were unfolding in Spain. Thus, whatever the 
disagreement amongst staff, editorial support for the government line inevitably meant 
that articles suggesting that Franco might be hostile towards Britain would not be printed. 
This censure was the catalyst for the early revolt within the conservative press towards 
editorial constraint on journalistic freedom. It has been pointed out that in his column in 
The Sunday Times, ‘Scrutator’ did consider the strategic implications of a Franco 
victory.99 However, at no point in 1936-7 did he criticize British policy. A most curious 
omission given both the publicly stated view of government that Franco posed no threat, 
and the obvious failure of British policy to contain Axis power intervention anything like 
as effectively as it had dissuaded France from intervening on the behalf of the Republic. 
The balance of the evidence would suggest that ‘Scrutator’s’ omission was deliberate. A 
newspaper whose editor and proprietor were close friends of Neville Chamberlain could 
do no other than support government policy. On May 2nd, for example, ‘Scrutator’ whilst
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admitting that Italy’s intentions in Spain were designed to impose a client state, 
nevertheless continued to defend British policy as genuinely neutral.100
Liddell Hart, the military correspondent of The Times 101, was one of the journalists in the 
conservative press who, in the course of 1937, came to view the prospects of a Franco 
victory with increasing alarm. He was one of the first to speak out against what he saw as 
the failure of the press to point out the dangers to its readership. When the Civil War 
began, he started an analysis of articles written by British correspondents reporting from 
each of the sides in the conflict.102 His own hostility towards the Nationalists developed 
largely because of the extent of the German and Italian aid reaching the insurgents: “a 
very ominous development for us, in view of the way that Spain flanked our main sea 
routes and commanded the western gateway to the Mediterranean.” However, Liddell 
Hart was also concerned at the internal policies of the insurgents, in particular the “policy 
of systematic and deliberate terror carried out by the rebellion in those areas of Spain 
which come under their control.”
In his memoirs, Liddell Hart implied that his hostility towards Franco meant that he was 
not permitted to write a military review of the war, which as military correspondent, he
1 mwould have normally expected to do. Moreover, he noted the consistent support offered 
by The Times leader columns to the policy of Non-Intervention, support that continued 
despite mounting evidence that the policy was indeed a failure. Liddell Hart, therefore, 
concluded that the concern of those in control of editorial policy was not to offend either
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Hitler or Mussolini, and that they supported the British government stance on Non-
Intervention because
Geoffrey Dawson and Barrington-Ward like much of the Cabinet harped on 
the risk that any action we might take to check German and Italian aid to 
Franco might involve us in a war with those powers.
At the end of April 1937, Liddell Hart wrote to the deputy editor, “in the hope that it 
might make some impression on the prevailing practice of The Times in turning a blind 
eye to German and Italian intervention in Spain.”104 Liddell Hart, in an attempt to 
persuade Barrington-Ward to adopt a more critical tone towards the Nationalists, was 
explicit in pointing out the concerns of the journalists at the attitude of the paper towards 
the conflict:
[Non-Intervention has] been more like non-intervention with those who are 
intervening.. .our unwillingness to take a firm line on insisting on genuine 
non-intervention clears the path for Italy and Germany to establish their 
position in Spain to our jeopardy.
On May 19 Liddell Hart again wrote to Barrington-Ward concerning the attempt by The 
Times to maintain a ‘neutral’ position in its presentation of the two sides in the Civil War. 
For Liddell Hart, this attempt at balance was not justified by the facts. It was certainly his 
view that whereas atrocities committed in the Republican zone were, in essence, 
spontaneous, those committed by the Nationalists were part of a deliberate policy of terror 
instigated by the state authorities in Nationalist Spain. Concerning The Times he wrote, 
“in the attempt to maintain the balance it seemed to me a very unfair representation of the 
balance of evidence.”105 Barrington-Ward’s reply reiterated what he regarded as the 
neutral policy of the paper: “up to the present there has in fact been very little to choose
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between them [the two sides] in that regard [atrocities]. For my part I refuse to be the 
advocate for either party.”106 The correspondence between Liddell Hart and Barrington- 
Ward, during the spring of 1937, illustrates fundamental differences in the way the Civil 
War was perceived even within the conservative press. Firstly, they disagreed on the 
strategic implications to Britain of a Nationalist victory, secondly they disagreed on the 
respective nature of the atrocities being committed in Republican and Nationalist Spain, 
and thirdly they disagreed on the neutrality of The Times. Whatever the privately held 
views of the deputy editor, such was his determination to ensure the support of his paper 
for government policy, that The Times could not claim it was neutral. This was the root 
cause of Liddell Hart’s complaint against the policy of The Times towards the Civil War.
Liddell Hart was convinced that a determination on the part of the western democracies to
make Non-Intervention a reality would not lead to war with the fascist States. On the
contrary, Liddell Hart claimed that Hitler, in particular, was eager to withdraw from his
Spanish commitments providing it could be done without loss of prestige. It was on this
matter that, at the end of May, Liddell Hart wrote to his deputy editor:
he [Hitler] deplored the stupidity of Franco. The Germans were dismayed by 
the reactionary tendencies which they found among Franco’s supporters.. .The
1 0 7inclination in Germany was to withdraw from the business...
The military correspondent continued to dispute what was publicly proclaimed by the 
government and defended in the conservative press, that, whatever its failures, Non- 
Intervention would prevent the outbreak of a European war. In the course of the year, 
even Dawson began to show unease regarding Franco. But, in continuance of his defence
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of government policy towards Spain, he did nothing consciously to compromise Britain’s 
relations with either Germany or Italy. Hence, he would not allow warnings about their 
intervention in Spain to be sounded in the columns of The Times. Nor was his military
1 fiRcorrespondent permitted to write about the implications of their intervention.
Liddell Hart, however, being a respected writer on military and strategic matters found
other means of achieving publicity for his views concerning the Civil War. In 1937, his
book Europe in Arms pointed out his view:
a new danger has loomed up in the possibility of a militaristic Spain, filled 
with the desire to renew its imperial role [which] is clearly reflected in some 
of the interviews given by General Franco, and linked with Fascist Italy by a 
common ambition.. .in that quarter too, Nazi Germany might find some scope 
for developing an indirect leverage on her own neighbours.109
He envisaged the possibility of the threat to the Western Mediterranean from a Spanish 
airforce developed with the resources of German aid. Such a force would render 
Gibraltar “untenable as a base for the British fleet as Malta proved in the last emergency.” 
In view of this, he expressed his disbelief at “the eagerness with which some of the most 
avowedly patriotic sections of the British public have desired the rebels’ success.” For 
Liddell Hart, the strategic threat of a Fascist Spain did not stop at the Western 
Mediterranean, for the establishing of submarine bases in the Canaries would enable 
Spain to threaten the Cape route. In the event of the Suez Canal being rendered unsafe 
for British shipping, this would be the only route connecting Britain with her overseas 
empire. Indeed, Liddell Hart questioned the promises made by both Franco and the Axis
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powers that there would be no cession of Spanish territory in return for their help. He 
wrote,
[t]here have been reports, formerly denied, of a secret promise of these two 
strategic points [Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands] to Italy and Germany 
respectively in return for help rendered.. ..Though the denial may be accepted, 
this does not remove the potential danger. The availability of bases in these 
islands for the possible use of a strong sea and air power would be scarcely 
less ominous than the actual cession of the territory.
Liddell Hart was once again challenging the basis of the consensus in conservative 
political and media circles, that Franco was a Spanish nationalist who would be able to 
maintain the territorial integrity of Spain. Indeed, the acceptance of so much Axis power 
intervention both by Conservative ministers and their press allies relied on the good faith 
of Hitler and Mussolini. Both dictators had declared that, despite their commitments in 
terms of manpower and resources, they had no long-term strategic motives in Spain. The 
confidence of ministers and their supporters within the press resulted from their 
acceptance, at face value, of the assurances given by both fascist dictators that their 
interest in the Spanish Civil War was solely to crush Communism. That such assurances 
were so readily accepted among influential circles in London was, of course, a reflection 
of their hostility towards the democratically elected republic and further evidence that 
neither the government nor its allies in the press were neutral.
Liddell Hart, however, was not alone in his condemnation of the government/press 
coalition regarding Spain. Baron Commander Stephen King-Hall, an influential 
journalist and lecturer in the inter-war period, took a keen interest in current affairs.110 
At least as early as June 1936, he became disenchanted with what he considered as the
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failure of much of the press to be sufficiently alert to the rising threat posed by Fascism. 
Therefore, he undertook to start an independent newsletter to be known as The King-Hall 
Newsletter Service. It was available only to subscribers. In spite of not having the 
financial support of advertising revenue, the newsletter was very successful. Circulation 
figures rose very quickly. From an initial six hundred subscribers in 1936, by 1939 it had 
risen to sixty thousand.111 In the same period, this figure was higher than the daily 
circulation of The Manchester Guardian, nearly half the daily circulation figures of The 
Times, and more than three times the daily circulation figures of the Yorkshire Post. 
What The King-Hall Newsletter Service offered was an independent and alternative view 
on international events.
King-Hall’s own views on Spain were similar to those of Liddell-Hart, with whom he 
corresponded. Both felt that a victory for the Nationalists in Spain was a threat to British 
interests. On August 11th 1936, King-Hall declared,
the great repeated statements which one comes across in the speeches of 
politicians and leading articles in the press to the effect that the internal
115affairs of a nation are of no concern to its neighbours is simply nonsense.
With the collapse of the press consensus on Spain in the course of the first six months of 
the war, the newsletter, like the liberal/left press in Britain, adopted an attitude of 
sympathy towards the plight of the Spanish Republic. King-Hall’s analysis of the 
strategic implications would have made it impossible for him to adopt any other position. 
Indeed in his letter of August 11th he declared also, “it is idle to pretend that the safety of 
our communications through the Mediterranean would not be affected by the existence in
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Spain of a government collaborating closely with Italy and Germany.” In his views on 
Spain, King-Hall was largely isolated from the British establishment of which he was a
1 1 omember. Given the willingness of the liberal/left press to oppose government policy on 
Spain, it is likely that a high proportion of the readership for the newsletter would have 
come from those traditional supporters of the conservative press who, like King-Hall, did 
not share the confidence in government policy shown by many proprietors and editors. As 
will be shown later, King-Hall, and through him his newsletter, maintained contacts at the 
highest levels of the government. Thus, in the years before the outbreak of the Second 
World War, a connection was forged between his newsletter and the Conservative 
establishment.
As long as Eden remained as Foreign Secretary, opposition towards the line being 
adopted by ministers and editors was limited among both journalists and readers of 
conservative journals. Because Eden had come to share the concerns of Liddell Hart and 
Baron King-Hall, the hope prevailed that the Foreign Secretary might use his influence to 
change the views of his colleagues. It was hoped he might persuade them that rather than 
continuing to pay lip service to Non-Intervention, it was necessary for the government to 
adopt measures to restrain the intervention of the Axis powers in Spain. Eden’s concerns 
at the increasing Axis power violations of the Non-Intervention Agreement throughout 
the second year of the Civil War were, unsurprisingly, shared by the Permanent Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, Vansittart.114 For his part, Eden was determined not only to 
make the Non-Intervention Agreement effective but to make an agreement with Italy,
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which would offer British recognition of the Italian Empire in Ethiopia, dependent upon 
Italy’s full co-operation on the issue of Non-Intervention in Spain.
Unlike most of his Cabinet colleagues, Eden was prepared to use what leverage he had to
tliachieve Italian withdrawal from Spain. As early as December 20 1936, he had written 
to Vansittart suggesting that, since Italy was financially dependent on British loans to pay 
for her commitments in Spain, Britain should refuse to lend her money: “it is not part of 
our business to provide money for aeroplanes for Franco and subsidies for Rossi to 
seduce Majorca! That is what a British loan would be used for at this time.”115 
Furthermore, Eden made clear to Liddell Hart his desire that Franco should not win the 
Civil War. Liddell Hart met Eden on November 23rd 1937, at the Foreign Office. 
According to Liddell Hart, Eden “regarded it as a British interest that Franco should not 
win.. .He thought that the government [Spanish loyalists] could hold out indefinitely apart 
from the food situation.”116
Eden’s new Spanish policy came under threat from Cabinet colleagues, such as Samuel 
Hoare, who wanted the victory of the Nationalists, but, more importantly, also from the 
new Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, who wanted to achieve the appeasement of 
Italy as a priority.117 At the end of July 1937, Count Ciano, the Italian ambassador handed 
a personal letter from Mussolini to Chamberlain. The letter lamented the poor state of 
relations between the two nations and reiterated Mussolini’s reassurance that Italy had no 
territorial ambitions in Spain. It referred also to Mussolini’s desire for Britain’s de iure 
recognition of Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia. Chamberlain, without even consulting Eden,
197
agreed to initiate Anglo-Italian discussions, a proposal, which Mussolini accepted on
August 2nd. Eden and Vansittart, through their contacts with the press, particularly the
conservative press, aimed to play down the significance of these discussions. Eden
wanted evidence of Italian good faith regarding Spain as the prerequisite for improved
Anglo-Italian relations. He did not want the conservative press to give Italy the
impression that the British government was willing to seek a rapprochement with her
regardless of her intervention in Spain. Two days after the Italian government’s
agreement to open Anglo-Italian conversations, Eden wrote to Vansittart, concerning the
way it should be handled by the British press:
I think it important that our press should emphasize connexion between 
Italians in Spain and Better A-I relations, there must be an end of giving 
and not getting. I hope that you will keep the News Department up to this.
I am still uneasy at the line such papers as I see, except Times, which is 
excellent, are taking today. We shall do ourselves great injury in the world• 11 ftif we do not show firmness in our dealings with Italy now.
Eden informed Vansittart that he wanted the press to welcome the prospect of the talks, 
but added that newspapers should stress there were issues to be cleared up including both 
the Italian presence in Majorca and the Italian troops in Spain. Eden, in fact, was 
referring to the tendency of newspapers to ‘talk up’ the prospects of an Anglo-Italian 
rapprochement, and in this he had to be alluding to specific conservative newspapers. He 
informed Vansittart of his concern that if newspapers were not more cautious there would 
be suspicion among a British public, increasingly wary of Mussolini’s assurances, that the 
government was preparing to go too far in its effort to appease Italy. This might trigger a 
backlash against the government and threaten the talks. Eden’s concern had been fuelled 
by headlines such as those in The Daily Mail for July 30th, which had announced the
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enthusiasm of the paper for the apparent readiness of Italy to agree to the British plan for 
the withdrawal of volunteers from Spain. Its headlines read, “FULL AGREEMENT 
WITH PROPOSALS”, “ITALY’S ENCOURAGING TONE”, and “HOPE OF REAL 
PROGRESS.”119 The Daily Express was also enthusiastic about Italy’s acceptance of the 
British plan for the removal of volunteers, and advised a reciprocal gesture on the part of 
Britain: “let us mark Mussolini’s acceptance of the British plan by recognizing the Italian
1 90sovereignty over Abyssinia, which is his anyway.” This was in direct contrast to Eden’s 
plan to make recognition of Italy’s Ethiopian Empire dependent on proof of Italian troop 
withdrawal from Spain. Furthermore, The Daily Express on August 2nd was very 
optimistic about the prospects of bilateral talks between Britain and Italy. The opinion 
was, “[w]e rejoice that Mr. Chamberlain has sent a personal letter of friendship to 
Mussolini for we should have no quarrel with that Nation.”121
Meetings were held, on August 3rd for example, between Eden and Vansittart to discuss 
methods of countering the glowing stories of imminent appeasement of Italy, and to 
persuade newspapers to adopt a more cautious tone. It was clear that on this issue, as on 
others, the British government had no common strategy to be adopted towards the press. 
This lack of consensus is evidenced by a meeting between Charles Warner, a News
1 99Department official , and Victor Gordon Lennox, the diplomatic correspondent of The 
Daily Telegraph, the purpose of which was to persuade Gordon Lennox to dampen down 
his enthusiastic reports of the Anglo-Italian conversations. Warner reported on this 
meeting to Vansittart, who passed the information on to Eden that Gordon Lennox had 
been “writing on some kind of information received from a member of the Cabinet but of
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course I cannot be certain of this.”123 Clearly Gordon Lennox’s informant had rather 
different views of how the proposed Anglo-Italian conversations should be handled. As 
Vansittart reminded Eden, Chamberlain’s own view was different from his. The Prime 
Minister felt that Britain should press ahead with the negotiations and “strike while the 
iron was hot.”
Even Eden and Vansittart disagreed on press strategy. Eden was prepared to inform the 
press a lot more about what the government hoped to achieve from the talks and the 
difficulties that it felt it would encounter in reaching a satisfactory conclusion. In 
Vansittart’s opinion, this would create complications with the Italians, and “might lead 
people to suppose that you and we were going in a different direction from that attributed 
to the Prime Minister”, which of course they were.124 In spite of their differences, the 
strategy adopted by Eden and Vansittart in persuading the press to damp down its 
optimism of the Anglo-Italian conversations was successful. Vansittart was later to 
inform Eden:
a number of papers which you have not seen are spontaneously taking the 
line that all is not gold that glitters and that the question of Spain will 
automatically come into the discussions and are in fact showing none of 
the disposition to rush their fences displayed for example, by Rothermere 
and The Daily Mail}25
The firm line followed by Eden on Spain was reflected further in the late summer and 
autumn of 1937, following the increase of air and submarine attacks on merchant 
shipping trading in Spanish ports. As part of his strategy to stop the supply of Soviet war 
material to the Republic, Franco made a secret request to Mussolini for further
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assistance.126 As a result, there was an increase in Italian naval activity in the 
Mediterranean Sea, between the Straits of Gibraltar and the Straits of the Dardanelles. 
Italian planes operating from Majorca in the Balearics intensified their attacks on 
merchant shipping sailing to Republican ports. From August 1st until September 2nd, 
thirty merchant ships were attacked. On two occasions, Eden ordered the British 
ambassador to inform the Italian government that rumours of Italy’s involvement in these 
Mediterranean attacks would have unfortunate consequences for Anglo-Italian
n J
conversations. Finally, on September 2 , the British Cabinet agreed to support the 
French proposal for a Mediterranean conference of the relevant powers to be held at 
Nyon. As a further measure, the Cabinet agreed to suspend both the Anglo-Italian 
conversations and negotiations with the Nationalist government concerning a proposal for
1 97an exchange of agents. The Nyon Conference resulted in the Nyon Agreement, which 
established a series of routes and maritime ways between the ports trading with
Republican Spain and also naval patrols to guarantee the security of these routes. The
1agreement represented a diplomatic defeat for Italy in particular. German and Italian 
refusal to attend the Nyon conference did not prevent the Mediterranean talks and a plan 
involving international co-operation was forged to deal with the submarine attacks on 
merchant shipping.
The firm stand taken by Eden at Nyon received almost universal acclaim in the British
press. A News Department official commented,
[th]e London and the provincial press are to all intents and purposes 
unanimous in paying tribute to the success of the negotiations at Nyon...
The difficulties in the way of securing Italian co-operation in the plan
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are fully realized and the handling of these difficulties comes in for no 
small measure of appreciation. For once the attitude of the left press is 
very little different from that of the right and so far as the former is 
concerned this is largely due to a wholehearted recognition of the 
diplomatic success shown in the treatment accorded to Soviet Russia 
and Italy respectively.129
Indeed the firm stand at Nyon was defended in The King-Hall Newsletter. The comment 
was, “[t]he great importance of the conference lies in the fact that it was a diplomatic 
victory for the democracies.”130 In the editorial of the same issue, King-Hall described the 
conference as “swift and effective, Britain and France meant business and it will surprise 
me if piratical attacks on Spanish ships by submarines whose origin is believed by 
everyone to be Italian, do not come to an abrupt end.”
The Nyon conference was to be the high water mark of Eden’s influence over his
colleagues. By February 1938 his position in Cabinet had become untenable. The cause
of this was the growing disagreement between Eden and Chamberlain over how to
respond to further Italian intransigence on the issue of foreign intervention in Spain.
Initially, at its meeting on October 6th 1937, the Cabinet agreed to Eden’s suggestion to
support a French initiative to open tripartite discussions involving Britain, France and
1^1
Italy, with a view to finding a means of making Non-Intervention effective. Yet hopes 
were quickly dashed. Given her commitment to the success of the Nationalist cause, 
Italy’s reply to the proposal was negative. Moreover, it signalled an end to the consensus 
between Eden and Chamberlain on policy towards Italy. Unlike Eden, Chamberlain was 
against a firm line and in particular would not support a threat of reopening the Pyrenean 
frontier to allow the transit of supplies to the Republic.132 The Nyon conference of the
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previous autumn had isolated both Germany and Italy and resulted in a further 
strengthening of the Axis partnership. Increasingly, therefore, Chamberlain was 
convinced of the necessity of appeasing Italy.
The growing divergence between Eden and Chamberlain was to have ramifications on the 
government’s relationship with the press. Both men were in agreement on reopening an 
effective Anglo-Italian dialogue.133 What divided them was Eden’s opposition to the 
official recognition by Britain of Italy’s conquest of Abyssinia prior to substantial Italian 
troop withdrawals from Spain. Without agreement on this point, there could be no 
government consensus on how the press should be lobbied on the forthcoming Anglo- 
Italian conversations. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary lobbied the 
conservative press from very different angles. An example of their contrasting views can 
be seen in Eden’s response to the way in which The Times, as ever the semi-official 
mouthpiece of the government, talked up the prospects of the forthcoming Anglo-Italian 
conversations. In October, The Times lent its support for the resumption of the Anglo- 
Italian conversations. On October 21st, the leader column expressed its faith in Italian 
good intentions. In its view, Italy’s acceptance of an international commission to be sent 
to Spain by the Non-Intervention Committee in order to ascertain the number of 
volunteers on either side was sufficient proof of Italian goodwill.134 Eden reacted by 
instructing his private secretary, Oliver Harvey, to approach Rex Leeper at the News
o r
Department. Leeper’s brief was to advise The Times that “the position remained
unchanged”, that the conversations would only take place once the British government 
was satisfied that Italian troops had withdrawn from Spain.136 Regarding the prospects of
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talks with Italy, official sources much closer to the Prime Minister’s way of thinking
were, nevertheless, able to instil optimism within the conservative press. Eden regarded
this as counter-productive. He believed it would make the Italians even more reluctant to
co-operate on the issue of troop withdrawal. In his view, whether or not they intended
to co-operate, the Italians would sense in the government-inspired stories in the
conservative press, a determination by the British government to come to terms with Italy
at all costs. Oliver Harvey noted in his diary,
AE very annoyed at a press campaign bearing all the marks of authoritative 
inspiration crying up the prospects of early and complete agreement 
between us and the Italians; this is exactly the way to arouse exaggerated 
hopes and to make the Italians difficult because they will think we are so 
eager we will pay anything for agreement.138
Harvey and Eden were aware that the Prime Minister himself was in some way involved
in this lobbying of the press. Such awareness is indicated in the following comment in
Harvey’s diary: “according to the News department the campaign [initiated by an article
in the Daily Mail] can only have come from Number 10.”139
Ultimately, the divergence of opinion between the Prime Minister and Eden over foreign 
policy resulted in Eden’s resignation from the Cabinet, an event that took place on 19th 
February 1938. Eden would not accept Mussolini’s acceptance of the withdrawal plan of 
the Non-Intervention Committee as sufficient proof of Italian goodwill, to justify the 
resumption of Anglo-Italian conversations. In his insistence on the precondition of actual 
Italian troop withdrawal from Spain, Eden was isolated in Cabinet from most of his 
colleagues who supported the position of the Prime Minister.
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The period from the beginning of 1937 to late February 1938 had been significant in the 
development of the relationship between the government and the conservative press. It is 
the case that editorial support for government policy largely held firm. Yet the 
development of the conflict, and the significance of Axis power intervention in securing 
the tide of war in favour of the Nationalists produced strains in the conservative 
consensus on Spain. Increasingly, journalists came to question the consensus being 
maintained by their editors and proprietors. After all, it was difficult for journalists who 
were accustomed to reporting the atrocities of the German and Italian governments 
towards their own peoples, to ignore their brutal actions in Spain. Within journalism, 
there was an expectation of reporting with openness and honesty. Those who controlled 
the editorial policy of those newspapers traditionally loyal to the Conservative 
government did not wish to cause difficulty for the government and yet this could not be 
avoided. This led to a rather peculiar development in a number of leading newspapers 
where foreign intervention was criticized but never the government policy that failed to 
prevent it.
It is quite clear that long before the Halifax visit to Berlin in 1937, the circumstances 
created by the Spanish Civil War had alerted the British government to the fact that, in 
the interests of the policy of appeasement, it was necessary for the free press to exercise 
restraint. The problem that was to dog the government was that in a democracy its ability 
to influence the free press was limited. It was a limitation of which the dictators, 
accustomed as they were to strict control over the media, remained unconvinced. Indeed, 
both Hitler and Mussolini assumed that, given the close contacts binding the conservative
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press with ministers, the British government, if it had so wished, could have persuaded 
the press to tone down its criticism. The German ambassador, Von Ribbentropp, moved 
in the most influential circles of the British establishment, as did Franco’s representative 
in Britain, the Duke of Alba.140 In spite of the knowledge of British society that such 
contacts could give to the dictator governments, the fascist dictators themselves could not 
accept that the British government was unable to compel the press, especially The Times, 
to co-operate. The irony was that conservative newspapers did what they could to pander 
to the hypersensitivity of the dictator governments. Yet, the subtle omission of 
potentially contentious news and the censoring of opinion hostile to the established 
consensus reached by newspapers and conservative politicians, were lost on the dictators. 
However, amongst journalists who questioned the wisdom of government policy, there 
was growing awareness that a form of censorship was being imposed. Liddell Hart and 
King-Hall, for example, felt that newspapers had a public duty to inform their readers of 
the strategic threat to Britain and France of a Nationalist victory. In a democracy, there 
was a limit to the extent to which editorial policy could suppress the publication of 
alternative views. If Liddell Hart was not allowed to print his warnings in The Times he 
could do so in lectures and books. Furthermore, his reputation as a military historian 
would undermine further the perception that the staff of The Times was united in 
supporting government policy. The divergence between his views and those of his paper 
demonstrated to his audience at home and abroad, that the consensus in support of official 
policy on Spain was a facade. It showed that The Times, in pursuit of what Dawson 
perceived as the interest of national policy, was prepared to suppress alternative views 
highly critical of government policy towards Spain. Only the continued presence in the
206
Cabinet of Eden, whose determination was to make Non-Intervention a reality, prevented 
a more fundamental breakdown in the consensus within the conservative press in the 
course of 1937.
In retrospect, the renewed press consensus in support of the government policy of 
firmness adopted at the Nyon conference and which mirrored that broad consensus which 
had linked newspapers from across the political spectrum in support of Non-intervention 
in the summer of 1936, was doomed to be similarly short lived. Even within the 
Conservative Party, the positions of Eden and Chamberlain could not be reconciled in the 
long term. The developing international crisis strengthened the Prime Minister in his 
resolve to press ahead with the appeasement of Italy in spite of the objections of his 
Foreign Secretary. As we shall see in the next chapter the crisis, which resulted in Eden’s 
resignation in 1938, was to have long lasting implications for even conservative 
newspaper reporting of government policy towards Spain.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE DEEPENING CRISIS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND
CONSERVATIVE PRESS.
This chapter will focus on the impact of Eden’s resignation on conservative newspaper 
reporting of the Spanish Civil War. It will also consider why, at a time when there was a 
new consensus emerging concerning international relations in general, there was still 
division over the way in which newspapers reported on Spain. Whilst the resignation of 
Eden removed from Cabinet the most significant opponent of Neville Chamberlain’s 
foreign policy, it resulted also in a weakening of conservative newspaper support for the 
official line on Spain. Hitherto, historians have neglected this factor. In fact, Eden’s 
departure from office was a watershed not, as Cockett has intimated, because 
Chamberlain was able to exert greater influence over the press in general, but because it 
marked a transitional period in the government’s relationship with its traditional allies in 
the press. With regard to Spain, Chamberlain attempted, though with only limited 
success, to impose a more rigid consensus both upon his party and on the press. The 
effect of Chamberlain’s imposition was to cause divisions both between and within 
conservative newspapers.
Broadly speaking, in the course of 1938, against the backdrop of a worsening 
international crisis, two opposing views were to emerge concerning the responsibility of 
the press in a democracy. Among those papers that still identified with the position 
adopted by the government on Spain, the opinion held that it was the duty of the 
newspapers to support government policy, which aimed, through appeasement of the
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fascist dictators, to stave off the nightmare of a second general war on the European 
continent. Because they acknowledged the impact of the press on relations with foreign 
powers, those in control of editorial policy of these newspapers felt it was still justifiable 
to dampen down or even suppress the views of their journalists, if they challenged the 
official view. In the period following the resignation of Eden, the London based 
conservative newspapers supported the convocation of Anglo-Italian conversations and 
the signing of the Anglo-Italian Agreement. Yet there were some journalists who were 
opposed to the level of support being offered by conservative papers towards government 
policy on Spain. Therefore, within conservative newspapers, the resignation of Eden 
gave rise to an alternative view on what constituted the responsibility of the press in a 
democracy.
During the course of 1938, opposition became more pronounced among journalists of 
those conservative newspapers that were continuing to accept the government line on the 
war. This can be explained by a number of factors. Firstly, the resignation of Eden had 
ended the uneasy alliance within government of the two opposing views on Spanish 
policy as advocated by Eden and Chamberlain. Eden’s supporters in the press were now 
left with the dilemma of whether to betray party or principle. In a parliament dominated 
by the Conservative government, it was only in the free press that conservative opponents 
of Chamberlain could really make their voices heard. Secondly, for those journalists who 
questioned the official line on Spain, 1938 added a sense of urgency. They felt the need 
to redouble their efforts in an attempt to persuade those in control of editorial policy to 
prevail upon the government to change tack. Liddell Hart, who had questioned the policy
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of The Times towards Spain during the previous year, remained a leading conservative 
press critic of official policy on Spain throughout the course of 1938. As mentioned 
earlier, during the course of the previous year he had come to view Spain as a counter in a 
strategy of global dimensions being waged by the Axis powers. Throughout 1938 in 
particular, evidence appeared to mount in support of his theory that the machinations of 
both Germany and Italy in Spain were part of a wider, more sinister plan to achieve global 
domination. Therefore, during that year, he was to become increasingly concerned over 
the prospect for British interests of a Nationalist victory in Spain. His sense of isolation 
within The Times, already apparent in 1937, increased following the resignation of Eden. 
He was to become increasingly convinced of a hidden agenda by those in control of 
editorial policy aimed at denying him the opportunity to use The Times as a means by 
which to influence opinion and to challenge the government line.
Throughout 1938, Liddell Hart continued to assert that both Italy and Germany would, as 
a result of the help rendered to Franco, be in a position to secure an advantageous position 
in the ‘New Spain’. This would allow them to challenge the strategic and economic 
interests of both Britain and France in the Mediterranean. During March 1938, there was 
heated correspondence between Liddell Hart, still the military correspondent of The 
Times, and the deputy editor, Mark Barrington-Ward, over the line taken by the paper on
tVithe Civil War. Earlier, on February 25 , a leader column had derided the complaint made 
by the Basques that Franco’s offensive against the Republic in Northern Spain had been 
successful largely because “the Nationalists had been better supplied with war material 
from abroad.”1 Liddell Hart complained about what he considered to be the inaccuracy of
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the paper, pointing out to Barrington-Ward that there had been for Franco “an 
overwhelming advantage in aircraft provided by Germany and Italy.” In the same letter, 
he complained that, despite his position as military correspondent, he had never been 
consulted about what should appear in leader columns dealing with the Spanish Civil 
War.
In the middle of March, Liddell Hart sent an article to Barrington-Ward, reviewing the 
situation in the Western Mediterranean. In it, he reiterated his concern at the likely 
attitude of a future right wing Spanish government towards Britain, but this time in the 
light of what had been the generally hostile attitude of the right wing government in Spain 
towards the allies during the 1914-18 war. Needless to say, Barrington-Ward refused to 
publish it. A frustrated Liddell Hart wrote again on the 26th, requesting that his article be 
published as a “letter to the editor”, insisting that it was imperative that the readers of The
i  t V iTimes be made aware of his views. In his reply on the 28 , Barrington-Ward’s defence 
of his actions merely proved what Liddell Hart had long suspected; that The Times was 
practising a deliberate policy of censorship of views on the Spanish conflict which were 
not in sympathy with the government version of events, the version defended by the 
paper.4 The reason for Barrington-Ward’s objection to Liddell Hart’s Western 
Mediterranean article was the military correspondent’s insistence that Franco was bound 
to be hostile towards Britain. With reference to this he commented, “it can be no more 
than a presumption and a presumption is not sufficient reason for upsetting the policy of 
non-intervention.” He also stated that opinion could be expressed in a leader column only 
and not in other articles. In his view, the Western Mediterranean article was heavily
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opinionated. That specific reasons were given why the article could not be printed, 
particularly that if such an alternative view were to appear in an influential paper like The 
Times, British relations with the new order in Spain might be threatened, made clear to 
Liddell Hart that a policy of censorship did, indeed, exist.
On March 29th, Liddell Hart wrote again to Barrington-Ward expressing surprise at his 
objections concerning the proposed Western Mediterranean article: “all I do is to list 
evidence entirely from the files of The Times itself, which justifies a doubt, of the hope 
that Franco will be able to be independent of his wartime allies once the civil war was 
over.”5 Liddell Hart’s anxiety to have his views printed in The Times was because this 
alternative view on the Civil War had never been put forward in that paper. For him this 
was a serious omission on the part of the editorial staff precisely because of the influential 
readership for which The Times catered. The correspondence between Liddell Hart and 
Barrington-Ward in the spring of 1938 is an illustration of the conflict of opinion that 
existed within conservative newspapers. So concerned was Barrington-Ward at the 
possible implications of Liddell-Hart’s views that he refused to allow the article to be 
published even as a letter to the editor.
Barrington-Ward was no doubt influenced by the development of events on the ground in 
Spain at this time, which made it prudent policy to avoid offending the likely victors of 
the Civil War. After the successful Nationalist counter offensive against the Republicans 
at Teruel in January and February of 1938, the Nationalist armies were able to put into 
motion a particularly rapid advance into Republican held territory. This, to foreign
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observers, appeared to herald the inevitable collapse of the Spanish Republic and the 
ending of the Civil War. Indeed, pro-government newspapers played down the 
significance of the Italian assistance to Franco during the winter and spring, in the process 
of which they gave a very misleading impression of the military situation in Spain. On 
March 17 , The Times, for example, in its leader column, suggested that the claims made 
by the British Labour Party that Franco had received fresh supplies of men and equipment 
from both Germany and Italy were an exaggeration.6 The leader reaffirmed the confidence 
of pro-government newspapers that Non-Intervention was a wise policy, and that British 
neutrality towards the conflict would be an effective guarantor of British interests after 
the war was over. The leader argued that regardless of the outcome in Spain, the Spanish 
would look favourably on Britain precisely because of her neutrality during the Civil 
War. Only two days earlier, Dawson had recorded in his diary that he “had a rather 
desperate morning keeping rubbish out of the paper of wild measures against the dictator 
[refemng to Mussolini].” The diary comment was a clear indication of the growing 
restiveness among his staff concerning his support for the official line.
The misleading impression being given of the military situation in Spain was a feature of 
conservative newspapers in general. In its leader comment on the defeat of the 
Republican army at Teruel, the view of the Daily Telegraph, like that of The Times, was 
that military assistance from abroad was not the key to Franco’s success. In its opinion, 
the chief cause was that the Nationalist army was better trained and commanded than its 
Republican adversaries.8 However, less than two months previously, the Daily Telegraph 
had published an article by its special correspondent, H. Buckley. The correspondent,
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commenting on the earlier capture of Teruel by the Republicans, referred to the 
Republican infantry as “better than Franco’s.”9 Indeed, in direct contrast to the leader of 
March 16th, Buckley had referred to both the poor training and the lack of experience of 
the Nationalist troops. The Times also had written previously of what it considered to be 
the improved military efficiency of the Republican army. On January 11 , for example, 
the leader commented, “[a]ll that it is safe to say at the moment is that the two sides no 
longer seem so unevenly matched in military efficiency as they appeared to be a month 
ago.”10
The evidence would suggest that the more critical comments being made in March 1938 
about the lack of efficiency of the Republican army and which ran contrary to previous 
statements, were part of a new and deliberate policy by the editorial staff intended to 
divert attention away from the importance of Italian and German assistance to Franco. 
The reason for this was the worsening international crisis in Central Europe caused by the 
expansion of the German Reich. It was in March that the German army crossed the 
Austrian frontier to complete the Anschluss. Thus, for the first time since the end of the 
First World War, Germany had expanded its territory beyond the borders of metropolitan 
Germany, in order to incorporate a previously independent state. This new development 
in Nazi foreign policy impressed upon the British Cabinet the urgency of the need to 
conclude an agreement with Italy. The Italian intervention in Spain could not become a 
barrier to this end.11 Hence, it would seem quite plausible that official pressure was being 
exerted on newspapers, still loyal to the official line, not to either give a more accurate 
coverage of the Italian contribution to the fighting in Spain at this time, or to print the
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concerns held in official circles regarding the Italian intervention. On March 21st, 
Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, recorded in his diary 
his conclusions about a meeting of the Cabinet Foreign Policy Committee that afternoon. 
The diary extract notes both Chamberlain’s awareness of the importance of German and 
Italian aid to Franco at this time and his concern at the prospect of “Franco winning in 
Spain by the aid of German guns and Italian planes.”12 It would seem inconceivable that 
when suppressing the reporting of certain types of news on Spain, editors were unaware 
of these more pessimistic views within official circles.
Liddell Hart refused to be silenced by the policy of his paper to suppress ‘unpalatable 
news’. He took advantage of the fact that he had an ally in Cabinet in the Secretary of 
War, Leslie Hore-Belisha. The Secretary of War came to share Liddell Hart’s concerns 
regarding the prospect for Britain and France in the Western Mediterranean in the event 
of a Franco victory. Two notes written by Liddell Hart provided Hore-Belisha with 
ammunition for his discussions with his Cabinet colleagues. In the ‘Note on the Spanish 
Situation’ written on March 13th 1938, Liddell Hart advised the minister, “German and 
Italian domination of Spain would place heavy odds against the success of Britain and 
France in a war with these powers.”13
Liddell Hart also dissented from the view, then prevailing in official circles in London, 
that Germany and Italy were better placed than the democracies to send military supplies 
to Spain. Liddell Hart argued that the geographical position of Britain and France actually 
put them in a more favourable position. Therefore, if they so desired it would be easier
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for them to assist the Republic than for either Axis power to assist Franco. If, according 
to Liddell Hart, the competition led either to the threat of, or to actual war with the Axis, 
it would be better to fight now, before they had secured the victory of Franco. He wrote 
that once that had happened, the democracies would have lost their current geographical 
advantage in the western Mediterranean over the Axis powers.14 Therefore, it is not 
surprising that he should be sceptical of the official view being promulgated by his paper 
that once the war was over, Britain, as a neutral power, would be in a position to regain 
its influence in Spain because of the dependency of any Spanish government on financial 
help from Britain for post war reconstruction. In his second note to Hore-Belisha, ‘Note 
of Warning’, written on March 15 , Liddell Hart argued that the second great war of the 
century had already begun with the outbreak of the Civil War in Spain: “[t]he direct 
assistance which Italy gave with aircraft, and the indirect assistance which Germany gave 
with warships in transporting Franco’s troops across from Africa to Spain were the first 
operations of the present war.”15 The note concluded that, to date, the Axis powers had 
almost succeeded in their plan for global domination without any serious attempt being 
made to stop them by those powers, which had most to lose from this development.
t h  fUHore-Belisha, in Cabinet meetings on March 14 and 16 , attempted to persuade his 
colleagues to support the French government should the French decide to reopen the 
frontier with Republican Spain in order to allow supplies of war material to the 
Republic.16 Because Hore-Belisha agreed with Liddell Hart that the Axis powers were 
thinking in terms of manoeuvring for long-term strategic advantage in Spain, he also 
agreed with Liddell-Hart that Britain and France should allow supplies to reach the
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Republic. However, the Cabinet was unmoved by Hore-Belisha’s arguments. It 
considered that the opening of the French frontier would make war with the dictators 
inevitable.
Although he was obstructed by the editorial policy of The Times from expressing his 
concerns in print, and thwarted in his attempt to influence government policy, Liddell 
Hart remained adamant. He was determined to express his views by any means at his 
disposal. On March 17th, the day the British Cabinet rejected Hore-Belisha’s advice that 
the French government be encouraged to reopen the frontier with Spain, Liddell-Hart 
delivered an address to University College, London, at which foreign ambassadors were 
also present.17 A significant part of Liddell Hart’s lecture concentrated on a consideration 
of the meaning of truth. He told the assembled gathering, “the longer I watch current 
events the more I am driven to see that most of our troubles arise from the habit, on all 
sides, of suppressing or distorting what we know quite well is the truth.”18 With regard to 
the latter, it is possible to interpret this as a signal to a wider audience that news and 
views on Spain, not consistent with the official line, were, in fact, being deliberately 
suppressed or distorted by the editors of The Times. Liddell Hart used the occasion to 
reiterate publicly his conviction that the second great war of the century had already 
begun with the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, and referred to the Italian and German 
intervention as part of a tactic of a “camouflaged war.”19
The Spanish Civil War was the only issue in current affairs to which he referred in his 
lecture, the latter part of which focused entirely on Spain. He compared the British policy
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on Spain in the 1930s with the policy adopted by the government towards Turkey prior to 
the First World War. His purpose was to show that in both cases the position adopted by 
the government was, in his view, immoral, that in both circumstances the official 
justification given for such an immoral policy, that it best served the interests of British 
foreign policy, was flawed. Before 1914, the British government had refused to support 
the ‘Young Turk’ movement and had clung to its age-old policy of supporting the 
authoritarian regime in power in Istanbul. The Sultan, however, was not grateful for 
British support and was to take the side of Germany in 1914. Liddell Hart drew a parallel 
between what he saw as the situation in Turkey in 1914, and that in Spain over twenty 
years later. In so doing, he implicitly challenged the contention being upheld by the 
government and championed in his own newspaper that the British government was 
indeed neutral. In comparing the situations in Spain and Turkey, Liddell Hart was 
arguing that the government was sympathetic towards the Nationalist cause in Spain in 
the same way as it had been supportive of the Sultan in Turkey in an earlier period. In 
Liddell Hart’s view, British policy was just as blind to the realities of the situation in 
Spain, for it was conniving in a rebellion which would result in the emergence of a new 
regime which would be hostile towards Britain.
In Through The Fog o f War, published that year, a book that was primarily a work on the 
First World War, Liddell-Hart once again expressed his concerns regarding the current 
Spanish situation. In the concluding chapter “Some Lessons from History’ he returned to 
the theme of the ‘second European war’ now in progress in Spain. Liddell Hart gave a 
clearer explanation of what he meant by the phrase ‘camouflaged war’ to which he had
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referred in his lecture. According to Liddell Hart, the advantages of such a war were that
“only a very small proportion of your resources are needed to ensure the success of the
party you choose to back in a particular small country that is of general strategic 
01importance.” In this, the author was of course making a very explicit reference to the 
forces engaged in Spain on behalf of both Italy and Germany. Liddell Hart sounded a 
note of warning with his contention that the methods being practised by the Axis powers 
in Spain were an imitation of British policy on the European continent in earlier centuries. 
Here, he again compared British policy towards Spain in the later 1930s with that shown 
towards Turkey before 1914. However, a repeated error in foreign policy did not result in 
comparable risks to Britain’s security. He pointed out that given Spain’s more important 
strategic position for Britain, the consequences of British policy makers favouring Franco 
were potentially far more disastrous than had been the misguided sympathy for the 
sultanate in Istanbul before the First World War.22
Liddell Hart’s thinking on the Spanish Civil War had hardened as a result of the 
development of events in Spain, which in the spring of 1938 seemed to be pointing 
towards a collapse of the Republican cause. His concern regarding German and Italian 
intervention increased during the course of 1938 and this is why he now sought to 
influence government policy towards the war. Through the expression of his views in 
lectures, but perhaps more importantly in print, given the wider audience it would reach 
both in Britain and overseas, Liddell Hart threatened to undermine further the consensus 
between the government and the conservative press. After all in print he could be more 
open as to his true opinions. Furthermore, in 1938, George Steer, The Times
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correspondent whose reporting of the air raid on Guernica, the previous year, had done 
much to escalate tension between Germany and Britain, fanned the flames of the 
Guernica controversy by publishing his book, The Tree o f Gernika. Not only did he 
reiterate his accusations against Germany for the atrocity, but also was critical of what he 
considered to be the indifference of the British ruling class to the plight of the Spanish 
Republic. The latter being an implicit criticism of the sympathy of The Times towards 
Germany. The apparent failure of the paper to publish a review of this book, written by a 
journalist whose dispatches on Guernica had been the subject of main articles and leader 
comment the previous year, was yet a further example of a selective policy of censorship 
aimed, as far as possible, at avoiding the alienation of the Nazi authorities. As with 
Liddell Hart, it was only by publishing independently that Steer would be able to find a 
means by which his views could be aired at length. 23
A variety of surviving evidence demonstrates that, during the later thirties, there was a 
growing number of journalists, particularly from a variety of conservative papers, who 
were becoming dissatisfied at the support their editors were willing to give to the official 
line on foreign policy. The closeness of Viscount Kemsley to Chamberlain and the 
support of Hadley, (the editor of Kemsley’s paper, the Sunday Times), for government 
foreign policy caused friction amongst the staff. Richard Keane, the diplomatic 
correspondent, was an opponent of appeasement and a supporter of Eden against the 
Prime Minister. Keane and Alexander Werth, the Paris correspondent, tried 
unsuccessfully to argue with Hadley the case against appeasement.24 Iverach McDonald, 
diplomatic correspondent of The Times, who later corresponded for the independent
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journal, the Arrow, wrote in his autobiography about his concern regarding the editor of 
The Times. He declared that given the consistent support of Dawson for Chamberlain, 
“most of the usual channels for expressing political opinion were blocked or led 
nowhere.”25 This was, of course, an oblique reference to the policy of that paper to 
impose restriction on the publication of views that challenged the government line on 
foreign policy and international affairs.26 Colin Coote demonstrated his own opposition to 
Dawson in chapter twelve of his memoirs. Indeed, the title “The Nightmare Thirties”, 
aptly describes the author’s frustration over the editorial policy of The Times during the 
period of the Spanish Civil War. In particular, Coote referred to “a cabal which dealt 
with the abroads”, a direct reference to the small clique who formulated the policy of the 
paper towards foreign policy and international affairs.27 Such was Coote’s frustration that 
he solicited the advice of Churchill on whether he should resign from The Times. 
Churchill’s reply, as recorded by Coote, was revealing of the more general frustration felt 
by journalists who were critical of the support of their editors towards a foreign policy 
which they considered harmful to British interests abroad: “he [Churchill] would prefer a 
friend in the enemy’s camp, but I fear that the influence of that friend is zero.”
Clearly, journalists increasingly resented the constraints being imposed upon their 
freedom. This led to a gradual increase in the number of independent newsletters, in 
which journalists could express their concerns at what many considered to be the 
shortsightedness of government policy towards the dictator states. The most influential of 
these newsletters was the Whitehall Letter.28 Tradition has it that this letter emerged in
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the wake of the Munich Conference in October 1938. In fact, it actually emerged much 
earlier, in the middle of February that year.
Eden’s perceived determination to make Non-Intervention more effective explains the 
lack of independent newsletters whilst he was still in office. It is therefore significant that
tlithe first issue of the Whitehall Letter appeared on February 15 , shortly before Eden’s 
resignation from the Cabinet. The Whitehall Letter was co-edited by Victor Gordon 
Lennox, the diplomatic correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, and Helen Kirkpatrick, a
9Qcorrespondent for the Chicago Daily News. Previously, Gordon Lennox had supported 
the firmer line Eden was prepared to take towards Italian intervention in Spain in the 
course of 1937, and had written to him expressing his confidence that “you have only to 
stand firm to win all you want.”30 It was also to Eden whilst he was still Foreign 
Secretary, that Gordon Lennox had expressed his opinion that the press was adrift from 
popular opinion in Britain.31 In that particular letter he declared, “it is the greatest mistake 
to think as so many do here, that the country is behind the ‘press’, it is not.” Quite clearly, 
this is a reference to Gordon Lennox’s dissatisfaction with his paper’s support of the 
government. The papers supporting the government line stressed almost continuously 
that government policy on Spain had the support of the majority of the British public. 
However, as we have seen, the diplomatic correspondent of at least one of the leading
99conservative newspapers did not support such a view.
The publication of the first edition of the Whitehall Letter coincided with the circulation 
in Fleet Street of rumours that there was indeed a divergence of views within the Cabinet
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over an issue of foreign policy that had profound implications for the development of the 
Spanish Civil War. According to Oliver Harvey this was “the inevitable result of 
Whitehall speaking with two voices.”33 With the division between Eden and Chamberlain 
becoming public knowledge, conservative newspapers would inevitably support 
Chamberlain, a reason why Gordon-Lennox, such a strong supporter of Eden’s stand on 
Italian intervention, should choose this time to begin the circulation of the Whitehall 
Letter. As mentioned previously, Eden’s resignation a few days later removed from the 
Cabinet the influence of the one man who might have acted as a restraining influence on 
Chamberlain. The circulation of the Whitehall Letter among those circles which might 
influence foreign policy was thus an alternative means by which Gordon Lennox could 
hope to influence the direction of policy, albeit in a much more limited way. Oliver 
Harvey noted in his diary the pressure being exerted on the conservative press from 
official sources, to secure their support for the position of the government. Note, for 
example, the following entry for February 27th: “[t]he Government took every possible 
step to secure the London papers” as a result of which, “the London press is rather rotten. 
All the London conservative papers have toed the line”. According to Eden’s Private 
Secretary, Gordon Lennox “was in tears” at the way the Daily Telegraph rounded on 
Eden following his resignation.34
The independent newsletters received contributions from journalists representing 
newspapers of a variety of political views, but for journalists from conservative papers, 
these newsletters provided the only outlet for expressing views that were critical of the
i f
government line on Spain. After all, the conservative press, unlike the left or liberal
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publications, was almost unanimous in supporting the Prime Minister both before and 
after Eden’s resignation. However, not all journalists who were critical of government 
foreign policy were willing to risk contributing to the independent newsletters. Bill 
Deedes, a contemporary of Gordon Lennox at the Daily Telegraph, was considered 
sufficiently close to the views of the editor of the Whitehall Letter to be invited to 
contribute to the newsletter. Deedes, however, declined the offer because he did not want 
“to leave mainstream journalism.”36
The Whitehall Letter, in expressing the views of conservative press critics of government 
policy on Spain, adopted a position completely at odds with the mainstream conservative 
newspapers. In contrast to the consensus view on Spain in the pro-government press, the 
Whitehall Letter for March 11th 1938, for example, drew the attention of its readers to the 
threat to Britain of a Nationalist victory in Spain. It did this by drawing a parallel 
between Germany’s actions in Central Europe and her activities in Spain. The newsletter 
comment was as follows: “parallel with Hitler’s Central Europe plan another is forming 
the Germanization of Spain, to complete the ‘bottling’ up of the western democracies.” 37 
The Whitehall Letter was concerned much more about German influence in Spain than 
about the implications of Italian intervention. Indeed there were many references to this
tliin the issues of 1938. For example, on March 11 , the newsletter claimed that reports 
confirmed by German General Staff officers in Spain showed that “considerable German 
additions have been made to the air force within the past fortnight.” To press home the 
point of German influence in Spain, the newsletter was not averse to blatant exaggeration, 
claiming that Franco’s Spain was being transformed into a political and economic
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satellite of the Third Reich. In fact, the German presence in Spain was to be a recurrent 
theme in the columns of the newsletter for the remainder of the war and beyond. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that on April 6th, the newsletter should scoff at the public 
assurances made by the governments of Germany and Italy that their troops in Spain 
would be withdrawn once the war was over. The opinion of the newsletter was stressed 
in the following way: “neither has any idea of losing interest in Spain.”38 On May 3rd, the 
Whitehall Letter reprinted part of an interview with Franco reported by a German 
newspaper. Here, the newsletter again took the opportunity to draw a parallel between 
Franco’s Spain and Hitler’s Germany, indeed the following comment: “The political 
similarity of the two systems of government” is indicative of this. In reprinting a 
translation of Franco’s words, the opportunity was taken to emphasize the growing 
alliance between the ‘New Spain’ and the more powerful of its foreign backers: “The 
fight which we are waging against Communism in the foreground is a further sign of 
sympathy and reciprocal interest.”39 The use of emphasis by means of underlining phrases 
to which the editor wished to draw attention was clearly designed to undermine 
confidence in the view, expressed by the government and defended in the conservative 
press, that since it would not become closely tied to Italy and Germany, Franco’s Spain 
did not represent a threat to British interests.
Among official circles in London, the Whitehall Letter was regarded as especially 
influential; indeed it was respected as the most important of the newsletters. Charles 
Warner, a News Department official, wrote that it catered “for a real desire on the part of 
a limited and serious public, who do not get what they want from the ordinary
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commercially run papers.”40 In August 1938, in reply to an inquiry by Sir Percy Lorraine, 
British ambassador to Turkey, Warner wrote of the Whitehall Letter, “we have found its 
information in general pretty accurate and from time to time it has shown itself 
surprisingly well informed about matters known to only a small number of people.”41 In 
the same letter he noted that the government was unlikely to look upon it “with a friendly 
eye.” Where the newsletter received its information from is unclear, although as Warner’s 
letter indicated it is possible that, in part at least, it did come from official sources, 
possibly from Vansittart. On previous occasions, Vansittart had broken the Civil Service 
code of neutrality by passing information to sympathetic journalists, in order to put 
information into the public domain contradicting the optimistic view, generally put out by 
government circles, of the likelihood of a successful accommodation with the fascist 
states.
In the course of 1938, Vansittart clearly felt increasingly frustrated with the direction of 
foreign policy under Chamberlain, which he felt powerless to influence. After all, in the 
previous December, he had been effectively sidelined with his appointment to the post of 
Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the government.42 Iverach McDonald, in his autobiography, 
described how officials such as Vansittart, who opposed government foreign policy, 
could disseminate news to the press, news which the government either would not release 
in its briefings or which it persuaded editors and proprietors to suppress in the public 
interest. McDonald wrote, “Sir Robert Vansittart, Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the 
government, freely gave to others the advice that the government ignored.” He also shed 
light on how this opposition to the official line was organized within the press.
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Journalists from pro-government papers mixed freely with those journalists from liberal 
and left wing papers.43 Such was the perceived threat to national interests posed by 
Chamberlain’s foreign policy, that national interest took priority over obedience to a 
particular editorial line.
Journalists who contributed to newsletters attempted to conceal their identity from their 
readers and of course from the government. In the first two issues of the Whitehall Letter 
Gordon Lennox was listed as the editor, but in later editions no further reference was 
made either to him or to the name of any contributor.44 From the 12th edition, on May 3rd, 
the newsletter carried the following message: “[t]he material in this letter is not for 
reproduction in any form.”45 Moreover, the publishers also changed, until May 3rd it was 
published by “Foreign Consultants” 22 Moorgate London EC. From then onwards 
however it was “THE ANGLO-FOREIGN INFORMATION BUREAU 40 CHANCERY 
LANE, LONDON WC2.” However, in spite of the attempts to conceal the identity of 
the editors of this clandestine journal, it is clear that they were known to those in the 
ranks of the Parliamentary Conservative Party who were in opposition to Chamberlain’s 
foreign policy.46 The newsletter was only ever available by subscription. Evidence from 
the files of the Foreign Office News Department suggests that its readership was 
influential. Given the fact that it was aware both of the address of the publishers and of 
the involvement of London journalists, it is surprising that, when replying to inquiries 
about the newsletter from British embassy officials, the News Department should claim to 
be unaware of the identity of the authors 47
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The secrecy that generally surrounded the independent newsletters was in marked contrast 
to Liddell Hart’s open opposition towards government foreign policy on Spain. Liddell 
Hart was in as much danger of losing his job, as were the contributors to the Whitehall 
Letter. The attempt at concealment strongly suggests the existence of contacts between 
the newsletter and official sources. The support of News Department officials for the 
Whitehall Letter was made clear in Warner’s reply to the British ambassador to Turkey: 
“We have only too much experience of the impossibility of getting really important 
matters properly treated in the [mainstream] press.48 Thus, Warner had indicated to the 
ambassador that it was still the policy of the News Department to attempt to influence 
newspapers to adopt a more critical line towards government policy abroad.
The independence that the News Department managed to maintain meant that, in the 
press war over Spain, it remained a dangerous enemy to Neville Chamberlain.49 It 
undermined the continued attempts by Downing Street to regain the support of the liberal 
and left press for the government line on the Civil War. At no point during the Spanish 
war did Chamberlain enjoy a broad-based support from newspapers across the political 
spectrum. In this he differed from Baldwin who, during the first few weeks of the war at 
least, had been able to secure the support of newspapers such as the Manchester 
Guardian, the News Chronicle and the Daily Herald, which were later to emerge as 
consistent critics of the government line on Spain. In August 1938, Chamberlain wrote to 
his sister concerning the reaction of the Italian authorities to the News Chronicle report of 
his public statement on a ‘Spanish settlement’. In response to this, Chamberlain had 
received a visit from Crolla, the counsellor of the Italian Embassy. The Prime Minister
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confided in his sister the frustration he felt at the effect of the article on the Italian 
authorities: “why will the foreigners always pay so much attention to our more 
irresponsible and uninfluential journals?”50 So concerned was Chamberlain at how the 
press might report Crolla’s visit that, in order to conceal the meeting from the press, on its 
conclusion the Italian official was “sent away by the garden entrance.”
The part played by the News Department in contributing to the difficulties that the Prime 
Minister was facing with the press in the last twelve months of the Civil War was 
illustrated in a letter sent by Barrington-Ward to Dawson on October 13th. Barrington- 
Ward wrote, “I am more and more of the opinion that the News Department of the 
Foreign Office is really a centre of anti-government propaganda.”51 The News 
Department and the Prime Minister’s Press Department had never been accustomed to co­
ordinating their activities. Therefore, it is not surprising that as divisions within official 
circles grew concerning the direction of policy under Chamberlain, Vansittart, for one, 
was prepared to use the News Department to counter the more optimistic world view 
which the triumvirate of Ball, Steward and Chamberlain were trying to persuade the press 
to support.52
The development of stronger criticism towards government policy on Spain from some of 
the journalists working for conservative newspapers had coincided with Chamberlain’s 
accession as Prime Minister, bringing with it a new development in the relationship 
between the government and the conservative press in general. It is ironic that outwardly 
at least, the policy of the Chamberlain government towards the Civil War seemed to
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enjoy more consistent support from the national conservative press. Beaverbrook and 
Rothermere, who had opposed Stanley Baldwin, gave their support to Chamberlain, with 
the consequence that the largest newspaper chains in Britain swung round in support of 
the new Prime Minister. Indeed, as early as August 1937, Rothermere had informed a 
friend of the Prime Minister that he had ordered his papers “to give Neville 100% 
support.” In fact, even though it led to a decline in circulation figures, Rothermere 
would not allow the Daily Mail to condemn the activities of either Germany or Italy.54 In 
September 1938, Beaverbrook wrote to Halifax, asking for guidance because “[t]he 
newspapers are anxious to help the Prime Minister.”55 In another letter, this time to the 
Prime Minister, Beaverbrook was very specific as to what he meant by guidance, 
suggesting that his friend, Samuel Hoare, be appointed to the role of minister responsible
r /r  c n
for informing the press. Chamberlain acceded to this request. Only the support shown 
by Dawson of The Times matched the support that Beaverbrook was to give the Prime 
Minister.58
Although Beaverbrook’s own sympathies were for the Republican cause, he refused, even 
in the face of mounting evidence of Italian and German intervention on behalf of Franco, 
to oppose the government line. Despite Beaverbrook’s private views, the Daily Express 
continued to support government policy in the belief that Non-Intervention would achieve 
the more important goal of European peace.59 The Daily Express leader comment on the 
parliamentary debate on Spain on March 16th 1938, effectively acknowledged the unfair 
application of the Non-Intervention Agreement, which prevented the Republic from 
purchasing war supplies on the international market but which did not stop German
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supplies reaching Franco. Nevertheless, it was critical of the demands made by the 
parliamentary opposition both for the ending of Non-Intervention, and for the sale of arms 
to the Republic. In the assessment of ‘Opinion’, victory for Franco would place Italy and 
Germany in a favourable position once the fighting had stopped. This was a gloomy 
enough prediction. However, the column continued by deliberately downplaying the 
significance of this; expressing confidence in the wisdom and good sense of British 
government policy: “ [h]ow great these advantages we’ve still to know. But they cannot 
be greater than have been foreseen.”60
From May 1937, the position of the Observer was one of progressive support for Neville 
Chamberlain’s government. By 1939, the paper was supportive of a policy that continued 
to deny the Nationalist government’s demand for belligerent rights at sea. This was in 
spite of the fact that in February of that year Franco had been recognized by the 
governments of both France and Britain as the legitimate ruler in Spain. Moreover, this 
was very different from the opinion expressed in that paper earlier, during the last days of 
the premiership of Baldwin, when, in April of 1937, ‘The World Week by Week’, had 
criticized the government for denying to Franco his demand for belligerent rights at sea.
Such a progressive swinging round of editors and proprietors of conservative papers in 
general, in support of government foreign policy coincided with and was most likely 
influenced by the worsening crisis in international relations in the course of 1938 and the 
perceived urgency to reach an accommodation with the dictator states. The priority was 
to avoid a repetition of the Great War only a generation before. Given the Civil War’s
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international implications for the peace of Europe, this trend had an obvious effect on 
how a number of conservative national papers viewed it. What disappeared in the 
process was a right wing criticism of the government from newspapers like the Observer, 
and the Daily Mail. Previously, Baldwin’s refusal to concede belligerent rights to Franco 
had not only been criticized because they denied to him what the right wing saw as his 
legitimate rights as ruler of the greater part of Spain, but also because it seemed that the 
government was in effect intervening indirectly in the Civil War on behalf of the 
Republic. Increasingly, however, after May 1937, such papers saw nothing to criticize in 
the policy adopted by the government of Chamberlain. At no point was he accused, as 
was Baldwin, of pursuing a partisan policy in favour of the Republican cause. The irony 
was, of course, that Chamberlain was following a policy very similar to that of his 
predecessor.
In marked contrast to the support offered to the government by the national conservative 
press was the attitude of the liberal and left-wing press. Indeed, throughout 1938, the 
papers of liberal and left-wing sympathies were almost consistently hostile towards 
government policy. They readily pointed out the wider significance of developments in 
Spain for the balance of power in Europe. On March 17th, the leader in the Daily Herald, 
reporting on the previous day’s parliamentary debate, gave a damning indictment of 
Chamberlain’s handling of Spanish policy. It pointed out clearly the strategic risks posed 
to British interests by the failure of Non-Intervention. According to the leader: “Mr. 
Chamberlain’s premiership has been disastrous...His continuance in office is a 
danger to this country and to international peace.”61
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In their assessment of the long-term risks to national security created by British policy 
towards Spain, the opposition press often bore a striking resemblance to the views being 
uttered by Liddell Hart in the course of 1937-8. One example is the leader comment of 
the News Chronicle for March 17 . It was explicit about the strategic implications for the 
western democracies should Franco win: “[i]f Spain falls into the hands of a hostile 
power, it may well mean the end of British command of the Mediterranean maintained 
since the days of Nelson.”62 The leader graphically spelt out for its readership, the 
connection between a Nationalist victory in Spain at the behest of the dictator powers, 
and the resulting geographical isolation of France, and German domination of Northern 
Europe. Furthermore, given its large circulation, the News Chronicle was in a position to 
influence a far larger audience than Liddell Hart could ever hope to do.
The Manchester Guardian even went so far as to accuse the British government of 
holding partisan views in favour of the Spanish rebels, and, like the liberal left press in 
general, saw grave strategic risks to Britain in the intervention by the Axis powers. 
Whereas the conservative press toned down the significance of the additional supply of 
men and material to the Nationalist cause, the Manchester Guardian emphasized the 
evidence that, in the Spring of 1938, there had been substantial reinforcement from 
abroad: “ there can be no doubt at all that the present rebel offensive is made possible by 
renewed Italian and German support.”
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However, underlying the ideological differences between a conservative press in support 
of the government and a liberal/left press in opposition, there was in existence a very real 
conflict within the conservative press over the issue of the Civil War. As we have seen, 
the rallying of much of the national conservative press in support of Chamberlain was to 
exacerbate tensions among the staffs of these newspapers. Furthermore, the resentment 
felt by journalists of conservative newspapers at what they saw as a deliberate policy of 
censorship on the part of their editors, was doubtless fuelled by the ability of their 
contemporaries in liberal and left newspapers to publicize their concerns over the 
strategic implications of government policy towards the Spanish Civil War. In the liberal 
and left press such concerns were regularly expressed in both editorials and main articles.
During the last fourteen months of the Civil War, there were thus two contrasting and yet 
related developments within the British press. The rallying round of editors and 
proprietors in the conservative press in support of Chamberlain’s policy on Spain, by 
provoking stronger opposition among journalists, led to the formation of a new alliance 
within the press which cut across the political differences. The narrow more ideologically 
based consensus, which now linked official circles and their press allies was now 
confronted by a broader opposition consensus where political distinctions were becoming 
blurred. Of course, the most striking indication of this new left/right consensus on Spain 
was the contribution to the independent newsletters by journalists from a variety of 
newspapers. It becomes clear that following the resignation of Eden, his supporters 
within the conservative press came to adopt a standpoint on the Civil War that closely 
resembled that of the parliamentary opposition and the liberal and left wing press.
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However, whereas the liberal and left view on Spain, whether in Parliament or in the 
newspapers, tended to have a natural affinity with the Spanish Republic as a centre-left 
democracy, it was necessary for the conservative opposition to suppress its natural 
ideological suspicion towards the Spanish Popular Front regime. For these conservatives, 
departure from the conservative consensus in support of government policy was justified 
on the grounds that government policy was failing to uphold the interests of British and 
French strategy in the Western Mediterranean. Thus, for part of the conservative press, 
and apparently for some Conservative politicians also, 1937-8 brought a change of view 
towards Spain. The worsening international crisis helped Chamberlain to secure the 
support of a greater share of the conservative press for his policy of appeasement since it 
was in the interests of peace. However, the growing prospect of a new European war 
awakened fears that Spain might be a useful client state for those fascist powers, which, 
in the event of war, would be the opponents of Britain and France.
A radically different reaction to the resignation of Eden was that of the Yorkshire Post, 
bringing a fundamental change in its relationship with the Conservative Party. Following 
Eden’s resignation, the paper’s relationship with the British government underwent a 
complete reversal. The result was that, unlike the rest of the conservative press in this 
period, the Yorkshire Post openly criticized the Spanish policy pursued by Chamberlain’s 
government. Until late February of 1938 the Yorkshire Post had been part of the existing 
government and press consensus. It, too had argued that the government was genuinely 
neutral and that Non-Intervention served British interests both within the peninsula 
specifically, and on the continent in general. However, the editor of the paper, Arthur
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Mann, was a very keen supporter of the former Foreign Secretary. He shared completely 
Eden’s growing concerns over developments in the Civil War. He too, during 1937-8, 
became increasingly wary regarding the long-term prospect for British interests following 
a victory for Franco. Uniquely among the conservative newspapers at the time of Eden’s 
resignation, the Yorkshire Post fully supported Eden against Chamberlain, expressing 
support for the position adopted by the former Foreign Secretary over the issue of Anglo- 
Italian conversations. On February 21st, therefore, the comment by the leader column was 
as follows:
[t]he ill effect of this resignation will be felt, we fear, especially in the 
United States of America, where already there has been a pronounced 
tendency to suggest that any understanding with Britain must be 
undesirable and unsafe because the government have already shown 
inclination to prefer association with the dictatorships to co-operation 
with the democracies.64
Throughout 1938, Mann and Eden maintained regular correspondence in which Mann 
offered his support, which was much appreciated by Eden.65 Their correspondence 
demonstrates that, regarding Spain, they were in complete agreement. Thus, having 
adopted the role of conservative press critic of the foreign policy of the National 
Government headed by Chamberlain, the Yorkshire Post became an advocate of the 
conservative opposition to the government line on Spain as well. Because the paper 
identified Franco’s association with the Axis powers as a threat to British interests, the 
attitude of the paper moved away from a position of neutrality towards open sympathy for 
the cause of the Spanish Republic. The correspondence between Mann and Eden not 
only revealed their shared perception of the Civil War, particularly their concern at the 
development of events on the ground in the course of the first half of 1938, but also their
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shared antipathy towards Chamberlain. On at least two occasions, Mann had met with 
either Halifax or Chamberlain, but remained unconvinced of the government’s case 
concerning its justification for its foreign policy. On March 25th, in a letter to Eden, 
Mann referred to Chamberlain as “living in a fool’s paradise”, and expected his 
resignation should it become clear that his policy of appeasement was a failure.66 As 
Eden’s disillusionment with Chamberlain grew, he encouraged Mann to continue with his 
open opposition to the government line. On March 1st, for example, Eden wrote, “I am 
convinced that the ‘Y P’, in writing as it did came much nearer to representing the
A7national mood than some other papers which have supported our policy in the past.”
Such was Eden’s trust in this particular ally in the conservative press that he confided in 
him his private thoughts concerning the situation in Europe, thoughts which were not for 
publication. Eden even supplied Mann with confidential information that confirmed the
• • tVieditor’s own scepticism regarding government Spanish policy. On March 13 , for 
example, Eden wrote to Mann concerning the European situation in general. In his letter, 
Eden also referred to the activities of the Italian forces engaged in Spain: “[i]t is a 
profound mistake to attempt conversations with totalitarian states who are systematically
Aft tliengaged in the violation of every agreement they have ever entered into.” On April 16 , 
the day that the Anglo-Italian Agreement was signed, Eden wrote to Mann, again in 
confidence. On that day, which coincided with the advancing Nationalist forces reaching 
the Mediterranean coast at Vinaroz, thus cutting the Republican held territory in two, 
Eden wrote in a disparaging manner about Chamberlain: “it seems that Mussolini is to be 
allowed to win his war in Spain and afterwards we have to pay him for his victory.”69 On
248
May 18th, Eden wrote again encouraging the editor in the independent and critical line 
adopted in its leader columns by the Yorkshire Post. He intimated to Mann the impact 
that even a small but influential newspaper could have. Eden wrote of the leader
70columns, “[t]hey have created, I know, a profound impression.” In fact its opposition to 
the official line was dangerous because in a paper so closely tied to the Conservative 
Party, the stance taken by Mann undermined the illusion of a broad conservative press 
consensus in support of government foreign policy on Spain. Although a comprehensive 
study has been made of the opposition of the Yorkshire Post to Chamberlain’s foreign 
policy in general, the importance of differences over the Spanish Civil War has been a 
neglected area. This is a serious omission given the significance accorded to Spain in the 
leader columns of that paper, in which every opportunity was taken to express the 
alternative view to the official line. A further neglected area has been the correspondence 
between Mann and Eden in the months following the latter’s resignation. Indeed the 
similarity of their views concerning Spain, as revealed in their exchange of letters, and 
Eden’s encouragement to Mann to continue in his independent line can only have 
encouraged the editor to continue in his crusade.71
During the spring of 1938, the rapid advance of the Nationalist forces and the impending 
collapse of the Spanish Republic were viewed ominously by the Yorkshire Post. Indeed, 
among conservative newspapers, the Yorkshire Post was unusual in that it pointed out to 
its readers the case against the Nationalists. On the day of an important parliamentary 
debate on the progress of the Civil War, the leader column of the paper stressed the threat 
of a Franco victory to British maritime routes:
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[t]he real territorial, political and military independence of Spain and its 
complete freedom from control by the Axis powers is of vital importance
79to every man, woman and child in this country.
On March 19th, the Yorkshire Post again considered the strategic implications of the Civil 
War, and in its leader column quoted directly from the lecture of Liddell Hart on March 
17th, by reiterating his view that the second great war of the century had already begun in 
Spain with the intervention by the Axis powers.
The Yorkshire Post’s concern at the designs of both Germany and Italy regarding Spain in 
the long term made the paper extremely sceptical of the offers of either German or Italian 
goodwill concerning their intentions there, and doubtful of the value of any Anglo-Italian 
agreement. On March 19th, therefore, the leader adopted a very pessimistic view of the 
Anglo-Italian talks in progress in Rome. The comment was “it would be the height of 
folly to place any confidence in an agreement which is not preceded by a real Italian 
evacuation of Spain.” On March 25th, the leader questioned the optimism shown by the 
Prime Minister in Parliament because he had received assurances from Italy that she had 
no territorial, political or economic aims in Spain or the Balearics. The leader declared, 
“[t]he Prime Minister will probably appear to most people to have been either almost 
excessively circumspect in his language or too optimistic.”74 On April 2nd, the Yorkshire 
Post again took an opportunity to dampen down any enthusiasm over Italo-German 
assurances that neither had any territorial designs on Spain. In a detailed article outlining 
the extent of German penetration in Nationalist held Spain in particular, the leader gave a 
very clear warning: “[i]t would be preposterous not to see now that an effective Nazi
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domination of Spain, after the National victory, would serve the purpose of that of the
*7r
destruction of France.”
In the course of 1938-9, the Yorkshire Post did not merely see its role as alerting its 
readers to the dangers inherent in British policy towards Spain. Faced with pressure upon 
it to conform to the prevailing orthodoxy, formulated by circles close to Neville 
Chamberlain, it considered that it had a much wider mission. As editor, Mann like 
Dawson and Garvin, for example, had a large degree of autonomy regarding the policy of 
his paper. However, the opposition of the Yorkshire Post towards government foreign 
policy quickly aroused the displeasure of the board of directors of the newspaper, in 
particular Stanley Pearson. On March 1st, therefore, Pearson wrote to Mann, warning him 
that the independence of the editor was to be raised at the next meeting of the board of 
Directors. Mann, who was jealous of his right to independence, wrote to the proprietor, 
Rupert Beckett, complaining about the threat to his position implied by Pearson’s letter. 
Thus, he informed the proprietor, “I regard his intention to comment on YP internal 
affairs at tomorrow’s meeting as entirely improper.”77 On this particular occasion, 
Beckett was to support Mann. However, even Beckett’s support ebbed away with the 
repeated hostility of the Yorkshire Post's leaders towards the government and Neville 
Chamberlain in particular. On March 23rd, Beckett wrote to Mann, criticizing the leaders,
- 7 0
which challenged government policy on Spain.
It is clear that Beckett’s letter was an attempt to influence the editor in advance of the 
Prime Minister’s foreign policy speech in Parliament the next day. He was concerned lest
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the Yorkshire Post should be seen as arguing for the removal of Chamberlain as Prime
Minister. Of course, the irony was that as editor of one of the few newspapers actually
owned by the Conservative party he faced far stronger political pressures to fall into line
than did editors of other conservative papers. This was especially so in regard to Spain,
which was an issue that polarized opinion in Britain along party lines. Mann, however,
continued to use the leader columns of the paper as a means of expressing his opposition
to government policy. Therefore, in spite of Becket’s express instructions, the leader
comment on the Prime Minister’s foreign policy speech of March 25th, was as follows:
[w]e are to maintain our non-intervention. The Prime Minister warns all 
whom it may concern that those interests for which we shall fight if they 
are menaced are ‘communications vital to our existence’. We [referring to 
leader comment on Spain on previous occasions] have recently shown that 
the domination of Spanish ports and islands by a potentially hostile foreign 
power would undoubtedly constitute a menace to vital British communications.79
The importance which Mann clearly accorded to Spain and the frustration that both he 
and Eden felt with the apparent blindness of the Chamberlain government to the real risks 
to British interests, made it virtually impossible for him to be positive towards the Prime 
Minister’s efforts. At best, therefore, the leaders of the Yorkshire Post could only excuse 
Chamberlain for lacking in insight. Even so, when there was a particular reference to the 
Prime Minister, opposition tended to be expressed in a circumspect manner. For
tViexample, the leader comment of April 16 , concerning the Anglo-Italian Agreement, 
recognized the difficulties faced by Chamberlain in a more difficult international sphere, 
and declined to offer criticism of the agreement in advance of its terms being made 
public. This was rather different in tone from the sarcastic and even contemptuous way 
in which the same newspaper only a month before had generalized about those who
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supported bringing the Anglo-Italian Agreement into force. On April 16th, however, the 
paper offered no more than a cautious warning against seeing the agreement as a 
watershed in Anglo-Italian relations: “it is impossible not to remember the proverb
OA
concerning the cup and the lip has not necessarily lost all its points.” Even when, on the 
following day, Mann was in possession of the actual terms of the agreement, and thus in a 
far stronger position to offer stinging criticism of Chamberlain’s handling of foreign 
affairs, the leader comment for April 18th was still guarded in its opposition. While on 
the one hand the terms were condemned, the following caveat was inserted: “if events 
prove that Mr. Chamberlain’s action has been well judged as it is unquestionably well 
intentioned, we shall not stint in our acknowledgment to his foresight and 
statesmanship.”81 At this stage, Mann was still prepared to be cautious in his public 
criticism of the Prime Minister. Indeed, as indicated by the evidence of his 
correspondence with Eden, it was only in private that a truer reflection of his opinion of 
Chamberlain’s conduct of foreign policy could be detected. As an example , on the same
t V iday that the April 18 leader was written, Mann wrote to Eden, expressmg, in 
unambiguous terms, his objections to the agreement on both moral as well as practical 
grounds. 82 Thus the mitigating nature of the concluding note of encouragement in the 
leader is hardly sincere. Indeed, it may have been as much a deliberate ploy to contain the 
criticism of the board of directors towards the line taken by the Yorkshire Post, as a 
conscious attempt to place Chamberlain’s policy in a positive light. Such ambiguity even 
suggests pressure was being clandestinely exerted upon Mann to fall into line.
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In spite of its choice of language, the Yorkshire Post was not generally successful at
deflecting criticism from an increasingly perturbed board of directors. Therefore, Mann’s
continued opposition towards Chamberlain led to further letters from Beckett attempting
to persuade him to change tack. On June 11th Beckett wrote in complaint of the previous
day’s leader on foreign policy:
I take strong exception to the latter part of The Yorkshire Post leader on 
Friday. I think it is most unwise to advocate that we should hitch our wagon 
to the small states of Europe and thereby risk being dragged into their 
complications...83
The independent line taken by the Yorkshire Post with regard to foreign policy can be 
seen as a reaction against the renewed pressure from official sources being exerted on the 
press. The surviving evidence from the Foreign Office files for 1938 points to a much 
more intensive effort by the government to secure the co-operation of proprietors in the
tlisuppression of certain news items. On February 28 , Leeper and Eden’s successor as 
Foreign Secretary, Halifax, discussed possible ways in which the British press in general 
and also the BBC might be induced to moderate their tone towards the dictator powers. 
Leeper advised,
the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State [Halifax] might together 
see the Chairman of The Newspaper Proprietors’ Association and make 
an appeal to do what is possible in the press to avoid provocation against 
Germany and Italy. Times were difficult, all of us, including the press, 
should have a sense of national responsibility.84
Leeper suggested that Sir Neville Henderson, Ambassador to Germany, and Lord Perth, 
Ambassador to Italy, should be given copies of what was being said to the press so that 
they in turn could inform the German and Italian governments. As Leeper had suggested,
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Sir Neville Henderson was informed that Halifax was to call a press conference at the 
Foreign Office to impress upon the gathering the responsibility of the press. The 
ambassador was apprised of the substance of the statement that Halifax was to make. His 
intention was “to make an appeal to do what it is possible in the press to avoid 
provocation against Germany and Italy, and to instil a greater sense of national
or
responsibility at the present time.” Henderson was also informed that Sir John Reith, 
Director General of the BBC, was to “ bear in mind the extreme sensitivity of Hitler and 
Mussolini to BBC ‘talk’ and presentation of news.”
In a democracy, such official pressure, especially on the independent media, was highly 
controversial. The government vociferously denied rumours that the press had been 
approached to tone down criticism of the dictators. On March 28th, Chamberlain had 
been asked in Parliament whether since February 21st, “ a request/ suggestion had been 
made to British newspapers to suppress or modify news and comment on government
ny-
foreign policy.” Chamberlain’s reply was ambiguous, for while emphatically denying 
that any such attempt had been made officially, he nevertheless drew the attention of his 
parliamentary colleagues to “the heavy responsibility, which rests on the press when 
commenting on international affairs.” The reality was far less ambiguous. Both he and 
the dictators who were the intended beneficiaries of such a policy were aware that the
87government had made strong representations towards the media. On a number of 
occasions in the course of 1938-9, the Yorkshire Post, that vociferous defender of press 
freedom, made vague reference in its leaders to the government’s attempts to interfere 
with the policy of newspapers. One such warning read, “[t]here have been some
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indications in recent months that some members of our government believe that there 
should be silence on such matters.”88
The Yorkshire Post was to cause increasing concern in official circles. As has been 
previously stated, this was largely because its influence on opinion was far greater than its 
small readership would suggest. Of particular concern both to official circles and to the 
board of directors was the effect of the paper’s open attack on government policy, since it 
drew attention to the limits of the conservative consensus on Spain. As far as government 
supporters were concerned, the action of the Yorkshire Post was to show that the criticism 
of the opposition press towards government policy on Spain could not be dismissed as 
merely a knee jerk reaction against the Conservative dominated government of the day. 
Thus, the opposition of Mann was another reminder that government policy on Spain 
could be genuinely opposed on grounds of strategic interest. The readership of the
QQ
Yorkshire Post although small had a large postal circulation. Not only was the attitude 
of Mann and, of course, Liddell Hart, a reminder that the conservative consensus in 
favour of Non-Intervention was limited, it also made it more difficult for the government 
to defend its policy as genuinely neutral. From the determination of certain conservative 
journalists to highlight the obvious pitfalls and inconsistencies of government policy on 
Spain, one could easily draw the conclusion that the failure of the British government to 
work for more effective Non-Intervention in Spain was because it was not neutral but 
would prefer the victory of the Nationalist side. Such a conclusion would be a cause of 
embarrassment for the government. Dawson showed his awareness of this fact when, on
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tilFebruary 28 1939, he wrote the following to Sir Samuel Hoare: “[t]here is no paper that 
has tried to do Chamberlain more harm in recent months than the Yorkshire Post.”90
By June 1938, the inability of Chamberlain to rebuild a broad consensus within the press 
in support of government policy on Spain was clearly in evidence. In February of that 
year, the Nationalist military command had embarked on a new strategy, that of attacking 
merchant ships trading in Republican ports. The increasing volume of these attacks was 
to place the Nationalist authorities in conflict with the British government. This was 
because the bulk of the foreign shipping engaged in the legitimate trade with Republican 
Spain was British registered.91 As virtually all of the contraband or war material being 
sent to the Republic was carried in either French or Russian vessels, the British ships 
being attacked were not only engaged in legitimate trade but carried Non-Intervention 
officials as a verification of the non-warlike nature of their cargoes. Since the Nationalist 
regime had not been recognized as a belligerent power, under international law, any 
attack on foreign shipping was an act of piracy. The attacks escalated from the end of 
May until June, with the biggest losses to merchant shipping being incurred by British 
registered vessels. Of the total of sixteen British ships lost during the Spanish Civil War,
t V iten were sunk during the period between June 16 and 22nd. A further thirty-seven 
merchant ships were damaged in air attacks either in Republican ports or on the high seas. 
The responsibility for such attacks lay with aircraft owned by the German or Italian 
forces, operating from bases in Mallorca.92 The problem for Chamberlain was that these 
attacks and, in particular, the disproportionate share of British ships and lives among the 
casualties undermined government policy on Spain still further. Public opinion in Britain
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was clearly in favour of reprisals against the Nationalists.93 The British government, 
however, was most unwilling to take punitive measures. In spite of the overwhelming 
parliamentary strength of the government, Chamberlain was clearly aware of the effect of 
the attacks in creating public hostility towards Franco, which in turn might force him to 
take action that he did not wish to take:
If he [Franco] must bomb Spanish government ports he must use discretion 
otherwise he might arouse a feeling in the country which would force the 
government to take action. Such a situation was by no means beyond the 
bounds of possibility if the sinkings were to reach say one a day.94
Given its stance, the government lay itself open to the charge, both within Parliament and 
without, that once again it was failing to uphold British interests overseas. The 
government did what it could to secure sympathetic reception in the press for its view on 
this crisis. On June 9th, for example, Halifax effectively instructed the head of his 
personal press department to canvass the support of newspaper correspondents.95 Indeed, 
Halifax was acutely aware of the political difficulties facing the government and warned 
Chamberlain, “it is going to give us all a lot of trouble.” The press was divided in its 
response towards the government on the bombing issue, providing further evidence of the 
continued limitations in the ability of the government, in a parliamentary state, to exert 
pressure on the press. On June 10th, the day after Halifax’s instructions to his press 
secretary, the Manchester Guardian summarized the intensification of the piratical and 
seaport attacks over the year and was highly critical of the British government: “it looks 
as though the government had no policy” was the opinion of the leader column.96
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The opposition press was generally united in demanding much more determined action 
than the government was in fact prepared to take. Mann was under no illusion as to who 
was responsible for the attacks from the air; he was convinced it was Italian aeroplanes. 
In his opinion, this was further evidence that there was no gain for Britain in following a 
policy of appeasement of Italy, given the patent lack of good faith of Italy towards
Q7Britain. What was particularly important however was the way in which Mann now 
openly criticized Chamberlain. He became much more willing to argue openly that with 
regard to Spain, Chamberlain was following a cynical policy. Having staked his political 
reputation on the success of the Anglo-Italian Treaty, Chamberlain was therefore 
prepared to be complacent in regard to the current Italian operations within Spain. In 
fact, Mann came to question publicly whether the continued support of Chamberlain’s 
government for Non-Intervention was indeed a reflection of neutrality towards the 
conflict. In his opinion; “[Mussolini] seems to have assumed that the British 
Government might take serious steps to impede action by Italy and Germany to hasten 
Franco’s victory.”98 Significantly, Mann had moved even closer to the position adopted 
by the liberal/left press on the Civil War. It would seem that the sustained bombing 
offensive against British registered vessels encouraged Mann to be bolder and therefore 
less circumspect in his opposition even towards Chamberlain. After all, such attacks 
were an affront to British prestige and a threat to British maritime interests in the western 
Mediterranean.
The failure of the government to secure newspaper support beyond its traditional allies in 
the conservative press for its policy regarding attacks on British shipping was exacerbated
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in the early summer by growing opposition within Parliament. Indeed, as Halifax had 
pointed out on June 9th, the government would face difficulties in Parliament on the 
bombing issue when it came to be discussed by members the following week." His 
prediction was proved correct for his private secretary later recorded in his diary for June 
14th: “the government’s extremely negative statement on bombing in Spain went badly in 
the Commons today.”100 After two further debates on the Spanish situation the following 
week, Chamberlain succumbed to parliamentary pressure and agreed to recall Hodgson, 
the British representative, from Burgos. Even Chamberlain was forced to admit the 
difficulties the government faced over the bombing issue. In a letter to his sister, Ida, 
written on June 25th, he stated, “I didn’t think that we came very well out of the first 
debate on Spain this week.”101 This makes his confidence regarding British press 
reception of his speeches on Spain even more surprising, for in the same letter 
Chamberlain also suggested that the newspapers in general supported him in his 
speech.102 According to Chamberlain, Rex Leeper was convinced that among the lobby 
correspondents there was “nothing but praise and satisfaction” for the way in which the 
Prime Minister had dealt with the situation in Parliament.
Chamberlain’s optimism was misleading for the reaction of the liberal/left press was
thpredictable. The Manchester Guardian, for example, in its leader for the 24 , accused 
the government of neglect of duty in its failure to provide adequate protection for British
1 mships engaged in lawful trade. As on previous occasions, the Daily Herald emphasized 
what it interpreted as the ‘malevolent neutrality’ of government policy against the 
interests of the Republic. In this particular instance, it was represented in the refusal of
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Chamberlain to take sterner measures against Franco’s regime. The leader column of the 
paper made clear its opinion that the reason for the government’s inactivity on the issue 
was that it did not want to do anything which might hinder the chances of Franco in the 
Civil War: “The premier’s policy is founded on the principle that nothing must be done to 
stop General Franco from winning the war. Nothing must be done because Mr. 
Chamberlain’s reputation is at stake.”104 Even more damaging to the government was the 
view of the Yorkshire Post published on June 23rd, in advance of the parliamentary debate 
that day. In an attempt to influence opinion ahead of the debate, the paper, whilst 
acknowledging the difficulties faced by the Prime Minister in his earlier attempt to 
respond to the attacks on merchant shipping, nevertheless stood out against him: “ we 
think that he under-estimates the real strength of public feeling.”105 The latter view was a 
clear indication as to why the Yorkshire Post should be less circumspect than previously 
in its criticism of the Prime Minister.
The bombing of British ships had represented a serious test of the loyalty of conservative 
newspapers towards the Spanish policy of the Prime Minister. To a large extent, the 
manner in which the conservative press in general dealt with the issue was a reflection of 
the success of Chamberlain’s personal touch with individual editors and proprietors over 
an issue which could have broken the alliance between Chamberlain and his press 
supporters. After all, in the previous autumn, there had been almost total support from 
newspapers for naval patrols to protect foreign shipping from submarine attack. Yet over 
the present crisis, conservative newspapers were asked and indeed agreed to support a 
completely contradictory policy to the one pursued earlier. In 1937 it had been possible
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for both government and conservative newspapers, albeit cynically, to hide behind 
phrases such as ‘unidentified submarine attacks’ against British shipping when it was 
common knowledge that the perpetrators were Italian. Over the bombing issue however, 
the attacks were aerial, and there could be no similar cover up. As both ministers and 
their press allies admitted, the aeroplane attacks on British registered vessels were 
deliberate. Given the explosive potential of the issue it is hardly surprising that it should 
inform discussions between official circles and leading members of the press. Between 
May 31st and June 30th, when the attacks on shipping were at their height, there are at 
least eight references to them in the Dawson diary, in fact it was the most common Civil
thWar issue referred to in the month of June. On at least two of these occasions, June 9 
and 14th, references to it are related to discussion with the Foreign Secretary, Halifax106, 
then a close supporter of Chamberlain’s foreign policy.107 Given that the government had, 
on previous occasions during the Civil War, exploited its contacts with its press allies to 
open up alternative forms of dialogue with the dictator powers, the evidence suggests 
that, in the summer of 1938, possibly through Halifax’s friendship with Dawson, attempts 
were being made to secure the offices of The Times in a broader diplomatic strategy; 
namely to bring the present crisis to an end. Furthermore, it makes sense of the ambiguity 
in the leaders of The Times. Take, for example, the leader for June 28th. The desire of the 
British government to find a peaceful solution of the crisis through joint action with the 
dictator powers was explained. However, a coded warning was given, implying that if the 
attacks did not cease, then the advocates of appeasement with the dictators might be 
forced by the clamour of an outraged public opinion into adopting punitive measures: 
“[i]t would be the greatest mistake to assume that the government would not act in any
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1 HRcircumstances.” In fact, the manner in which the above terms were couched suggest 
this was written as much for reception abroad as for the domestic readership. After all, 
the leaders in The Times were very long, often excessively detailed and ambiguous, 
requiring both time and patience to digest their true meaning. As long as they were 
willing to comply, newspapers could be used by ministers, albeit in a limited way, as a 
means of conveying to the dictators those concerns they were not willing to make public. 
Indeed, the warning implied in The Times on June 28th bore striking resemblance to the 
privately held views of Chamberlain. On June 25 , he had written to his sister, Hilda, of 
his fears that if the attacks on British ships persisted then it could lead to war between 
Britain and Franco.109
While on one level, conservative papers appeared to support the government line on the 
bombing issue, this did not alter the fact that the Civil War remained a divisive issue. 
Both the Daily Mail and the Observer, for example retained their sympathies for the 
Nationalist cause. The tacit sympathy of the Observer even in the light of repeated 
Nationalist aeroplane attacks on ports condemned elsewhere in the conservative press, 
was indicated in the use of inverted commas when referring to the distinction which was 
commonly made between ‘civilian’ as opposed to military targets. Clearly, the paper did 
not see a clear distinction between the two, thus the attacks on ports were justified as 
legitimate targets. On June 19th, in a lead article Garvin wrote that it was in the interest 
of British shipping engaged in trade with Spain that Franco should win the war.110 
Meanwhile, The Truth was becoming increasingly concerned lest the Nationalists should 
win the war. As early as April 20th, for example, ‘Entrenous’ wrote, “I am still trying to
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discover why any sensible or patriotic Englishman should want Franco to win.”111 
Moreover, the persistence of their partisan attachments to either the Republican or 
Nationalist sides limited the support most conservative papers were willing to give the 
government. This was even shown in the way in which a number of these papers dealt
with the bombing issue. Even The Times implied that the British government was partly
112to blame for making it too easy for foreign owned vessels to obtain British registration. 
The Daily Mail was prepared to be more directly critical of the government for not 
closing the loophole in current legislation. On July 1st, the leader advised the government 
to “end a system by which aliens can buy the protective might of the British fleet for £70 
or £80.”113 On June 12th, Garvin criticized the government for failing to grant belligerent 
rights to both sides in the Civil War. His main concern was Britain’s relations with 
Franco that, he assumed, would be bolstered by the raising of his international prestige 
that the granting of belligerent rights would entail. For Garvin, given the progress of 
events on the ground in Spain, such action was also practical policy: He concluded that 
with Franco winning the war, “[i]t would be senseless for Britain and France to [have] an 
unnecessary enmity with the Spain of the future.”114 However, some conservative papers 
were even moving in the direction of urging the government to adopt a more energetic 
policy in response to the attacks. Take, for example, the editorial of the Daily Telegraph 
on July 5th 1938. It only accepted in part the warning that the government had issued to 
British shipping that trading in a war zone was at their own risk. The leader implied that 
the government should do more to protect British interests.115 Even Truth expressed its 
exasperation at what it saw as the timidity of British policy. At the end of June, in a 
rather ambiguous statement in which, while Entrenous expressed support for Non-
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Intervention for confining the war to Spain, the rider was added that the same policy “has 
brought us a good many unpleasant and even humiliating experiences.”116 Thus, the 
attitude of many conservative newspapers towards the bombing crisis was ambiguous. At 
one level they rallied behind the government, especially in the face of attacks by the 
parliamentary opposition. Hence, its policy was defended as wise because it prevented 
the escalation of the Civil War into a wider conflict. But the support was conditional; the 
protracted bombing crisis in the summer of 1938 strained the alliance that bound these 
papers in support of Spanish policy. In the circumspect opposition expressed in leader 
columns, newspapers were entering a semi-secret dialogue with the government, in which 
they gave indications of the limits of their patience with current policy. Some, such as the 
Daily Mail and the Observer were in effect arguing for a change of policy.
However, in marked contrast to the division over Spain was the display of unity among
newspapers across the political spectrum in defence of the Munich settlement in the
autumn of 1938. On this issue, Cockett, in Twilight Of Truth, wrote,
[t]here is no doubt that by reading the press comment on Munich one would 
have gained the impression that, as W.W. Hadley later claimed, ‘the free 
press of this Country has never been nearer to complete unity than in the117chorus of praise and thanksgiving which followed Munich’.
Cockett concluded that the unity among the papers, which in fact masked the very real 
divisions among them regarding appeasement, was achieved through Chamberlain’s
1 1 o
“consistent and secret cultivation of the personal touch with the press.” Yet the 
consensus on Munich was brought about not so much by Chamberlain’s cultivation of the 
press as by the very special circumstances created by the Czech crisis in the summer and
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autumn of that year. In the autumn especially, there was the very real risk of an outbreak 
of war over Czechoslovakia. It is true that there had been similar fears regarding the 
conflict in Spain, that it too might escalate into a war amongst the European Powers. 
However, this point was never reached. This was because of the determination of the 
British government never to allow such a possibility. Indeed, throughout the war, French 
initiatives to offset the material disadvantages to the Republic, in particular by allowing 
the traffic of war material across the Pyrenees into Republican Spain, were doomed to fail 
without British support, which of course was never forthcoming. Furthermore, both the 
Axis powers and Franco recognized that the British government had no intention of 
fighting a general war over Spain. Therefore, to ease the political pressure on 
Chamberlain in Parliament, on June 25th, Franco ordered his fleet and air force to stop the 
attacks on British vessels.119 Thus, British newspapers could attack the government line 
on Spain in the confidence that there was no risk of provoking a crisis that could lead to 
war. Yet Spain was an issue vital to British interests. The opposition press was looking 
towards a different war in which Britain and France would be allies against the fascist 
states. They therefore repudiated the Prime Minister’s confident belief in the possibility 
of a long lasting accommodation with Germany and Italy being achieved.
The limited nature of actual support for Chamberlain became very apparent shortly after
the Munich conference. He had been confident that the contact established with both
Hitler and Mussolini at Munich could be exploited to secure their support for an armistice
in Spain that would bring the Civil War to a close. Indeed, Chamberlain expressed this
1 0(\confidence in a letter that he wrote to his sister, Hilda. However, his optimism
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regarding the good faith of the dictators was to be short lived, for in the following week
Chamberlain wrote to his sister, Ida, of the threat made by Mussolini, that, unless the
Anglo-Italian Agreement was signed immediately, Italy would sign a military alliance
with Germany.121 The Prime Minister confided that political circumstances at home
would make it difficult for him to sign the agreement. Nevertheless, taking the token
withdrawal of 10 000 Italian troops from the CTV during the previous September as an
excuse, the British government allowed the Anglo-Italian Agreement to come into force
on November 16th, well in advance of the total withdrawal of Italian forces.122
Significantly, the reaction of the British press to this new twist in government policy on
Spain was not purely on party political lines. The Yorkshire Post referring to the
parliamentary debate on November 2nd made the following, predictable comment about
the Anglo-Italian Agreement:
We are now to believe without any material evidence that despite all these 
violated undertakings we need no longer feel in the least concerned lest 
Spain should be found completely dominated by a Nazi-Fascist government 
pursuing a policy antagonistic to the democracies.123
By late 1938, even Camrose was demanding a change in policy in order to place the 
country on a war footing.124 However, in spite of the increasing concern of its proprietor 
over the attitude of the dictators, the Daily Telegraph would not move away from 
defending government policy on Spain.125 It was to the Whitehall Letter therefore, that 
Gordon-Lennox, had to resort in order to point out his scepticism regarding the Anglo- 
Italian Agreement. Indeed, on October 20th, the Whitehall Letter explained that the 
reluctance of Franco to agree to the withdrawal of foreign volunteers was because of his 
dependence upon the Italian and German troops.126 Franco’s reluctance to co-operate and
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therefore the absence of any effective agreement on Spain among the powers of the Non-
Intervention Committee was raised again by this journal on November 3rd, the day
Parliament gave approval for the Anglo-Italian Agreement to come into force.127 Yet the
cracks within the conservative press consensus on Spain were to widen as more of the
government’s allies began to show reservations towards Chamberlain’s policy. The
Observer, unlike most conservative papers at this time, was not prepared to accept the
government’s case unreservedly. On November 6 , therefore, even this paper came close
to criticizing government policy on Spain, returning to a mocking scepticism of Non-
Intervention schemes that had characterized its ‘The World Week By Week’ column
before Chamberlain became Prime Minister. Thus, in the opinion of the paper:
In the technical sense Italy’s evacuation of 10 000 volunteers has satisfied 
the criterion of a ‘settlement in Spain’. The plan launched by the Non- 
Intervention Committee has stipulated a specific degree of evacuations 
as the condition precedent to the granting of belligerent rights. But General 
Franco who is the claimant for belligerent rights has not yet accepted the 
plan, there results the remarkable dilemma that before General Franco can1 98be given what he wants he must first agree to be given it...
As we shall see in the next chapter, reservations among editors and proprietors previously 
loyal to Chamberlain on the issue of the Civil War were to develop, in the final months of 
the War, into much more open opposition.
In conclusion, the resignation of Eden in February 1938 resulted in a further realignment 
of the conservative press on the issue of the Spanish Civil War. The removal of Eden 
from office confirmed that the government would continue turning a blind eye to the 
continued involvement of Italy and Germany in the Civil War. It was this that led to the
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emergence of a conservative press opposition rather different from the opposition that had 
been offered by certain conservative newspapers towards the government line in the first 
twelve months of the war. In terms of circulation figures, this new opposition reached a 
far smaller audience. However, this alternative view was expressed with a greater sense 
of urgency as the clouds of war loomed across the European continent during the later
1  9 Qthirties. The tone of the Whitehall Letter, for example, was very different from that of
the King-Hall Newsletter. From the outbreak of the war in July 1936, the King-Hall
Newsletter had been prepared to be sympathetic towards the government line on Spain.
This was in sharp contrast to the attitude of the Whitehall Letter whose treatment of the
1 1 0Spanish Civil War was from a consistently pessimistic perspective. 1938 highlighted 
the very real limitations on Chamberlain’s efforts to build a broad consensus within the 
press for his policy of appeasement. Spain was too divisive an issue, for what was at 
stake in the Civil War were not just issues relating to ideology or class but the very 
security of the British and French Empires. The disagreement between the independent 
conservative press on the one hand and the government and its conservative press allies 
on the other was based on a completely different perception of the European situation. 
Chamberlain defended his policy as pragmatic, his view being that, in the context of the 
later thirties, Britain had to deal with the dictators. The independents by challenging this 
were moving towards the unthinkable, the inevitability of a second general war on the 
continent between the Democracies and the Axis. For them, the conduct of Hitler and 
Mussolini in the Spanish Civil War demonstrated the impossibility of any real agreement 
being reached with the Dictators.
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As we have seen the resignation of Eden did not lead to the emergence of two stable 
coalitions within the press on the issue of the Spanish Civil War. That coalition still 
supportive of the government line became more brittle. From within these newspapers the 
voices of dissent and criticism may have been more muted than the strident criticism of 
the Yorkshire Post, but the development of circumspect opposition among papers 
officially supportive of the government, especially in the summer of 1938, pointed to the 
limited extent of the support upon which the government could rely from any of its 
ideological sympathizers within the British press.
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muted in its opposition of the government line on Spain. The issue of November 4th 
1938 was supportive of the British government for bringing the Anglo-Italian 
Agreement into force: “I say quite frankly that if the implementation will prevent Italy 
from doing certain things she might otherwise do in the Mediterranean and Middle 
East, I’m for the implementation”. Therefore, King-Hall saw no contradiction in his 
being hostile towards Franco as a threat to British interests, while at the same time 
supporting Chamberlain’s Spanish policy, which did so much to contribute to the 
final victory of Franco in the Civil War.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE INTENSIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO
INFLUENCE THE CONSERVATIVE PRESS DURING THE CLOSING STAGES 
OF THE WAR.
The last Republican offensive of the war had begun in mid July of 1938. This was the 
battle of the river Ebro that ended in November 1938, after nearly five months of some of 
the bitterest fighting in the whole of the Spanish Civil War. The offensive had surpassed 
official British expectations of the fighting capacity of the Republican army following the 
disaster at Teruel. Within official circles, this was to alter perceptions of the Civil War. 
Indeed, Chamberlain reached the conclusion that a decisive victory in Spain was unlikely. 
Therefore, he seriously reconsidered the armistice idea that had been put forward by the 
British government earlier in the war. Chamberlain’s confidence in the prospects of a 
British peace initiative was bolstered by three main factors. Firstly, as briefly shown in 
the last chapter, his discussions with Hitler and Mussolini at Munich in late September 
had convinced him that both dictators were now weary of the war. Therefore, he believed 
they would be receptive to a negotiated peace rather than holding out until an outright 
victory for Franco had been achieved. Secondly, in the late autumn and early winter of 
1938, reports were reaching the government both of growing war weariness on each side 
in Spain and of the existence of internal opposition to the Nationalist regime in Burgos. 
Finally, the failure of the Nationalist high command to take the initiative and launch a 
new offensive against Catalonia in December, seemed to confirm the view now held in 
London that a mediated end to the war was a real possibility.
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British conservative newspapers were supportive of the efforts of the government to 
secure international support for a negotiated peace. They showed this by emphasizing the 
war weariness on both sides. They also deliberately ‘talked up’ the prospects of an 
armistice in Spain. On December 19th, the Paris correspondent of the Daily Telegraph 
wrote the following about the extent of the fraternization between the Republican and 
Nationalist armies: “ in effect a truce actually exists.” 1 On December 23rd, The Times 
leader pointed out that the expected Catalan offensive was delayed because of two 
factors: firstly the defection of a Nationalist officer to the Republican side taking with 
him the plans for the offensive; secondly the mutiny within the Nationalist army. The 
leader was highly critical of Franco’s intransigence towards any negotiated settlement to 
the conflict; suggesting that it merely stiffened Republican resistance. Even the Daily 
Mail, ever sympathetic towards the Nationalist cause, admitted to its readers that there 
had been a serious revolt against Franco, resulting in two hundred arrests. The pro- 
Chamberlain journal, Truth, whilst suggesting that the stories of revolts against Franco 
may have been exaggerated, accepted that there was an element of truth in them. It 
suggested, “an army that is composed of different nationalities is always difficult to keep 
in order, after the first flash of enthusiasm has worn off the various allies usually [get on] 
fighting terms fairly quickly, especially if the war is a civil war, and most especially of all 
if Spaniards are involved.”4
Plans were afoot for the Prime Minister to visit Rome in the following year, in the wake 
of the bringing into force of the Anglo-Italian Agreement. The details of the visit were 
discussed in Cabinet on December 21st. Halifax remarked, “[w]e were not anxious to see
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an extreme government of any description in Spain.”5 He, like Chamberlain at this time, 
was confident in the prospect of an armistice because “there was now much in common 
between the programmes of the two sides.” Chamberlain, expressing his agreement with 
the Foreign Secretary on this, believed that when the two Prime Ministers met in January, 
it would be opportune for him to raise with Mussolini the matter of a joint international 
initiative to secure a cease-fire in Spain.6
The peace initiative idea, however, was based upon a misconception of events on the 
ground in Spain, which had assumed that the end result of the battle of the River Ebro 
was effectively a stalemate. In fact, the battle ended in defeat for the Republican army, 
which had exhausted nearly all of its resources. The military hardware abandoned by the 
retreating Republican army merely exacerbated the shortage of war materiel, which had 
hampered the Republicans since the beginning of the war. The defeat was also a 
psychological blow to the Republic, confirming its inability to achieve lasting success in 
the field.7
Most importantly, the loss of materiel at the Ebro was to have more devastating and long­
term implications for the Republican army than the losses incurred earlier in the year 
following the disaster at Teruel. This is because, on that occasion, the Republican war 
machine had been re-supplied from Soviet sources. This, in turn, enabled the 
Republicans to slow down the Nationalist advance after the loss of Teruel, thus 
preventing the expected collapse of Republican resistance in the spring.8 However, 
following the Munich conference, the Soviet Union, convinced that the democracies
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would not resist Hitler, determined on a new course of foreign policy. This led ultimately 
to the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in August of 1939. Thus, after the 
Ebro offensive, there was no further injection of Russian supplies, which were vital for 
the continuation of the Republican war effort. After all, Soviet help, albeit crucial to the 
survival of the Spanish Republic, was actually part of a much broader strategy in Soviet 
foreign policy. In essence, Stalin had hoped that the activities of Germany and Italy in 
Spain would persuade Britain and France to enter into an anti-fascist alliance with the 
Soviet Union. Increasingly though, he lost faith in the capacity of the democracies to 
make an effective stand against Hitler. Stalin came to the conclusion that the way Non- 
Intervention operated in practice demonstrated the duplicity of the western powers in the 
face of Italian and German activity in Spain.9
When the Nationalist offensive against the Republican positions in Catalonia finally 
began on December 23rd 1938, the exhausted state of the Republican army quickly 
became apparent to outside observers. As far as the British government was concerned, 
the role played by Italian forces in the Nationalist offensive was an impediment to cordial 
relations between Britain and Italy. It undermined both the credibility of the Anglo- 
Italian Agreement and any justification for Chamberlain’s visit to Rome. As we shall see, 
for the British Prime Minister the failure of any hope of a negotiated peace in the last 
months of the Civil War scuppered the last chance that he and his government had of 
building a broad consensus within the press in support of government policy. A broad 
press consensus would have been important as part of British propaganda in Spain. It 
would have presented the Chamberlain government as a true friend of Spain, thereby
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allowing Britain to regain its dominant position in the peninsula once the fighting had 
ceased. The government, no doubt, had hoped that its promotion of an armistice would 
be seen as a genuinely neutral act, even by those newspapers, which had been so critical 
of its line on Spain throughout the war.
Of significance, is the misreading of events in Spain amongst even the highest levels of 
British government circles. Confidence in the possibility of an armistice, in which the 
moderates of both sides in the Spanish war would prevail, was, in part, fuelled by stories 
of a widespread plot against Franco, leading to mass arrests and executions. Certainly, 
there were arrests of suspected spies; the Nationalist authorities admitted this in a press 
communique, the day before the final Nationalist offensive was launched against 
Catalonia.10 Yet, in spite of the reports of war weariness in Franco’s Spain, allegedly 
fuelling general discontent against his rule, Franco was not deterred from launching a 
massive assault; in short he was not forced to accept a compromise peace, as opposed to 
achieving outright victory in Spain. Indeed, it is at least plausible that the exaggerated 
stories concerning Nationalist Spain were the result of Republican propaganda, an 
example of which has been discussed previously in relation to the alleged German 
infiltration of Spanish Morocco. Reporting from the Republican capital, the 
correspondent for the Daily Telegraph referred to rumours that high-ranking Nationalist 
officers had defected, taking with them the plans for the Catalan offensive. He strongly 
inferred that this was the only reason for the delay.11 However, it was almost certainly bad 
weather, particularly “a period of torrential rain” which delayed the offensive.12
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The misreading of events on the ground in Spain by both the press and official circles in
Britain was to have other far-reaching implications. Before the fall of Barcelona, pro-
government conservative newspapers, which had printed critical comments about either
the Nationalist regime or the fighting capacity of the Nationalist army, were no doubt
doing so in the confidence that such comment would not harm British interests in the
long-term. This was because there was the expectation that Franco would not achieve
outright victory. But there were other factors influencing newspaper opinion on the Civil
War. The ferocity with which the war was fought certainly influenced the way in which
both sides were viewed. In particular, the continued use of aircraft in the bombing of
civilian targets struck a chord in the imagination of the populace, reinforcing the fact that
the development of war technology meant that the sea could no longer preserve Britain
from the ravages of a continental war. The longevity of the conflict, with the resultant
misery it brought to the Spanish people, intensified humanitarian concerns and these, too,
found expression in the leader columns of a number of conservative papers. Furthermore,
it seemed that the longer the war lasted, the greater the likelihood of a compromise
solution that could command the support of a majority of Spaniards. This was, of course,
far removed from the opinion that had been expressed in the leader columns of both The
Times and the Daily Telegraph at the outset of the conflict. Then, the consensus had been
1 ^that only a dictatorship could emerge out of the Spanish crisis. Yet, at the end of May 
1938, a little over two months after confidently predicting the final victory of Franco, 
which would, in fact, have led to the imposition of a dictatorship, The Times leader 
declared, “independence is a sign of health and vigour and a necessary condition of 
liberty. The Spanish people are not in the least likely ever to be battered into drab
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uniformity.”14 This hope and indeed confidence in a democratic solution was to be a 
recurrent theme in the leader articles until it became obvious in London that the Republic 
could not fight the war to a situation of stalemate. The Daily Telegraph, like The Times 
during this period, hoped for a compromise resolution to the war. As for Scrutator of the 
Sunday Times, such was his confidence of a democratic settlement to the war that, in 
January of 1939, he was enthusing that even Fascist Italy could assist in a British peace 
initiative which would result not in a centralized state, but in a federal arrangement for 
post war Spain.15 Of course, Scrutator was rather unusual in the columns of the 
conservative press in that he had never believed that dictatorship was a solution to the 
Spanish crisis. Therefore, as far as the leader comment for both The Times and the Daily 
Telegraph was concerned, there had been a significant shift in attitudes. Both newspapers 
had come to the conclusion that the apparent inability of either side to bring the war to an 
end would result in increasing war weariness. This would, in turn, create the democratic 
impulse to force leaders on both sides to agree on terms for peace.
Such a misinterpretation of events was to cause difficulty for Anglo-Nationalist relations. 
Franco was to prove as sensitive as his allies, Hitler and Mussolini, to foreign press 
criticism. Indeed, this had been made very clear by the Spanish dictator when he had 
spoken to Francis Hemming, Secretary of the Board of Non-Intervention, in an interview 
in November 1938. On that occasion, Hemming recorded in his diary that Franco 
“believed that any misunderstanding between countries was due to ill-advised statements 
in the press.”16
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Even when, in the New Year, it became clear to foreign observers that the Nationalist 
offensive in Catalonia would not stall as previous offensives had done, pro-government 
newspapers continued to criticize the Franco regime. A prime example of this was the 
attitude of Truth. As in the previous summer, this journal, in spite of the particularly 
close relationship it had with the Conservative Party, was to adopt a hostile line towards 
the Franco regime. More importantly, the change in attitude was at odds with the new 
diplomatic offensive of the Chamberlain government during 1939, which sought to 
improve relations with both the victorious Nationalist Regime and Italy. At the same 
time as Chamberlain was attempting to improve relations with Italy, Truth was becoming 
increasingly concerned at the long-term threat to British interests of Italian intervention in 
Spain. Thus, whilst the Prime Minister continued to turn a blind eye on Italian 
transgressions of the Non-Intervention Agreement, Truth, albeit in a small way, was
tlicontributing to the undermining of his diplomatic efforts. On December 29 , a few days 
after the start of the Catalan offensive, Truth referred to Franco as a “peijured rebel 
against the Spanish government”, because of his continued dependency on Italian
1 7troops. The caution shown by the journal, only weeks before, concerning the extent of 
the rebellion in the Nationalist army, was thrown aside. The same journalist now 
declared that such was the seriousness of dissent within the Nationalist ranks that an
• • 1 Oassassmation attempt had been made against Franco. The journal now expressed 
nothing but contempt for Franco, who was portrayed as a man who “will lightly break his 
word and will then attempt to explain his treachery to God and man away as if it were 
nothing.”19
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In the New Year, Truth argued that the presence of Italians in the Catalan offensive meant 
that the conflict could no longer be viewed as a Civil War, and that “the Empire has
90nothing to gain and much to lose by the triumph of fascism in Spain.” In spite of the 
rapid Nationalist advance, the journal did not believe that the defeat of the Republic was 
inevitable. On January 20th, seven days before the fall of Barcelona, ‘Entrenous’ 
declared, “the government line is still intact. Everybody who has any concern for the
91integrity of the British Empire will pray that it will remain so.” A week later, however, 
‘Entrenous’ referred to the impending fall of Barcelona, accepting that the war was lost. 
It predicted that Franco’s Spain would in effect become a satellite of the Axis powers.22
The Prime Minister was determined that, at all costs, Italy had to be prevented from 
forming closer ties with Germany. It was clear that Chamberlain was confident of 
reaching an effective compromise with Italy that would vindicate his appeasement of 
her.23 In a letter to his sister, Ida, in January 1939, he expressed his confidence regarding 
his impending visit to Rome: “I believe that Mussolini is most anxious for Anglo-Italian 
friendship.”24 A further factor that was influencing Chamberlain’s thinking at this time 
was the threat to the British Empire should Italy form an alliance not only with Germany 
but also with Imperial Japan. Therefore, the Prime Minister still clung to the belief that 
Mussolini was sincere when he had assured Britain that Italy would withdraw her forces 
from Spain once the war was over, and that Axis power intervention in defiance of the 
Non-Intervention Agreement, did not represent a long-term threat to British interests.25 
Indeed, Chamberlain wrote to his sister Ida, “I have always maintained that when 
Germany and Italy declared that they had no territorial ambitions in Spain and would get
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26out as soon as the war was won, they meant what they said and should be believed.” 
Again, on February 19th, Chamberlain wrote to his sister, Hilda, expressing his 
confidence that Franco posed no threat to British interests: “I think we might be able to 
establish excellent relations with Franco who seems well disposed to us.” Clearly, 
Chamberlain’s private correspondence demonstrates his optimism regarding the post war 
situation.
The pessimism now being shown by Truth was significant in that it diverged from the 
government line. How is this difference to be explained? The answer would seem to lie 
in the fact that the control, which it has been assumed Sir Joseph Ball exerted over the 
paper, has been exaggerated.28 Following its very pessimistic forecast of the future of 
Spain, made on the eve of the fall of Barcelona, Truth did not cover the Civil War until 
the middle of the following month. The articles, which then appeared on the Spanish 
conflict, represented a volte-face from those that had appeared only a couple of weeks 
previously. On February 17 1939, for example, the journal printed a review of a book on 
Spain, and was critical of Liddell Hart’s pessimistic prediction that the future policy of 
Nationalist Spain would be anti-British.29 Later, on March 17th, in a special article, Truth 
journalist Shane Leslie declared, “ Franco will be the strong man of Spain.. .Neither the 
Germans nor Italians are likely to make their footing good in Spain.”30 It seems that as far 
as Spain was concerned, Ball was unable, at least temporarily, to control the editorial line 
even on this, the one journal over which he was supposed to have had considerable 
influence. The reversal of attitude on the part of Truth in the space of a few weeks, from 
its view of Franco as a threat to the British Empire because of his dependence on Italian
289
and German support, to that of a potential friend who would be able to reassert his 
independence of his former allies, indicates that there was a conflict over editorial policy. 
It was not until the middle of February that support for the line being adopted by the 
government re-emerged.
The Foreign Office News Department was still able to maintain its independence of 
Chamberlain and, as a result, it continued to be a cause of concern for a government 
clearly unable to centralize the dissemination of news to the press from official sources 
loyal to the Prime Minister.31 Yet, such opposition from the News Department was not 
new. A more fundamental problem facing the government was the progressive break 
down in the conservative press consensus in support of the government line. For an 
increasing number of individuals within the newspaper industry it was becoming 
increasingly clear, as the war drew to a close, that the continued Italo-German support for 
Franco was further evidence of the hollowness of the Munich Agreement and indeed of 
any justification for appeasing the dictators. Cadogan, the Permanent Under-Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, met with Leo Kennedy of The Times on February 13th 1939. 
Although Kennedy held similar views to Dawson on government foreign policy, Cadogan 
was not completely confident that Kennedy would write a leader favourable to British 
recognition of Franco as de iure ruler of Spain. Although Cadogan recorded in his diary 
that Kennedy “seems quite sound”, nevertheless he qualified his optimism that the 
journalist would support British recognition with the phrase: “[he] will write accordingly 
I hope.” In these, more difficult times it seems that even the support of The Times could 
not necessarily be taken for granted.
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The Daily Telegraph had been a consistent supporter of the government line on Spain up 
to the end of 1938, yet its editor, Watson, felt that the Rome visit of Chamberlain was 
premature. On this particular matter, he expressed in private the criticisms that, unlike 
Arthur Mann, he was not willing to publish in his paper.33 In fact, the Daily Telegraph 
had always been prepared to be directly critical of what it considered to be the failure of 
the government to be more energetic in preparing Britain for a state of war. The attacks 
now being made on the government by both this paper and also the Yorkshire Post were a 
cause of concern in circles close to the Prime Minister. Horace Wilson, Chamberlain’s 
chief adviser on foreign affairs lunched with Dawson at the Travellers’ Club, on 
December 5th 1938. Wilson deplored the attacks made against the Prime Minister in “The 
Daily Telegraph [every other day].”34 The change in the stance of the Daily Telegraph 
reflected the change in attitude of its proprietor, Camrose, who at this time was also 
expressing reservations about the foreign policy of the Prime Minister. On January 10th 
1939, he wrote encouragingly to Mann, showing that he too doubted the wisdom of 
government policy, and even suggested that there was now a general feeling of unease at
o r
the current direction of foreign affairs by the Prime Minister.
The increasing coolness of both the editor and proprietor of the Daily Telegraph towards 
the government line on foreign policy was reflected in the leader columns on Spain in 
early 1939. Although the paper did not mirror the strident opposition of the Yorkshire 
Post, nevertheless the opinion of the Daily Telegraph was in sharp contrast to that of The 
Times, which, in spite of Cadogan’s concerns, continued to offer unstinting support to the
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official line on all aspects of foreign policy. As an example, following the declaration by
iL
the Nationalists of a blockade of the Republican coast on March 10 , the Daily Telegraph 
leader column stressed that the “sinking of merchant ships is undeniably an infringement 
of international law unless the crews are taken to safety, and the British government 
cannot permit themselves a passivity which might be interpreted as creating a contrary 
precedent”. This call for the British government to adopt a stem line on the issue was an 
implicit criticism of its failure, in the previous summer, to respond assertively when 
British merchant ships were attacked in Republican ports. Yet, whereas in the summer of 
1938 criticism had been more circumspect it had now become direct. The paper called 
upon the government to adopt a course of action that it considered to be its duty in 
defence of both British interests and prestige.
The change in the attitude of the Daily Telegraph, in particular, regarding government 
policy towards the Civil War, highlighted the increasing fragility of the conservative 
consensus on Spain. The policy of the government, especially under Chamberlain, of 
turning a blind eye to German and Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War, relied 
very much on the prevalence of class interests in influencing editors and proprietors of 
conservative newspapers. If the Civil War could be viewed in terms of a class struggle 
then, in spite of Franco’s dependence on the aid of those fascist states which were posing 
the most serious threat to international peace, the Nationalist cause would be seen as 
performing an essential service to foreign investment in Spain, in which such a vital part 
was played by British investors and companies. However, the widespread support of 
conservative newspapers for Chamberlain had effectively reached its peak at the Munich
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conference in September 1938. When, increasingly, the actions of the fascist dictators 
demonstrated their lack of sincerity towards international agreements, there was 
increasing demand even among traditional supporters of the government for a clear sign 
of British firmness towards the dictators. In the final stages of the war connections were 
now being made between the situation in Spain and with the worsening crisis in 
international relations on the rest of the continent. Even the Observer, which had adopted 
a partisan position in favour of the Nationalists, was, by early 1939, becoming concerned 
at the strategic implications of a Franco victory. The editor, Garvin, was making a very 
clear connection between the continued presence in Spain of large numbers of Italian 
troops and the long-term threat this implied for both Britain and France. For him, this 
made the granting of belligerent rights, now being demanded by Franco, impossible on 
pragmatic grounds. On January 15th 1939, Garvin wrote, “[w]e have to consider the 
immense combined strength of the new triple alliance in submarines...Spanish harbours
' i n
might be used for this purpose before the Civil War was declared officially at an end.” 
The article stressed that if belligerent rights were granted just because Franco had 
demanded them, “Britain and France would appear as having weakened themselves even 
in the Western Mediterranean and its approaches without any kind of reciprocity.” 
Indeed, in Garvin’s view, the government must not concede such rights to Franco because 
“Britain and France would be divided from each other and both from the United States.”
At no point though did the Observer actually criticize the government, or require it to 
tackle more energetically the problem of securing an Italian withdrawal. On January 22nd, 
for example, it argued, “[i]t is better for us to let the situation develop by itself and refrain
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from antagonizing the future Spain.” However, the paper did deviate from the opimon 
of Chamberlain, who did not feel that Italian involvement in the Catalan offensive should 
pose a problem for a genuine rapprochement between Britain and Italy. Furthermore, 
Garvin’s attitude on the issue of belligerency rights, as expressed in the Observer in 
January, was very different from that expressed in December 1938, before the final 
offensive against Catalonia began on Christmas day, an offensive in which Italian troops 
played such a vital part. On December 11th, Garvin had written that there “is a strong 
case on its own merits for leaving the Spanish combatants to fight it out and for 
conceding to General Franco at sea the belligerent rights that cannot be denied to him on 
land.”39 Again, on December 18th, in ‘The World Week By Week’, the Observer had also 
expressed the opinion that belligerent rights ought to be granted: “equal belligerent rights 
for both parties on sea as on land would be both logical and fair.”40
The leading popular conservative newspaper, the Daily Express, added its voice to the 
concern being felt in much of the conservative press at the prospect of a Franco victory in 
Spain. One issue that concerned the Daily Express was the wisdom of granting loans to 
assist the post war reconstruction of a potentially hostile power. This attitude was, of 
course, in complete contrast to that of official circles in London. The issue of a British
thloan to Franco’s Spain was discussed in the Daily Express in ‘Opinion’ on February 14 . 
The attitude of the leader was clearly against such a loan: “If you don’t want to send any 
presents to Mussolini and Hitler join the Daily Express in the outcry against lending 
British money to Spain.”41 On February 28th the lead article wrote disparagingly about 
Franco whom both Britain and France had recently recognized as ruler of Spain in ‘A
294
Five Foot Soldier Becomes Dictator By Accident.’42 On the same day, ‘Opinion’, whilst 
acknowledging the logic of British recognition of Franco, since he had demonstrably won 
the Civil War, nevertheless stated “we prolonged our estrangement from Italy by not 
admitting she had conquered Abyssinia”. Clearly, this was a criticism of Chamberlain’s 
government also for the delay in bringing into force the Anglo-Italian Agreement. 
Moreover, the column referred disparagingly to Non-Intervention: “there was a farce in 
Spain. We have been saved a farce of non-recognition.”43
The growing divergence of opinion between the government and its press allies 
highlighted the limits to the official consensus on Spain even more sharply than did the 
bombing crisis of the preceding summer. Official assurances of the neutrality of 
government policy with regard to Spain were hard to square with its apparent indifference 
to the repeated Italian breaches of Non-Intervention and to the renewed pressure on 
British shipping posed by Franco’s threat to blockade Republican ports. Differences of 
opinion over Spain revealed growing unease among conservative papers concerning the 
long-term ambitions of both Axis powers. Thus, those newspapers that, in the winter of 
1938-9, expressed hostility towards Nationalist Spain often did so because they detected a 
strengthening bond between the Axis and Franco. For the Daily Express, hostility to 
Franco was an accurate reflection of Beaverbrook’s long-term ideological aversion to 
fascism. However, this paper, too, drew the attention of its readership to the connection 
between Franco and the Axis. A more dramatic shift occurred in the Observer. Although 
ideologically committed to the success of the Nationalist cause since the beginning of the 
Civil War, Garvin had always been wary of the threat of Germany to British security.
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Thus the apparent volte-face in the attitude of Garvin in the winter of 1939 was caused by 
his realization that a victory for Franco would strengthen the ability of Germany to 
threaten British and French maritime interests in the Mediterranean. Therefore, in the 
closing months of the Civil War, there was a further blurring of the political differences 
between conservative papers as well as a weakening of the press support for 
Chamberlain’s Spanish policy. In their assessment of the long-term strategic threat posed 
by Franco to British interests, newspapers such as the Observer, Daily Telegraph and 
Daily Express were moving closer to the stand taken earlier by the Yorkshire Post and 
even the Truth.
In these particularly difficult times, the government, confident that it could exploit its 
political contacts with the board of directors of the Yorkshire Post, stepped up its efforts 
to stifle the independent line taken by Arthur Mann. In December of the previous year, 
Mann was informed that Sir Samuel Hoare had been instrumental in persuading one of 
the directors, Stanley Jackson, to issue a protest about the attitude demonstrated in the 
leader columns of the Yorkshire Post towards Chamberlain’s foreign policy.44 In spite of 
this, the Yorkshire Post continued to be vociferous in its attacks. The leaders even 
warned the readers of the paper of the attempts being made to silence press criticism.
t V iDuring a parliamentary debate on December 16 , a Conservative Member of Parliament, 
Osbert Peake, criticized the stand taken by the newspaper on foreign policy. Peake 
accused the newspaper of causing national disunity. He argued that through harping on 
about the mistakes of Chamberlain in the past, it was undermining confidence in the 
foreign policy of the government. Mann replied to this attack in the leader column of
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December 19th. Indeed, he argued that the Yorkshire Post had not created disunity, since
disunity was already present within the Conservative Party on the issue of foreign
policy.45 In Mann’s view, unity could only be re-established within the Party by a change
of foreign policy. Mann also referred to the importance of an independent conservative
view that had the right to oppose the line advocated by the Parliamentary Conservative
Party. The editor declared,
[as] long as the view is held that for a Conservative to oppose the foreign 
policy of the government is an act of disloyalty towards his party, the voting 
in the House can never be a true reflection of national opinion as it should 
be when the issues involve the security of the state.
In 1939, as in the previous year, Mann perceived that the role of the paper should be to
act as the mouthpiece of Conservative opposition to Chamberlain. For Mann, whatever
the consequences of maintaining such a line in the leader columns, the issues at stake
were too great for him merely to rally round behind the banner of Chamberlain and to
suppress his concerns for the sake of the more narrow party political interests of the
Conservative Party. This more altruistic view was clearly expressed in the leader
comment on January 17th 1939. The leader explained,
[in] this Country we need to have done at last with complacency. We dare 
not any longer doze under the hypnotic suggestion that the dangers in Europe 
are aggravated by attempts on the part of the press and public to look them 
frankly in the face 46
During the latter part of 1938 and into 1939, the continued opposition of the Yorkshire 
Post towards the government line on foreign policy was, not surprisingly, the topic of 
discussion within Conservative circles. For the period 1938-9 the Dawson diary records 
a number of occasions on which he had raised the issue of the independent line being
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taken by the Yorkshire Post. On September 4 1938, for example, Dawson recorded
having lunched with Rupert Beckett, the chairman of the Yorkshire Post.41 When Sir
thHorace Wilson lunched with Dawson on December 5 , he used the opportunity to draw 
Dawson’s attention to the growing irritation with which the repeated attacks by the 
Yorkshire Post were viewed by the government. Dawson had various points of contact 
with that paper; firstly he was a Yorkshireman and therefore part of the constituency for 
this quality provincial paper; secondly as has already been pointed out, the Yorkshire Post 
was considered as a suitable form of apprenticeship for those seeking a career as a 
journalist for The Times. Since he was a firm supporter of the government line on 
appeasement, and a believer in the power of the press to exert harm or benefit on 
diplomatic relations, Dawson’s support in bringing pressure to bear on Mann was no 
doubt being sought by Sir Horace at that December 5th meeting. In fact, throughout 1938- 
9, Beckett wrote to his editor expressing his increased irritation at the attacks by the
tViYorkshire Post on government foreign policy. On December 8 , for example, Beckett 
effectively ordered Mann to stop criticizing the Prime Minister.49
Stanley Jackson also wrote to Mann urging him to support the foreign policy of the 
government so as not to compromise the chances of Conservative candidates in 
forthcoming by-elections: “[i]f the candidates make speeches applauding [the PM] and 
his efforts and the leaders in the Yorkshire Post at the same time condemn him it will be a 
bit awkward.”50 Attempts were made at meetings of the board of directors to force Mann 
to abandon his attacks on the Prime Minister. The board met on December 16th, for 
example, at which the subject of Mann’s independent attitude was to be discussed. In
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advance of this, Beckett wrote to Mann, warning him that, among the board of directors, 
there was a great deal of opposition towards him. As a result his position as editor was at 
risk.51
In spite of all the pressure to toe the line being exerted upon Mann, the Yorkshire Post 
continued to criticize Chamberlain’s policy towards Italy, and made no secret of its 
concern for British interests at the prospect of a Nationalist Victory in Spain. On January
ii.
9 the leader commented,
it has always seemed to us a grave mistake on the part of the British Prime 
Minister not to have used Mussolini’s desire for an agreement with Britain 
as a lever to force Italian military withdrawal from Spain.
The following opinion was also expressed:
the vast majority of people in the United States and we believe an increasing 
preponderance of people in this Country appreciate the fact that the menace 
to the freedom of the world will be enormously increased by Franco’s victory 
in Spain.52
The extreme pessimism of the paper at the development of events in Spain also found
thexpression in the leader comment on January 19 , which referred to the Anglo-Italian 
Agreement as a “Mediterranean Munich.”53 According to the leader, the agreement was 
worthless, given the continued importance of the role played by Italian forces in the 
offensive in North Eastern Spain. By repeatedly highlighting the hollowness of the 
statements of good faith that were being uttered by the fascist dictators, the Yorkshire 
Post was questioning the whole basis of government foreign policy towards them.
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The government now began to respond to the attacks of the Yorkshire Post in a more 
energetic way. It sought to use its contacts on the board of directors to secure the 
dismissal of Mann when the board next met on February 24th. Even though Beckett had 
earlier expressed to Mann his growing impatience at the critical line taken by the paper 
towards government foreign policy, his support for Mann at this meeting was crucial. 
Indeed, without it, it is hard to see how Mann could have remained as editor. Mann was 
therefore able to maintain the independent line of his paper concerning government policy 
towards Spain. Four days after the meeting of the board, the leader comment on 
government policy was that “it became obvious that short of some miracle we should 
presently find ourselves recognizing in Spain a government which owed its existence to 
the support of the Axis powers.”54 The newspaper continued to doubt whether either Italy 
or Germany would withdraw from Spain once the war was over. Thus, far from muting 
Mann’s criticism of foreign policy, the February meeting of the board only strengthened 
his determination to pursue an independent line.55
The Yorkshire Post was now at the centre of the controversy on the role of the free press 
in a parliamentary state. For journalists of pro-government conservative newspapers who 
were personally opposed to government foreign policy, the issues at stake in the Spanish 
Civil War were too important for the security of Britain and France for them to continue 
to acquiesce in attempts to silence them. This was regardless of the threat to the efforts of 
the government to improve relations with Germany and Italy. Newspapers such as the 
Yorkshire Post helped to raise the awareness of the British public to the debate about the 
role of the press in a democratic society, a debate that had largely been confined to the
300
boardrooms, the clubs and correspondence of the participants. On January 3rd, for 
example, the paper had attacked the government’s denial that official pressure had been 
applied to persuade newspapers to adopt a particular line on foreign affairs. In its leader 
column for that day, the paper gave a much more detailed description of how official 
influence was exerted on the press. It even alerted its readers to the existence of 
independent newsletters, the demand for which “clearly suggests that the public are not 
satisfied with the news service of the regular press. They feel uneasily that newspapers 
are not telling them the whole truth about current events, and especially about foreign 
affairs.”56 In the view of the Yorkshire Post, “[njothing- no official pressure or party 
loyalty should restrain a newspaper from telling the public the full truth about current 
events to the best of its power.” This was because “[government policy in a democratic 
country, depends ultimately on public opinion, and public opinion cannot function 
reliably in the dark. Fearlessly to enlighten public opinion on topics of vital national 
importance is the first responsibility of newspapers.”
On March 1st, in another leader commentary critical of government policy on Spain, the
paper defended the independent critical line it had been taking since the previous year.
The leader declared,
we could not be blind to the increased strategic and material hardships 
to this country and France which seemed bound to accrue alike from 
developments in Central Europe and from effective domination in Spain 
by the Axis powers”.57
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The Yorkshire Post disclosed once again that attempts had been made to pacify the
dictators in their insistence that foreign governments should suppress the reporting of
news that was critical of them:
we urge in particular that the government themselves should not appear to 
desire to gloss over or to conceal facts dangerous and disagreeable or to 
encourage an attitude of national complacency.. .For only so will the people 
of this country realize the dangers that actually beset us and be prepared to 
confront them.
The fall of the Republican capital, Barcelona, to the Nationalist forces under the 
command of General Yague, on January 26th 1939, effectively heralded the end of the 
Spanish Civil War. From that point, the British government, faced with the imminent and 
final Republican defeat, made a more concerted effort to improve relations with the 
victorious Nationalist regime. The task before the government was to secure British 
recognition of the Franco regime as the legitimate authority in Spain. This would 
necessitate withdrawing recognition of the Republican government. Unlike the fascist 
dictator powers who were not troubled by the need to appeal to the sensitivity of public 
opinion in their own countries, the British government, mindful of the widespread 
popular sympathy within Britain for Republican Spain, had to endeavour to secure 
Franco’s agreement that there would be no bloody reprisals should the defeated 
Republicans agree to surrender. The British government also wanted to avoid having to 
recognize Franco as the ruler of Spain, in advance of the Republican surrender. The force 
of public opinion was an obstacle to what ministers saw as the more essential task of 
improving relations between the two countries, which British recognition of Franco 
would facilitate enormously.
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Halifax, who in the course of January, wanted Italy to show evidence of its good faith by 
withdrawing its troops from Spain, recognized that irrespective of whatever course of 
action the Italians took, it was vital for Britain to recognize the Franco regime. Only then 
could work begin on counteracting German influence in Spain, which Halifax believed 
was very great. Without recognition of Franco, a British diplomatic offensive to counter 
German influence would be impossible. Halifax’s Cabinet colleagues shared his concern 
as to the extent of the influence of the Axis powers on the Nationalist authorities. 
Therefore, at the Cabinet meeting on February 15th, they too agreed that it was imperative 
that Britain should recognize Franco.58
Among those conservative newspapers [Yorkshire Post excepted] which had until 
recently been critical of the government line there was, during the final weeks of the Civil 
War, a change of attitude towards the conflict. By the end of January, the official 
pressure being exerted on editors to change tack was beginning to take effect. With the 
collapse of Republican resistance in Catalonia, most conservative newspapers were 
willing to accept that whatever criticism they may have expressed towards the Nationalist 
cause from December 1938 up to late January 1939, the fall of Barcelona meant that it 
was in the interests of British policy that the new regime be persuaded to look more 
favourably upon Britain. This involved editorial reconsideration of how the Nationalists 
should be portrayed in the news columns. However, a number of conservative 
newspapers continued to maintain what was, at best, a cautious optimism towards 
Nationalist Spain. Nevertheless, a shift in opinion regarding the Nationalist regime can be
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detected by comparing those leader columns that had appeared before the fall of
iL
Barcelona with the ones that followed it. On January 7 , when the fate of Barcelona still 
hung in the balance, the attitude of The Times was as follows: “[e]ven if General Franco 
triumphs decisively and soon it may well be asked whether a settlement imposed by the 
sword can possibly prove durable.”59 Furthermore, lamenting the failure of attempts at 
mediation as a means of bringing a compromise solution to the war, it expressed the 
opinion that much blood remained to be shed before peace would be restored to Spain. 
Of course, as we have already seen, the critical attitude of The Times towards the 
Nationalist side in the winter of 1938-9 was based on the misconception held in London 
that neither side could win. As late as January 17 , the editorial of the newspaper did not 
believe that the fall of Barcelona was inevitable: “recollection of the Nationalists’ failure 
to capture Madrid should give pause to confident prophecy.”60 However, once the fall of 
the Republican capital became imminent, The Times editorial modified its views on the 
military skill of Franco, and even went so far as to suggest that British and French appeals 
to the Nationalists not to carry out wholesale reprisals were unnecessary. Commenting on 
the stream of Republican refugees in flight from the Nationalist advance into Catalonia, 
the editorial suggested, “many seem to be in flight from their own fears rather than any 
maltreatment [from the victors].”61
Thus, from late January, the reporting in The Times editorials regarding the nature both of 
the Nationalist authorities and of Franco himself was in complete contrast to the manner 
in which each had been presented earlier in the month. There was now no longer any fear 
that Franco or his subordinates would carry out reprisals as they had done in the past. In
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its leaders, The Times expressed its confidence that pragmatism would dictate policy in
tliFranco’s Spain. On February 10 , the leader described Franco as a magnanimous victor, 
temperamentally suited to bring unity to a country divided by civil war. During the 
closing stages of the Civil War, a repeated theme in the leader columns was the
i t .
confidence that the new regime would be friendly towards Britain. On February 15 , in a 
lead article, the correspondent was confident that in spite of the help given him by 
Germany and Italy, Franco was likely to be favourable towards Britain because the 
economic ties binding the dictator towards the democracies were strong.
A change of opinion towards Franco similar to that demonstrated by The Times was 
shown in this period by other leading conservative newspapers. For example, the Daily
i\\Telegraph of January 11 had argued that victory had always proved elusive for Franco, 
and that there should therefore be peace without victory.64 Once again, with the fall of 
Barcelona imminent, the attitude of the leaders changed. On February 20th, for example, 
the editorial opinion of the Daily Telegraph assured its readers that Franco was not a 
vengeful person and that he would refrain from arbitrary killings of his defeated 
opponents.65 The change in attitude shown in the leader comment of the Daily Telegraph 
is especially important, given the recent willingness of that paper to be critical both of 
government foreign policy and of Franco.
The surviving evidence of government and press contacts points to an increased number 
of meetings between the two parties in the final months of the Civil War. Since a great 
deal of the British press was critical of government Spanish policy in this period, it was
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felt that British recognition of Franco, without first gaining his agreement not to carry out 
reprisals against the defeated Republicans, would only provide further evidence of the 
duplicity of the government. Yet Franco was unwilling to oblige the British government 
by making such a public declaration. In spite of this, however, in the opinion of 
government circles, it was vital for British interests that this should not prevent the 
recognition of him as the legal ruler in Spain as soon as possible. Yet, the refusal of 
Franco to issue a proclamation of clemency meant that the support of the press, vital as it 
was, could not be taken for granted. Thus, even The Times was lobbied frequently in 
order to ensure that the paper did not inadvertently write in such a manner as to risk 
compromising the government’s position in Spain at this particularly delicate juncture in 
the Civil War.
From the beginning of January until the surrender of Madrid in March, Dawson made a 
series of high level contacts. Following the return of Chamberlain from Rome, he met 
the Prime Minister in Downing Street on January 15th, 66 and again on February 25th, at
fdCliveden. Two days later came the Prime Minister’s announcement in Parliament that 
Britain was to recognize Franco. Samuel Hoare who, since the previous autumn, had
fhbeen minister with special responsibility for press relations, met Dawson on January 16 
at the Travellers’ Club, during which they discussed the visit of the Prime Minister to
iL
Italy. Further meetings between Hoare and Dawson took place on January 24 , February 
27th, on March 1st at Samuel Hoare’s office, and again on March 27th, the day before 
Madrid fell. In the same period Dawson’s diary records at least six meetings with 
Halifax. The same source records a couple of meetings with Chamberlain’s chief adviser
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on diplomacy, Sir Horace Wilson; firstly on January 16th at the Travellers’ Club; secondly 
on March 17th. The venue for the second meeting was not disclosed, but among the 
topics discussed at this meeting was the Prime Minister’s visit to Rome. In his diary for 
February 11th, Dawson recorded a talk with the ambassador to Berlin, Neville Henderson.
iL
The entry for March 28 records a meeting at the Beefsteak with R.A. Butler, a senior 
official at the Foreign Office. There is mention also of a meeting with Leeper on 
February 9th. Given the development of events both on the ground in Spain, and in 
diplomatic circles as a result of the impending triumph of the Nationalists, it is not 
surprising that issues related to the Civil War were a frequent topic of conversation at 
such meetings.
In spite of the fact that in the Dawson diary references to events are brief and often only 
general comments are made, it is nevertheless possible to locate Spain as a particular 
focus for discussion on a number of these occasions. In fact at no other period in the 
Civil War does the Dawson diary demonstrate that there was such frequency of 
discussions relating to Spain as during the final three months of the war. The visit by the 
Prime Minister to Rome is referred to on January 9th, 15th, and again on the 16th. Of 
course, all discussions on this topic related to the wider impact of the war on British 
relations with an Axis power. The Spanish Civil War was specifically referred to in the
• fhentries for February 9 , when Dawson met Leeper to discuss developments on the ground 
in Spain and again on February 25th, during a house party at Cliveden. In the entries for 
February 27th and for March 28th, Spain is again specifically referred to as a topic of 
discussion. The European situation in general is referred to in the entries for January 25th
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and on March 19th and 20th, and of course it is at least likely that on one or more of these
/TO
occasions the Spanish Civil War was brought up in the discussions.
The contacts between the government and the press are referred to in other sources. The 
Prime Minister, in his pocket diary, recorded a number of meetings with newspapermen 
during this period. On November 22nd, he attended the Press Club Luncheon, and met 
lobby correspondents on December 16th and on March 19th 1939.69 That so much 
evidence survives, especially in the latter period of the Spanish Civil War, concerning the 
frequency of contacts between ministers and members of the media, suggests a concerted 
effort from those in the highest levels of government to secure the support of newspapers, 
at a time when, as we have already seen, such support could not be taken for granted.
There are other possible explanations for the change of tack among conservative 
newspapers following the fall of Barcelona. One possibility is a change of attitude on the 
part of the Nationalist press department towards journalists. Given the tone of a number 
of the articles mentioned earlier, the Nationalist regime had little reason to feel grateful 
for the way in which sections of even the conservative press in Britain were willing to 
report on the Francoist side in the closing months of the Civil War. Indeed, much of the 
criticism towards the Nationalists was provoked by the tenor of news reporting among 
correspondents working in Republican held areas, including Barcelona. After the 
occupation of that city, the same journalists, who had earlier been critical of the 
Nationalists would have relied upon their co-operation regarding permits and facilities. 
As has been demonstrated earlier, the Nationalists were quite prepared to expel
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correspondents of newspapers, which had offended them. However, in spite of this, the 
Barcelona correspondents of papers such as the Daily Telegraph or The Times, for 
example, were allowed to stay on following the occupation of the city. This, surely, is a 
possible, additional explanation for the change of tack among newspapers. Indeed, it is 
even possible to read an expression of gratitude in the way in which the leaders of both 
papers now described the Nationalist regime. Another important issue affecting 
newspapers was, inevitably, the worsening of the international crisis in European affairs. 
Indeed, the ending of the Spanish Civil War coincided with the collapse of the Munich 
agreement, following the German invasion of the rump state of Czechoslovakia on March 
15th 1939. The invasion “spelled the apparent end of Chamberlain’s foreign policy and
7  nthis was universally acknowledged in the press”. However, the invasion, by making 
European war more likely in the long term, also increased the strategic importance of 
Spain to British interests in the Mediterranean, especially following the extension of
71Franco-Bntish guarantees on Poland to certain Balkan states. As we have seen on a 
number of occasions, whilst retaining their independence of government control, 
newspapers, whether supportive or critical of the official line on foreign policy, claimed 
to have the best interests of national security at heart. This justified a change of tack in 
order to entice Franco away from the axis powers. However, the continued close ties 
between Franco and his Civil War allies was, as we shall see in the next chapter, to be the 
basis of continued criticism of his regime even from within certain sections of the 
conservative press.
309
In effect, the support that both The Times and the Sunday Times offered to the 
government line on Spain in 1939 was consistent with the stand taken by these 
newspapers throughout the war. Although The Times had expressed criticism of Franco 
in the previous December, of much greater significance was that in January 1939 the 
paper showed no real concern at the role played by the Italian troops in Spain. This was 
in spite of the fact that the continued Italian presence was in defiance of the Anglo-Italian 
Agreement so recently brought into force by Britain. Indeed, the editor of The Times 
shared the optimism of Chamberlain that appeasement of the Italians was possible. When 
Dawson met Chamberlain, following the latter’s return from Rome, Dawson remarked to 
the Prime Minister, “you have evidently impressed your personality on the Italian
77people.” In January 1939, The Times made no reference in its news columns to the 
reprisals being conducted in the Nationalist held areas of Spain. The reports in that paper 
were clearly at variance with what was printed in other conservative newspapers at this
n'Xtime. As we shall see, the pessimistic views expressed in much of the conservative 
press that Franco would be a brutal victor proved to be an accurate forecast of the frame 
of mind of the Nationalist authorities in the immediate aftermath of the war, when 
thousands of former Republicans were either executed or imprisoned. As Liddell-Hart 
had attempted to point out to Dawson in 1937, the massacres carried out in Nationalist 
Spain, unlike those in Republican areas, were part of a deliberate state policy aimed at the 
systematic terrorizing of the population in order to achieve submission. Dawson, 
however, continued to remain oblivious to the warnings of Liddell Hart concerning the 
type of regime that would unify Spain under one type of government. Indeed on February
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9th, he wrote in his diary about his discussion with Leeper on the Spanish Civil War, 
which in the editor’s opinion “was visibly improving.”74
In his autobiography, The Times correspondent Iverach McDonald expressed his concern
nc
at the support offered by his paper towards government foreign policy in general. In the 
course of 1939, McDonald contributed to a new newsletter The Arrow.76 This newsletter 
like its forebears, the King-Hall Newsletter Service and the Whitehall Letter gave 
considerable coverage to the Civil War in Spain. But, unlike the former newsletters, The 
Arrow was scathing in its criticism of the government. All three of the newsletters were 
concerned about the intervention of the Axis powers in Spain, which they interpreted as 
part of a deliberate and long term strategy aimed at securing advantage for Germany, in 
particular, at the expense of the western powers. On January 20 1939, The Arrow read, 
“so HUMBLE have our standards become that we must be grateful no British interests 
have been sacrificed in Rome.”77 The same issue expressed the hope, rather sarcastically, 
that “not peace or ‘appeasement’ highly detrimental to British interests, but the defence at 
all costs of the security and well being of the Commonwealth will be the aim resolutely 
pursued of our foreign policy henceforth.” However, what confidence the newsletter had
iL
m Chamberlain was short lived. On January 27 The Arrow read,
[t]he Prime Minister remains inattentive to the experts and wraps himself in 
obstinate wishful thinking. He believes that a German-Italo victory in Spain 
will not be a menace to the Commonwealth and that Germany will break under 
the strain of rearmament.78
A more damning verdict was delivered against Chamberlain on February 3rd: “NO feature 
of our public life at the present moment is more profoundly distorting than the reasons
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advanced by Mr. Chamberlain’s ‘machine’ why he and his policy should be trusted 
without question and all criticisms repudiated.”79 In that particular issue, The Arrow made 
a direct reference to the continued pressure from Downing Street upon the press. On 
matters relating to foreign affairs, The Arrow was avowedly partisan in its views. On 
January 6th, for example, it had been prepared to support the Foreign Secretary when it 
believed he was to take a firmer stand towards Italy during the Anglo-Italian 
conversations in Rome.80
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Foreign Office News Department considered 
the Whitehall Letter to be the most reliable and therefore most influential of the 
independent newsletters. The Arrow, being both more easily obtainable and cheaper, had 
a potentially larger audience.81 It was available either on a six-month subscription at 
seven shillings and sixpence, or for a year at fifteen shillings. Postage of the newsletter 
to subscribers both at home and abroad was free. The use of italics, of words in block 
capitals, as well as the more sensationalist tone of the writing set it apart from the more 
conservative tones of both the Whitehall Letter and the King-Hall Newsletter Service. 
From February 10th 1939, The Arrow differed from the Whitehall Letter in allowing 
reproduction of any part of its contents, as long as acknowledgment was made to The 
Arrow as its original source. Those in control of The Arrow were deliberately aiming at a 
much wider audience, whereas the higher price of the Whitehall Letter would suggest its 
focus to be on a smaller, though more influential audience.83
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Predictably, up until the end of the Civil War, Liddell Hart continued to complain about 
the leader columns of The Times. Therefore, in November 1938 Liddell Hart wrote once 
again to Barrington-Ward, only this time, unlike his previous communications, Liddell 
Hart now complained that articles on the Civil War which he had sent in for publication 
were being amended rather than refused as had formerly been the case. On November 8th, 
Liddell Hart stated, “censoring without consultation, seemed to me a clear and precise 
way of describing a recent development of cutting out somewhat important points from 
my articles without previous reference to me...” 84 He declared, “in the past eighteen 
months there have been repeated cases of the omission both of articles and of points in 
them over Spain...”
Liddell Hart’s doubts concerning the wisdom of government policy towards the Spanish
Civil War had progressively increased with the development of the conflict on the ground
in Spain: “each time the sequel has brought cause for increased doubts.” He was also
confident that “most other members of the editorial staff’ shared his doubts. Barrington-
Ward also found himself having to face criticism from other influential quarters, and, as a
consequence, to defend the support offered by The Times for government policy. In a
reply to the Master of Balliol College, Oxford, he defended the neutrality of the paper,
denying the allegation that it was sympathetic towards fascism, and disputing the
existence of a ‘Cliveden set’. Refering to fascism and communism he wrote,
they grow more and more like each other daily and I detest them both 
equally utterly as systems of government. We here [The Times] have
oc
tried consistently to avoid being committed to either of them in Spain.
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However, in the early months of 1939, the ignoring by The Times of the strategic 
implications of a Franco victory together with the consistency of the support which it was 
still prepared to offer to the government line on Spain, meant that, both at home and 
abroad, the paper was still performing the role of sounding board for the government 
view. At a time when other conservative newspapers were becoming less enthusiastic, 
this meant that The Times was adopting a partisan position. Barrington-Ward’s comment 
to the Master of Balliol on the neutrality of the newspaper was, at the very least, 
misleading. This was a position which could only prolong and exacerbate the opposition 
towards its editorial policy that existed amongst journalists of the paper.
Liddell Hart, of course, did not limit himself to written protests on the policy of The 
Times towards the Civil War. In the previous November, he had been invited to join ‘The 
Advisory Committee of The Parliamentary Committee on Spain’. This was a pressure 
group whose purpose was to bring to the notice of the general public the threat to national
o/r
interests should Franco win. This committee was part of a growing movement in Great 
Britain at this time of like minded individuals, who, being increasingly concerned at what 
they saw as the threat to British interests of a Nationalist victory, joined together in 
pressure group activity. The purpose of this, in the last months of the Civil War, was to 
mobilize public opinion against the policy of Non-Intervention. For example, a “National 
Emergency Conference” took place at Queen’s Hall in London, at which leading figures 
of the Pro-Republican movement such as the Duchess of Atholl and Harry Pollitt were in
on
attendance. Liddell-Hart was invited to speak at this conference but indicated his 
unwillingness to do so. Although Liddell Hart declined the invitation of the Advisory
314
Committee, he did allow his pamphlet ‘The Eleventh Hour* to be read out at its weekend 
conference. In this pamphlet, Liddell Hart expressed his view that a Franco victory 
would be a strategic threat to Britain and France. Nevertheless, he was confident, even at 
this late stage of the conflict, that the Republic could still win the war as long as the food 
situation improved.88 When asked to speak at “The Food And Freedom For Spain 
Conference”, on November 12th 1938, he again refused, although his pamphlet ‘Britain 
and Spain’ appears to have been circulated in advance to those who were a to attend the
OQ
conference. Liddell Hart agreed to act as patron for ‘The Westminster And City Food 
Ship For Spain’. He was also involved in the extra parliamentary pressure to dissuade the 
government from granting belligerent rights to Franco. In addition, he was a co-signatory 
of a document on the legal, political and strategic aspects of the Civil War, ‘General 
Franco’s Demand for Belligerent Rights.’90 This was presented to the Prime Minister on 
January 7th 1939 by “The Parliamentary Committee For Spain”. Liddell Hart’s co­
signatories were J.L. Brierly, Professor of International law at Oxford University, and J. 
Emelyn Jones, former president of the Cardiff Chamber of Commerce.
Liddell Hart was active in other ways too; for example, he took exception to the more 
moderate criticism of government policy on Spain offered by the King-Hall Newsletter 
Service. He had been irritated by the occasional refusal of the newsletter to publish his 
views on Spain. In the previous September, Liddell Hart had sent an article to King-Hall, 
which the latter refused to print. In his reply to Liddell Hart, King-Hall pointed out that 
the government was even putting pressure on his independent newsletter to moderate its 
criticism of government policy:
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I have been in touch on another matter with a member of the government.
In view of what I have heard I feel it is impossible, and on every ground 
of public interest highly undesirable to print anything in any responsible 
paper which seems to expose our nakedness.91
Unlike the Whitehall Letter, for example, the King-Hall Newsletter Service did not 
attempt to conceal the identity of its authors. Therefore, it was relatively easy for 
pressure to be exerted on King-Hall. After all he was a well-known public figure. There 
was also the question of how the newsletter would be received abroad as, in addition to 
its British following, it also attracted a foreign readership including some German 
subscribers. Again, on September 13th, Liddell Hart received a letter from King-Hall, 
justifying the self-censorship: “It would not be policy for us to print anything at the 
present time which is critical of British defence arrangements.”
In contrast to other independent newsletters, the King-Hall Newsletter Service was 
supportive of the government action in bringing the Anglo-Italian Agreement into force, 
following the withdrawal of 10 000 Italian soldiers from Spain. King-Hall supported it 
on the grounds that it might dissuade Italy from threatening British interests both in the 
Mediterranean and in the Middle East.93 On November 5th, Liddell Hart wrote to King- 
Hall asking him if he had taken into “account [that while] the difference that what Italy 
might do in the Eastern Mediterranean or the Middle East could be so much more 
damaging, the danger from a hostile Spain could be fatal.”94 Yet King-Hall could not be 
won over. He refused to accept Liddell Hart’s argument that only by refusing to bring the 
agreement into force until she had withdrawn completely from Spain, would Italy be 
dissuaded from pursuing foreign ambitions inimical to British interests.95 In Liddell
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Hart’s opinion, King-Hall seemed to be accepting the inevitability of a Republican defeat
in the Civil War. On November 9th 1938, Liddell Hart wrote once more to King-Hall
hoping to convince him to adopt a more optimistic view of the situation:
even in the past we could easily have restored the situation of the Spanish 
government without committing ourselves to intervention by playing the 
German and Italian game in a mild way and ensuring the Spanish government 
had an adequate supply of munitions.96
According to Liddell Hart, if the Republic could be ensured an adequate food supply, then 
the stalemate on the ground in Spain in the late autumn and early winter could be 
maintained indefinitely. However, Liddell Hart’s interpretation of the development of the 
Civil War was far removed from the actuality of events on the ground in Spain, especially 
after the Republican defeat at the battle of the river Ebro. Also, if he had hoped to 
influence King-Hall to change tack, he was to be disappointed. On February 17th, while 
acknowledging that the failure of the policy of Non-Intervention had ensured the defeat of 
the Spanish Republican cause in Spain, King-Hall nevertheless wrote that “the impartial 
attitude of the British government might well in the long run cause Great Britain to be the 
nation to whom Spaniards would turn for help when confronted with the immense task of
, , 9 7reconstruction.
There were other opportunities available for Liddell Hart to express his concerns in the 
media. On January 23rd 1939, he wrote in the Evening Standard “for us the security of 
the sea-routes should be a reminder of the importance to us of Spain.”98 Also on February 
4th 1939, Picture Post printed an article by Liddell Hart titled ‘What Spain Means to
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Britain.’99 Earlier in October of the previous year, the American magazine Time printed 
his article ‘Spanish War Outlook.’100
The opposition of journalists towards both government policy and the support given by 
The Times did not, of course, produce a reversal of policy. Nevertheless, it certainly 
contributed to the growing public awareness of an alternative conservative view on Spain. 
Moreover, it undermined the strategy of the British government that aimed at improving 
relations with the Franco regime in the last months of the Civil War. Indeed on 
December 14th 1938, General Gomez Jordana, head of Franco’s Diplomatic Cabinet had 
written on this matter to the Duke of Alba, the Nationalist agent in London, asking why 
the British government allowed agitation on behalf of Republican Spain.101 Reference 
has already been made to the fact that in spite of the more intense lobbying of the press by 
the British government, the Daily Telegraph continued to hold reservations about Franco.
it.
In its leader on March 8 , it viewed with some scepticism the prospects of Franco turning 
towards the democracies at the end of the war: “the semi-official statements issuing from 
Burgos are none too encouraging to advice from ‘the democracies’ and their humanitarian 
manoeuvres.”102 Furthermore, it continued, “the policy of Non-Intervention however 
wise and disinterested in intention has not tended notably to earn the gratitude of the 
victorious side in the Spanish Conflict.” Press scepticism of the official view in London, 
that excellent relations could be established with the Nationalist regime, was viewed with 
concern in Burgos. As for the Nationalist authorities, it simply increased their distrust 
regarding the change of tack, which was evident in much of the British press following 
the fall of Barcelona. On February 21st, E. Keeling, the British Consul General at
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Tangier, sent to the Foreign Office in London a copy of an article written by a journalist 
in Franco’s Spain. In it, the journalist wrote, “[ajccording to the English newspapers 
victory is ours, and for that reason they have suddenly changed their tune within a day
1 mvictory has fallen into the hands of General Franco.” What is significant about the
article’s criticism of the British press is the specific focus on the conservative press at this
time. Take for instance the following: “the Daily Telegraph has suddenly awoken from
its lethargic slumbers to put its house in order as best they can in order to receive decently
the disloyal, insurgent and rebel Spaniard [Franco].” In referring to the Sunday Times,
the article read, “Scrutator has discovered overnight that his shortsightedness can be
remedied by altering the number of his spectacles.” For the Spanish journalist the attitude
of the British conservative press was cynical:
it was necessary that victory should crown the head of Franco like a visible 
and tangible aureole for the English nation to discover that Franco’s policy 
as regards Spain was the same as that of ‘Scrutator',  the Sunday Times,
Churchill, Duff Cooper and Anthony Eden [i.e.] a strong and independent 
Spain.
The warning about the harm being done to Anglo-Spanish relations by the attitude of the 
British press towards the Civil War, was taken very seriously. Two pro Franco Britons, 
Lord Walker and Wing Commander James M.P., had informed Mounsey that, following 
the British recognition of Franco, British press announcements to the effect that “his 
government would of course have to come to England for a loan”, had made a very bad 
impression on him: “our confident assumption that he would have to come to us for 
money has been enough to make him determined that on no account will he do so.”104 
Criticism of the role of the conservative press in the Civil War was also a fundamental
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theme in Observations Past and Present by Sir Leo Chiozza Money, a Member of
Parliament sympathetic towards the Nationalist cause.105 He wrote disparagingly of what
he saw as the cynical change of attitude of the British press. He declared,
[t]hese British and French press stories representing Franco to be in extremity 
were published one month before the fall of Barcelona, and two months 
before Mr. Chamberlain rose in The House of Commons to state that the Red 
‘government’ was scattered.106
Furthermore, he added,
[a]fter the conquest of Catalonia, the British press, for the most part, swung 
round as though at a given signal, and began to praise Franco and suggested 
what good friends Britain and France could be to Nationalist Spain. Our
1 0 7‘credits’ are better than Italian lives, ran the argument.
Even The Times came under attack, this was due to its failure to record the humanitarian 
aid sent by Italy to Catalonia, following the Nationalist conquest: “Not even The Times. 
published the telegram of the Alcalde [mayor] of Barcelona to the Duce thanking him for 
the ship loads of food, clothing and comforts which were so promptly sent by Italy to
10Ssuffering Catalonia.” In his book, Sir Leo was attempting to explain why British 
relations with both Italy and Nationalist Spain were poor. His conclusion over and again 
was that the press had been responsible. He wrote, “the cost of printing these [stories] 
must be enormous, but more serious is their effect in preventing a valuable friendship 
with a noble people.”109
In spite of the partisan views and the simplicity of Sir Leo’s analysis of events, his book 
does throw some light on the dilemma faced by the pro-government press in Britain, 
especially in the case of the Spanish Civil War. Even supporters of the Nationalist side
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regarded the support of pro-government papers for the recognition of Franco as a cynical 
manipulation of the British press in the closing stages of the Civil War. Moreover, by the 
end of the Civil War, the conservative consensus on Spain was in serious trouble. The 
growing concern shown by Garvin, Watson and Camrose towards German intentions in 
the wake of the Munich Settlement was reflected in the more pessimistic tone of their 
newspapers regarding developments in Spain. Their support for recognition of Franco, 
when this was clearly the policy of the government, was as cynical as it was deemed 
pragmatic
For the duration of the war the fascist dictators had over-estimated the extent to which the 
British government could exert pressure and control over the press. As we have 
repeatedly seen, neither the Nazi nor the Italian Fascist governments could understand 
that the British government simply did not have the power to impose severe restrictions 
on the manner in which newspapers reported events. The divisions within the 
conservative press over the Civil War were especially damaging to British relations with 
Germany and Italy. The reason for this was because it was to the conservative press that 
official circles in Rome and Berlin looked in order to gauge opinions and attitudes that 
they believed reflected those held by the Conservative dominated National Government.
A significant impact of the Spanish Civil War upon Britain was the failure of 
Chamberlain’s policy to secure a stable pro-government consensus even within the 
conservative press. It is true that there were other factors at work during the later thirties, 
which contributed to the growing crisis in international relations. However, the descent
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into European war in 1939 was not inevitable. It was not inevitable that the Spanish 
crisis should undermine relations between the governments of Italy and Britain. With the 
removal of Eden from office, Chamberlain was free to pursue his policy of appeasement 
of Italy, albeit at the expense of democracy in Spain. The governments of the western 
democracies and the fascist states shared an ideological revulsion towards communism. 
Indeed, such was the distaste for communism in official circles in Britain, that fascist 
power intervention in Spain was viewed as far less of a threat to British interests than the 
fear that Republican Spain would be superseded by a communist state tied to Russia. 
Yet, in spite of the common ground between Britain and Italy, the impact of the press on 
relations between them was profound. This was because of the tendency of dictator 
governments of the period to read into press comment, official attitudes of frustration, 
even hostility towards them; attitudes that the British government would not make more 
explicit through the normal diplomatic channels. In this they were mistaken. But in spite 
of repeated assurances made privately by official circles in Britain, the effect was to 
increase a sense of isolation from the democracies, and to drive Italy into closer ties with 
Germany. 1937 was a particularly crucial year. The conservative press reporting of 
Italian reverses in Spain during the spring accelerated a crystallization of the Axis 
partnership. Divisions between the western democratic powers and Italy, which the press 
had exacerbated, prevented the formation of a united front against Hitler. It is no mere 
coincidence that the second half of the Spanish Civil War coincided with an increasingly 
expansionist and reckless foreign policy by the Third Reich. In the absence of strong 
representation from abroad, the counsels of caution within Hitler’s Germany were 
ineffective in their attempts to contain the more radical elements within the Nazi regime.
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At the war’s end, Germany had emerged as a new super state dominating East and Central 
Europe. If the Spanish Civil War did not lead directly to the outbreak of the European 
conflict in September, it certainly contributed very much to the crisis in Anglo-German 
and Franco-German relations that did. In this, the role played by the conservative press 
during the Spanish Civil War was significant.
Such was the divisive impact of the Spanish Civil War on government and conservative 
press relations in Britain that there never was a common policy to which all Conservative 
politicians and every conservative newspaper could adhere. The geographical location of 
Spain at the gateway to the Atlantic and Mediterranean sea routes ensured that even 
within the supposedly pro-government press, the policy of British Non-Intervention could 
be criticized for failing satisfactorily to ensure the security both of British naval 
hegemony and of the Empire. In their way, Arthur Mann of the Yorkshire Post, and 
Liddell Hart of The Times presented a gloomy, though realistic, assessment of the aims 
and ambitions of Hitler and Mussolini, an assessment which was based substantially on 
the unfolding of events in Spain. Spain could not be sacrificed; its strategic importance 
for the French and the British would be realized in the forthcoming confrontation with the 
Axis powers. In their refusal to support the government line, these conservative 
opponents undoubtedly undermined the policy of appeasement, yet they also alerted the 
public, both at home and abroad, to the dangers posed by the foreign policies of Hitler 
and Mussolini. Both dictators aimed at altering the balance of continental power to their 
own advantage. The achieving of such ambitions would pose a clear threat to the 
predominance of Britain and France in World affairs.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE IMPACT OF THE CONSERVATIVE PRESS ON
RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND SPAIN.
One of the major tasks of this thesis has been to take issue with previous thinking 
concerning the degree of control that the government was able to exert over the press 
during the late 1930s. In Twilight o f Truth, Cockett made the assertion that when 
Chamberlain became Prime Minister in 1937, he was particularly successful at 
manipulating the press.1 He suggested also that the consequences of the tight control that 
Chamberlain was able to exert over the press “was that no alternative policy to 
appeasement could ever be consistently articulated in the British press.”2 Contemporary 
opinion was certainly that the press was failing in its primary duty, namely to alert the 
British public to the dangers of the international situation confronting the nation in the 
later thirties. In his postscript to The Press, written in the aftermath of Munich, Wickham 
Steed wrote bitterly “with one or two notable exceptions [the press] has made further 
progress on the road that leads to totalitarian servitude.”3 The following year, Denys 
Thompson was to write in Between The Lines “[t]he English Press at the moment is so 
uniform under the surface that an observer might think a dictatorship was already in 
being.”4
Suggestions have been made also that declining public confidence in the press resulted in 
a lessening of its influence during the later thirties: “most people soon came to rely on the 
radio news for a more balanced and authoritative version of World events.”5 Yet, it is 
most unlikely that the BBC or the newsreel were ever in a position to replace newspapers
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as more reliable sources of news and views on Spain to the general public. In the spring 
of 1937, when negotiations between the British government and that of Franco were 
underway, the suggestion was made in Cabinet that the BBC should be asked to reduce 
the number of its broadcasts on the Civil War. As a result of official pressure during the 
last two years of the conflict, BBC coverage of it declined.6 The newsreel companies, 
which covered the war extensively, also bowed to official pressure.7 This was significant 
considering that each newsreel had the potential capacity to reach a very wide audience. 
About two hundred copies of each newsreel were made and it was expected that each of 
these would be viewed in four or five cinemas.8 Given the close contacts that he had 
made with important figures in that industry, Sir Joseph Ball was very confident that the 
government could therefore “count on them [newsreel companies] for full support to a 
reasonable degree.”9
Unlike the BBC, which attempted to display impartiality in its reporting of the war, 
newsreels that reached a far bigger audience were not impartial. Of course the 
government, in spite of its claims of neutrality, had no objection to newsreels electing to 
put across a decided bias towards the rebel cause. British Movietone News, owned by 
Lord Rothermere, is a particularly good example of a newsreel company that consistently 
over simplified the issues at stake “by dubbing the protagonists as ‘red’ and ‘anti-red’.”10 
Hence, the newsreels, in giving an increasingly biased picture of the Civil War, were able 
to exploit a misguided faith amongst the populace in the veracity of the moving image 
over other forms of communication. As we have seen in previous chapters, it was the 
conflict of views over Axis power intervention in Spain, which was mainly responsible
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for undermining the conservative press consensus regarding the Civil War. Yet the
Nationalist authorities imposed severe restrictions on what foreign cameramen were
allowed to film. This led to a curious paradox where Gaumont British filmed the return
of a contingent of Italians who had served in Spain, whereas the same company had not
filmed the presence of either Italian or German troops in Spain because the Nationalist
censors had forbidden them to do so.11 Rene Brue, a cameraman working for Pathe
Gazette was arrested and held in Seville prison and threatened with execution by Luis
10Bolin himself, for filming the massacres at Badajoz in August 1936. Although 
newspaper correspondents with the Nationalist forces were not allowed to report on the 
presence of German and Italian troops in Spain, nor on any alleged atrocity by Nationalist 
troops, unlike the cameramen, as mentioned before, at least they had the option of driving 
to France, where, free from the gaze of the censors, they could send back their reports.
It is true that there was considerable collusion among ministers, editors and proprietors, 
based on a shared perception of the need for the British press to act in a more ‘responsible 
manner’. Yet, the extent to which even conservative newspapers were willing to respond 
to such pressures to tone down the way in which they reported the dictatorships has been 
exaggerated. This becomes evident when a detailed study is undertaken of newspaper 
representation of the Civil War in Spain. As we have seen, during the last winter of the 
Spanish conflict, the failure of the policy of appeasement resulted in a further breakdown 
in the conservative consensus. Moreover, the variety of pressures impinging upon even 
pro-government newspapers, such as the requirement to print reports from both sides of 
the conflict or the difficulty of ensuring accuracy before going to print, meant that they
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were apt to fall foul of the governments of Germany and Italy and also of Franco. To put 
it bluntly, it was not possible to achieve the level of news censorship which would satisfy 
the dictator governments, without imposing draconian censorship laws on the same level 
as those which operated in their own countries. On the topic of the Civil War, although 
the leader columns of The Times and the Sunday Times especially, attempted to display 
sensitivity to the dictators, they could not avoid conflicting with the balance of news 
appearing in the news columns.
Newspapers were, in fact, in a far stronger position to challenge the official line on Spain, 
than either the BBC or newsreels. Despite the presence of outside, governmental 
pressure, and notwithstanding the attempts at self-censorship in compliance with 
government requests, the press was still able to present a far greater diversity of views 
than either of its rivals. On a number of occasions, discussion in official circles centred 
on the desirability of the introduction of some form of press censorship. This, however, 
was always rejected as unacceptable. On March 4th 1939, William Risdale, a News 
Department official, commented in a memorandum: “newspaper interests would regard 
with very considerable suspicion any legislation introduced on the lines suggested as 
liable to interfere with the freedom of the press.”13 There was, moreover, tremendous 
public opposition to any statutory censorship of the British press. An opinion poll survey 
carried out in November 1938 found that 70% were opposed to the idea of the state 
imposing a political censorship of the British Press.14
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Popular perceptions towards the Spanish Civil War did change, with a progressive 
collapse in sympathy for the Spanish Nationalists, bringing a dramatic decline in the 
number of people who had no preference for the victory of either side. In January 1937, 
the British Institute of Public Opinion held the first opinion poll on the issue of the 
Spanish Civil War. A massive 86% were opposed to the recognition of Franco’s 
Government as the legal government in Spain. Moreover, “further polls continued to 
show a preponderance of sympathy for the [Spanish] government side.”15 For example, in 
March 1938 the results of an opinion poll on the war were as follows: 57% supported the 
Republic, 7% Franco, 36% were undecided.16 Between October 1938 and January 1939 
opinion in support of the Republic increased from 57% to 72%. Meanwhile, although by 
October 1938, support for Franco did rise by 2%, from October until January it remained 
static at 9%. The number with no preference for either side was to decline slightly by 2% 
from March 1938, reaching a figure of 34% in October. However, by January of the 
following year this had sharply declined to 19%.17 By the latter phases of the War, there 
was substantial support for the Republic even among Conservative voters. When the 
results of the British Institute’s latest poll were analyzed further, it was found that “a 
majority of Conservative voters - 76 per cent of those with a preference were on the side 
of the Spanish government.”18
It has been claimed that newspapers were out of step with public opinion on international 
affairs, and that the public was not beguiled by the false optimism that was prevalent in 
most of the press during Chamberlain’s premiership.19 Yet it seems an inescapable 
conclusion that the shift in opinion on the Spanish Civil War, in particular the rise in
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sympathy for the Spanish Republic, was linked to the way in which the media presented 
the conflict to the British public. In their presenting of the images of modem warfare as it 
was carried out in Spain, all forms of the media in Britain had an impact in shaping and 
changing popular perceptions of the conflict. Even though ownership of much of the 
industry was concentrated in the hands of those who claimed to be either neutral or 
sympathetic towards the Nationalists, they had little control over the manner in which 
such images were received. The irony was that media presentation of the war frequently 
had the unintended effect of increasing popular sympathy for the Republican cause. Of all
the forms of media, the press was in a particularly strong position to do this, precisely
00because of its independence from outside control.
The conservative newspapers, regardless of whether their editorials promulgated the 
virtues of non-partisan Non-Intervention, made a significant contribution to this change in 
popular attitudes. Katharine, Duchess of Atholl, the Conservative MP dubbed the ‘red 
duchess’ for her championing of the cause of the Spanish Republic, was, in the early 
months of the war, very much influenced by what she read in the newspapers. In 
particular, the reports in the Daily Telegraph detailing the arrival of German and Italian 
aeroplanes to assist the rebels, convinced her that Franco was dependent on the Axis and 
that a win for him would be a blow to British strategic interests.21 Henry Page Croft, the 
right wing Conservative complained of what he saw as the pro-Republican tendencies of
British newspapers regardless of whether they were left, liberal or conservative in
00outlook. It is not surprising, therefore, that there should be increasing numbers of 
readers of conservative newspapers developing sympathy for the Republic. This was in
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marked contrast to the line being peddled in The Times leaders of the desirability of 
neutrality towards the conflict. As for Dawson himself, his privately held sympathy for 
the Nationalists never wavered. In a letter dated August 1940 he expressed this clearly to 
the British ambassador to Spain, Sir Samuel Hoare. Dawson wrote, “The Franco regime 
has always had my sympathy and support.”23 It would appear that the carefully crafted 
leaders in The Times had only limited influence in moulding the opinion of Conservative 
voters towards the conflict in Spain. A PEP survey on the press carried out in 1938 
would suggest this was indeed was the case. The survey concluded that “the leading 
article was seen or read by about half the readers of a national morning newspaper, and 
read completely by about one third.”24 Although it observed that “reader interest was 
highest in class newspapers”, it would still appear that the overall influence of these 
articles was limited. Moreover, reader interest declined as the day wore on. The same 
report concluded that for the London evening press, “more readers ignored the leader and 
fewer read it completely.” This is especially significant given that the function of the 
leader column was to express the view of the paper, and attempt thereby to mould public 
opinion. The findings of the PEP report found some support in a later survey carried out 
by Mass Observation in 1949. At that time, whilst the readership of The Times was 
considered too small for a statistical result, the survey revealed that few readers liked or 
even read the editorial column of their paper. In the following list of conservative 
newspapers the numbers who admitted to reading the editorials are represented as a 
percentage of the total number of readers: the Daily Telegraph, 9%; the Daily Mail, 24%; 
the Daily Express, 24%. The same survey found that only 22% of the readers of the 
Sunday Times, and 3% of the readers of the Observer liked the editorial.
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This survey, although carried out ten years after the Civil War, throws some light on why, 
in spite of the intense interest shown in that war, the divergence of opinion between 
readers and the official view of the paper did not produce a more widespread conflict 
between the papers and their public. The indications are that the majority of the 
readership was hardly aware that any difference in viewpoint existed. During the later 
thirties, the circulation of the leading conservative newspapers continued to increase. In 
fact, in the course of 1938, the circulation of the quality press grew more than that of 
other newspapers. At the time PEP concluded, “the continued daily circulation of the 
eight principal class newspapers during the past few months apparently for the first time 
in history reached approximately one million.”26 When considering this statistic, it must 
be remembered that the bulk of the ‘class newspapers’ was, indeed, conservative.
Such was the public perception of the Civil War that it resulted in a great deal of 
voluntary activity in support of the Spanish Republic. Most of the practical support 
generated in Britain in aid of the Republic was of a humanitarian kind: “it was to become 
the most widespread and the most representative mass movement in Britain since the 
mid-nineteenth century and the most outstanding example of international solidarity in 
British History.”27 ‘Aid Spain’ Committees dedicated to humanitarian relief sprang up all 
over the country. The intense outburst of humanitarian sympathy and support in aid of 
the Republic was, of course, to prove an embarrassment to the British government 
seeking to improve relations with the Nationalist authorities. The evacuation of Basque 
children to Britain in 1937, for example, was opposed by the Nationalist Government,
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which sought their repatriation. Moreover, at the end of the war, public pressure mounted 
on the government to rescue large numbers of Spanish Republicans who were at grave 
risk once Franco had completed his conquest of Republican territory. This again was 
something, which of course, the British government was most unwilling to do. When the 
matter was discussed in Cabinet, Chamberlain remarked that “such action would amount 
to intervention.”28 Although public pressure could not force the government to alter its 
policy, it did impose difficulties for the government in its effort to improve relations with 
the Nationalist government after the war. Early in April 1939, Halifax attempted to 
persuade Clement Attlee, the leader of the parliamentary opposition, to moderate his 
comments on the situation in Spain. Halifax’s lack of faith in his ability to win over 
either the political opposition or the press was revealed clearly in the following remark: 
“we must hope that Spain may gradually become less interesting to politicians and
   >>29press.
As Halifax had hoped, once the Civil War was over, Spanish issues featured less 
prominently in either the news columns or in the editorials. Particularly striking at this
tVitime was the absence of any detailed account of atrocities. On April 12 1939, Philby, 
The Times correspondent, wrote to Ralph Deakin, his superior at Printing House Square, 
advising him “it would be best not to refer to police work or other horrors in the headlines 
or m the cross headings.” Philby was thus aware of the atrocities, as also was Eugene 
De Caux, The Times correspondent in Madrid during the Civil War. On February 13th, 
De Caux wrote informing Deakin of a massacre committed by Nationalist Troops at Sta. 
Coloma de Queralt, in which 250 men, women and children had been massacred by
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machine guns.31 The government, too, had clear evidence of the atrocities being 
committed after the War. On June 6th, for example, the ambassador, Sir Maurice 
Peterson wrote to Halifax giving details of the number of executions being carried out in 
various parts of Spain, with the ominous addition that “it is generally agreed that the 
actual number of executions which have taken place greatly exceeds these figures.”
The failure of the British press to refer to the mass executions following the fall of 
Madrid had as much to do with the difficulties of reporting in Spain as with any desire to 
dampen down criticism of the Franco regime in the interests of Anglo-Spanish relations. 
Indeed, Philby, in a letter to Deakin, written on August 1st 1939, summed up the problem 
for journalists working in post war Spain: “there has been no corresponding relaxation of 
the censorship. Therefore the scope for journalistic work in Spain has been drastically 
reduced.”33 A further factor, which affected correspondents such as Philby, was, of 
course, the extent of the difficulty being experienced by British residents in Spain. Sir 
Maurice Peterson, in his autobiography, was to refer to the suspicion of the Nationalist 
authorities towards the British community: “the mere circumstance of British citizenship 
was enough to make its holder gravely suspect to the authorities.”34 As a result, British 
subjects were at risk of arbitrary imprisonment.35
In August 1939 Charles Peake, of the News Department, commended the patience of the 
press with regard to Spain. He expressed his appreciation of the difficulties which British 
newspapers faced, confronted as they were by a general lack of co-operation from the 
Spanish authorities. He commended “the considerable caution and care” demonstrated by
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British agencies and correspondents “in the difficult task of handling Spanish news.” In 
reality, Peake’s praise was a misleading assessment of the reaction of the British press as 
a whole towards the Franco regime in the post war period. Even conservative newspapers 
could be critical towards the new regime in power, in spite of the difficulties that this 
would pose for Anglo-Spanish relations. On April 3rd, for example, the Daily Express 
had published, as its main article, a piece written by its staff reporter, O.D. Gallagher, 
recently expelled for the second time by the Nationalist authorities. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that Gallagher was to write disparagingly of the Nationalists’ food relief of the 
capital: “it is not difficult to imagine Madrid’s disappointment when Santa Claus in the 
face of Franco’s conciliation of the population department brought them [madrilenos] 
loads of lentils and rice.” Unusual for any British national newspaper at the time, the 
article was open in its description of the post war terror in Spain: “[d]eath, it was 
announced, was the penalty for all offences from high treason and insulting the 
Nationalist military down to listening to broadcasts from countries unfriendly to 
Franco.”37
In the spring and summer of 1939, confidence began to dwindle in the government’s 
publicly declared assertions that Franco would be no threat to Anglo-French interests. 
This deterioration in public confidence was exacerbated by the appearance in the 
conservative press of articles expressing unease at the new regime. Such articles were 
written with the expressed aim of influencing opinion. For instance, the lead article in 
the Daily Express on May 4 , raised doubts about the stability of Franco’s hold over 
Spain. The correspondent, Sir Anthony Jenkinson, went as far as to pose the question,
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“will General Franco last for only one year?” 38 Within a number of conservative papers, 
there was unease also at the continued presence of Axis power troops in post Civil War 
Spain. On May 21st the Observer commented, “until it can be supplanted by reason, the 
essential purpose of Italian troops in Spain is the encirclement of France on each of her 
three land frontiers.”39 In early June, the editorial of the Yorkshire Post concluded, “Spain 
is being used by the Axis powers as a depot for material to be available to them if they 
should desire to employ the Peninsula as a basis for warlike operations against France and 
Britain.”40 In expressing their concerns so openly, these papers had abandoned any 
attempt at restraint and were in fact completely disregarding the likely impact on Anglo- 
Spanish relations.
The Times, and less consistently, the Daily Telegraph, whose leader columns supported 
the British government line on Spain, were not immune from the charge that, they too,
i t .
were guilty of undermining Anglo-Spanish relations. On April 12 1939, the Daily
Telegraph, for example, printed an article by its diplomatic correspondent, which referred 
to the irritation in British government circles at the continued delay in the return of Italian 
troops to Italy now that the war in Spain was over. The correspondent wrote, “[i]t cannot 
be understood why it should be necessary to retain tens of thousands of troops in the 
peninsula.”41 On April 14th, the Daily Telegraph reported on the tension between Britain 
and the ‘New Spain’ over the matter of Gibraltar, as a result of which, according to the 
correspondent: “[t]he frontier is now manned day and night by British troops in full war 
kit.”42 The Times, more so than the Daily Telegraph, attempted to play down the 
significance of political developments in the post war Spain, which were increasingly
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turning the Franco Regime away from the democracies and towards the Axis. 
Nevertheless, it too printed reports in the news columns that made clear the diplomatic 
tension between the democracies and the new Spanish government. On April 12th, for 
example, a correspondent stated that Italian reinforcements had been arriving at Cadiz.43 
On April 14th, an article appeared, written by the correspondent at Hendaye. He wrote 
that, in spite of the desire for peace among Spaniards, “report[s] that Spaniards are being 
enrolled in volunteer camps for service commitments to Italy are perhaps more serious 
than has been realized.”44
The difference between newspapers such as The Times and the Daily Telegraph on the 
one hand, and the Yorkshire Post on the other, was that the leader columns of the former 
made no mention of articles in the news columns pointing to the danger to Britain of the 
new regime in Spain. In fact, from April 1939, Spain ceased to feature in the leader 
columns of both The Times and the Daily Telegraph. Thus, it could indeed be argued that 
these newspapers were, as Charles Peake had noted, exercising a form of restraint in 
particularly difficult circumstances. However, what was regarded in Britain as a form of 
self-imposed restraint to please the sensitivities of a dictator government, failed to 
impress the Nationalist authorities. The Times, for example, did not fare well in the New 
Spain'. As Philby was to write to Deakin in April, “[a]s far as can be seen, the acceptance 
of Spanish censorship conditions by The Times during the last years has not altered the 
official attitude towards The Times as an institution.”45 Indeed, following the end of the 
war, De Caux was not permitted to return as special correspondent to Madrid. Earlier, in 
February, he had written to Deakin, referring to the suspicion with which he was held in
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Nationalist circles. He wrote that Franco’s “police will not favour a correspondent with 
so many contacts. They will naturally prefer a greener hand.”46 No doubt the failure of 
self-imposed restraint to produce any tangible benefit influenced Dawson when he wrote 
to Sir Samuel Hoare in 1940: “it [Spain] is, unlike Portugal, very difficult for The Times 
to help. The Franco regime has been extremely short sighted about English 
correspondents and particularly about De Caux.”47
Post war relations between Britain and Spain were poor, partly as a result of the way in 
which British newspapers had reported the war. Yet, the realization of this fact by 
conservative newspapers in general did not prevent them from continuing to undermine 
relations once the fighting had stopped. Thus the restraint that was exercised by only a 
few newspapers such as The Times availed little if most other papers failed to refrain 
from expressing frustration and concern with the new regime. Also, this was to create 
problems for the British government, in terms of domestic as well as foreign policy. In 
June, for example, Halifax predicted that press coverage of Italian arms being left behind 
in Spain was likely to exacerbate the opposition within Parliament towards aspects of 
Spanish policy 48 Thus, the divisive impact of the Civil War on British political opinion 
was evident even after the fighting in Spain had ceased.
Abroad, in Nationalist Spain, Sir Maurice Peterson was made plainly aware of the 
irritation of the Spanish Government at the way in which it was being represented in the 
British press. Concerning an interview he had with Serrano Suner, Sir Maurice wrote, 
“[h]is Excellency [gave] lengthy tirade against the English press which, he mentioned,
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could not be regarded as uncontrolled in the sphere of foreign affairs and Imperial 
interests.”49 Clearly, the Spanish Minister of the Interior, like Hitler and Mussolini before 
him, was assuming too much regarding the ability of the British government to control 
the press. As in the earlier case of Germany and Italy, this lack of understanding was to 
sour relations between Nationalist Spain and the National Government that, ironically, by 
its policy of Non-Intervention, had done so much to assist the victory of Franco. The 
futility of the policy of self-imposed restraint practised by most of the conservative press 
towards the Spanish Civil War and its aftermath was pointed out by the Yorkshire Post
tlileader, ‘Spain And The Axis’ on March 28 1939. The leader challenged the justification 
for dampening down criticism of the dictators. In its view such policy did not improve 
relations but was counterproductive: “we shall recover respect, and may later ensure 
Spanish good will, by demonstrating now that we never were mere cowards and have 
ceased to be fools.”50
It was because the Spanish Civil War occurred at a time when newspapers were still the 
most influential form of mass media available, that competition arose between various 
interest groups seeking to influence the way newspapers reported. As demonstrated so 
convincingly by Cockett in Twilight o f Truth, the press was also an arena in which the pro 
and anti-appeasers vied with each other to win the hearts and minds of the British 
electorate. Yet, while there was, at the time, general agreement that newspapers were 
influential, there was a misconception of the ways in which newspapers managed to 
influence their readers. The notion that it was the leader column, especially in the so 
called ‘class papers’, which was most influential in forming opinion was a
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misinterpretation of the influence which this feature actually had. Although as early as 
1938, PEP had published evidence that suggested that leader articles were not as 
influential as had been assumed, it did not seem to change attitudes. Indeed, this report 
was given very little consideration in the press.51 This lack of interest by the newspapers 
was in sharp contrast to their response towards earlier PEP surveys. When Italy, Portugal, 
Germany or Nationalist Spain complained at their treatment in the British press, their 
anger was often directed not at leader comment, but by individual articles in the news 
columns. In spite of this, and in spite of the evidence of the PEP report, the leader 
column remained the arena chosen by the supporters and opponents of government 
foreign policy, in order to promulgate their views to the general public. Clearly, those 
who wished to use the press to fight the contest over British policy had chosen the wrong 
arena. Thus conservative papers could not be dismissed as “mere fools and cowards”. 
This was because these newspapers were able to represent a greater diversity of views 
than most contemporaries realized. As has been demonstrated in chapter one, a myriad of 
competing pressures, especially the need to work to a very tight time schedule greatly 
reduced the ability of editors to oversee the content of their papers. In general, 
newspapers would become aware of the harmful effect of a particular article on 
international relations only after it had been printed. There simply was not time, on a 
continual basis at least, for close inspection before going to print. The pro-government 
conservative newspapers, since they lacked the consensus maintained by the liberal and 
left press, fuelled a greater diversity of opinion on Spain. Whereas the opposition press 
was more or less unanimous in its opposition to the Spanish policy of the National 
Government, only in conservative papers were readers presented with substantial
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evidence upon which to form varied opinions on Spain. Thus from reading the same 
newspaper, a reader could develop sympathy for either the Republican or the Nationalist 
cause.
This study of the relationship between the government and the press during the Spanish 
Civil War demonstrates quite clearly that the press, far from being “a reasonably tame
cj t
creature which could be manipulated” actually resisted government influence. This 
resistance took a variety of forms. The dissidence shown by the opposition press and the 
independent newsletters represented a conscious attempt to oppose the government. Yet, 
as far as government and press relations were concerned, this was only a part of the 
problem. A more serious difficulty was that posed by those newspapers, which were 
loyal to the government. By simply exercising their democratic right to ‘publish and be 
damned’, they managed both to incur the antagonism of the dictator governments and to 
turn British public opinion against them. The irony is that there was no intention of 
harming Britain’s relations with these regimes. Nevertheless, they unwittingly 
undermined the government’s efforts at appeasement. In the event, the conservative 
press, despite its closer links with the dominant party in government, proved to be of only 
limited malleability. The press as a whole remained a loose cannon that the government, 
despite its best efforts, was never able to restrain.
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45 TNL Archive, Deakin file; Philby to R. Deakin, April 12th 1939.
46 TNL Archive, ‘Internal Memos’; E.G. De Caux to R. Deakin, February 23rd 1939. 
Moreover, Sir Maurice Peterson was greatly concerned at the decision of the 
Nationalist authorities to expel De Caux, see Peterson, Both Sides o f the Curtain, 
p.184.
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48 CAB 23/99, Cabinet minutes, June 7th 1939, conclusion seven.
49 PRO, FO 371 24160, W708/5985/41, April 20th 1939.
50 ‘Spain And The Axis’, Yorkshire Post, March 28th 1939, p. 10.
51 Political and Economic Planning, How the Press Report was Received, broadsheet 
number 120, April 19th 1938, p.12.
Jill Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, p. 196. This note has 
been previously cited in chapter one, see note 21.
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Conclusion.
Within the context of the Spanish Civil War, this thesis has aimed to bring together 
two themes that have been previously separated in the historiography of the British 
press in the 1930s. The first is the way in which international relations were reported 
in British newspapers and the second is the pressure exerted upon the press from 
without. Previous studies have tended to focus on one or other of these. As a result, 
they have failed to explain why, in the face of so much persistent, often intense 
official pressure, even those newspapers closely allied to the Conservative dominated 
government of the day managed, in the view of official and ministerial circles in 
Britain, to report in a way that acutely irritated the dictator regimes.
Contemporaries who warned the public of the duplicity of much of the press during 
the later thirties had failed to realise the complexity of the relationship between the 
government and the press, and the fluidity of newspaper allegiance towards a 
particular point of view advocated by official sources. Newspapers were not merely 
the semi-official mouthpieces for the government of the day. Indeed, during the 
Spanish Civil War, the conservative press engaged in a dialogue with the government. 
Analyses of the leader columns of these journals suggest that very strongly. It is 
shown in their often ambiguous or even contradictory nature. On one hand support 
was being offered to the official line, but what was also being expressed was the 
limitation of the paper’s tolerance towards what it considered to be the inactivity of 
the government. Even modem historians appear to have taken at face value the 
damning indictments of the supposedly compliant press made by Wickham Steed in 
1938.1
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There is a consensus among historians that the Spanish Civil War had a particularly 
divisive impact upon British society as a whole. However, there has been no 
acknowledgement of the destabilising effect of the war on Conservative circles. In 
fact, it would be quite wrong to assume, as has been the tendency among historians, 
that opinion was divided along predictably partisan lines. The most detailed study to 
date of Conservative attitudes was made nearly thirty years ago by Denys Thompson 
in The Anti Appeasers. In the chapter devoted to the Civil War, he asserted that the 
Conservative parliamentary Party was more united on this than on any other issue of 
foreign policy.2 However, as I have attempted to demonstrate throughout this thesis, 
conservatism was more than the party in Parliament. It represented a broad-based 
coalition, of which the extra-parliamentary wing represented in the press and in the 
constituencies was a vitally important part. In the absence of a coherent ideology 
binding the various parts of this coalition together, newspapers had a vital role to play 
in interpreting the Conservative world view, independently of direction from party 
headquarters. In fact, in the years preceding the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, 
independent conservatism emerged as a distinct force within the press.
The British Conservative movement was particularly prone to division over the 
Spanish Civil War, an issue that was as controversial as it was long lasting. As we 
have seen, the attempt to put pressure on conservative newspapers to adopt the official 
line on Spain served to sharpen the political debate over what conservatism meant. 
The greater the official pressure on proprietors and editors to conform, the greater was 
the likelihood of serious conflict developing between conservative newspapers and 
the Conservative political hierarchy. That is why, during the course of 1938-9, 
opposition was particularly strong from those two newspapers that were especially
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under pressure to toe a particular line; namely the Yorkshire Post and Truth. Yet there 
has been no previous consideration of how the Civil War highlighted the instability of 
conservatism as an ideology. From the beginning, ministers and officials realised that 
any consensus of support for Non-Intervention, even from its natural allies within the 
press, depended on newspapers upholding the illusion, created in official circles, that 
Britain was neutral. In short, newspapers were required to down play any partisan 
attachment they might have for the rival factions in Spain. But, as we have seen, this 
was not possible even from within the ranks of the conservative press. Moreover, the 
Civil War had a profound impact on the meaning of independent conservatism. 
During the premiership of Baldwin, whose political leanings were towards the centre- 
left of the party, independent conservatism was represented strongly in the right wing 
press.3 Furthermore, it was ideological; overt support for Franco reflected the hostility 
of the right towards the supposed communist threat. However, Chamberlain who, as 
Prime Minister, attempted to impose a narrower, more ideological consensus on the 
press, was indirectly responsible for a redefinition of independent conservatism. In 
effect, it lost its ideological identity, as the new opponents found common cause with 
the liberal/left wing opposition against the policy of Chamberlain.4
Circles close to the government’s way of thinking had correctly assumed that the way 
in which British newspapers reported, particularly on the actions of the fascist 
dictators, had a direct bearing on Britain’s relations with them. The relationship 
between the government and the conservative press during the years of the Spanish 
Civil War highlights the dilemma faced by the Conservative political establishment. 
It was not possible to achieve an agreed voluntary suppression of news and views, 
which would satisfy those governments Britain was trying to appease. The effect of
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this on international relations has been a neglected area. In fact, the dictators, used to 
nothing but unstinting praise from their own papers, could not accept even mild 
criticism in the British press as anything other than officially sanctioned. In this, of 
course, the role of conservative newspapers was particularly important, given the 
widely accepted view abroad that they were particularly close to government circles 
in Britain. Attempts to influence the media to support what was in effect a partisan 
line on Spain, favourable to the government of the day, raises issues of the role of the 
state in a democratic society, where the freedom of expression is a vital component of 
the open and democratic dialogue between government and people. However, the 
governments of Baldwin and Chamberlain were not averse to attempting authoritarian 
methods to bring the media to heel. In the wake of the Munich conference, Central 
Office, by exerting pressure through the constituency associations, brought pressure to 
bear on those persistent opponents of appeasement in the parliamentary party.5 
Therefore, only from within its press could a Conservative critique of national policy 
be mounted with any consistency. The assumption has been that the level of support 
that newspapers gave to Chamberlain demonstrated them to be increasingly out of 
step with their readers. Yet, the persistence of criticism of Spanish policy, even 
during the months following the ending of the war, suggests this was not the case. 
Newspapers reflected the shift in attitudes among the conservative constituency as a 
whole towards the Civil War. Conservative political pre-eminence in the 1930s was 
based on maintaining its appeal as a party of the centre ground rather than tied to a 
narrow ideology.6 Support for Franco was always associated with factions on the 
ideological and right wing of the party, which viewed the struggle as another example 
of the ongoing fight between left and right. Support for the Spanish Republic was to 
become increasingly acceptable in moderate conservative circles because it was non-
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ideological. Yet the survival of the Spanish Republic could even be equated with 
aspects of British nationalism associated with right wing attitudes, tenets such as 
defence of national prestige and of maritime supremacy, the security of the Empire 
and even Britain’s status as a great power.7. Hence, the consensus maintained by the 
government and its press allies was attacked precisely because, in the view of the 
independent conservative press, it failed to appreciate fully the real threat to national 
and imperial security. Indeed, as a consequence of the Civil War the political division 
between left and right became blurred. This was because the more strongly pro- 
Republican liberal and left press also attacked Chamberlain for a weak foreign policy 
on Spain.
In conclusion, a factor that previous studies have failed to address is the potential for 
damage possessed by conservative newspapers, for they too managed to offend the 
sensitivities of the dictators. As Chamberlain himself acknowledged, his policy of 
appeasement stood far greater chance of success with Mussolini than with Hitler, e, 
His own political preferences made him confident of establishing very good relations 
with Franco. Yet, following the end of the Civil War, neither Franco nor Mussolini 
was well disposed towards Britain. Why should this be so, given Chamberlain’s 
willingness to tolerate blatant Italian transgressions of the Anglo-Italian and Non- 
Intervention agreements, actions which had done so much to aid the victory of 
Franco’s cause in Spain? The answer would lie in no small part to the role played by 
the British conservative press and its impact on international relations. Why could not 
even the conservative newspapers co-operate more effectively in the task of 
appeasement? Indeed, these newspapers showed less caution, even sympathy towards 
both Italy, especially in 1937, and Nationalist Spain, than towards either Portugal or
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Nazi Germany. But the extent of the military intervention of Italy on behalf of its 
Spanish protege and the manner in which Franco fought the war made it much harder
Q
for newspapers even to appear sympathetic to either.
Apologists for the role of the British government during the Civil War have asserted 
that if the Republic had won the Civil War then, after the fall of France, the Germans 
would have invaded Spain and closed the Mediterranean to British shipping. 
However, what this argument fails to consider are the potential political ramifications 
for Italy and Germany in the defeat of the Nationalist cause to which they had 
committed their regimes. An invading German army would have discovered, as had 
Napoleon a century earlier, that Spain is a most difficult country to subjugate. If three 
years of civil war had exhausted that country materially, it had also created a huge 
number of experienced war veterans. An attempted conquest of Spain would have 
extended German commitments in the west, thus diverting resources from the central 
goal in Hitlerite expansionist policy. This was the conquest of the Soviet Union, 
which by 1939 was surpassing Germany in terms of military-industrial capacity. By 
June 1940 the implications of the failure of Chamberlain’s policy towards Franco and 
Mussolini were finally being realised. With the fall of France imminent, Italy at last 
joined the war on the side of Germany. With German domination of continental 
Europe secure, Spanish neutrality under Franco, even after three years of civil war, 
was in doubt. The nightmare scenario which had been played out in the leader 
columns of the Yorkshire Post and Truth, which echoed the fears expressed earlier by 
Liddell-Hart and by even the cautious King-Hall, appeared to be unfolding.
360
1 Wickham Steed, The Press.
Neville Thompson, The Anti Appeasers, Conservative Opposition To Appeasement 
In The 1930s (Oxford, 1971), p.116
3 The ‘New Conservatism’ as defined by Baldwin in the mid 1920s reflected the 
party’s traditional late 19th century Disraelian ‘one nation’ reformist traditions; 
hence the emphasis was on transcending class differences, see Stuart Ball, The 
Conservative Party And British Politics 1902-1951 (New York, 1995), p.80.
4 The divisive impact of the Civil War on the conservative press has been 
considered especially in chapter two.
5 The precarious position of the Conservative Members of Parliament who opposed 
Chamberlain is summed up by Thompson; he asserted that but for the outbreak of 
war in September 1939, they would have most likely have been deselected by their 
constituency associations in advance of the General Election that was likely to be 
held that year; N. Thompson, The Anti Appeasers, p.200.
6 However, what has not been considered are the implications in the changes to the 
Conservative constituency in the years prior to 1936 on undermining consensus 
towards the Spanish Civil War. Historians have tended to assume that conservative 
attitudes towards the conflict were overwhelmingly dictated by narrow right wing, 
ideological considerations.
7 Within the ranks of the Conservative parliamentary Party, one of the staunchest 
advocates of the Spanish Republic was the Duchess of Atholl. What made her 
standpoint surprising was her former advocacy of right wing causes in foreign and 
imperial affairs.
Q
Even though, on the whole, the British conservative press treated Germany with 
more caution. The view of the British ambassador was “it [the press] handicapped 
my attempts in 1937 and 1938 to contribute to the improvement of Anglo-German 
relations..”: Neville Henderson, Failure O f A Mission: Berlin 1937-1939 
(London, 1940), p.65.
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